Abstract In order to be a general theory of human cognition, the theory of mental models needs to accommodate a variety of forms of reasoning in addition to deduction. The mental model theory of induction is a crucial step in establishing generality. After suggesting that the theory of mental models can also account for abduction and analogy, the paper points out that inductive performance is likely to be constrained both by the nature of the representation used and by strategic factors. (...) Since human cognition involves the communication of arguments, a final section explores the relationship between the theory of mental models and the notion of an argument. It proposes that models can contain tokens of inductive arguments which can be referred to in the course of other arguments. (shrink)

In 1983, Dr. J. Robin Warren and Dr. Barry Marshall reported finding a new kind of bacteria in the stomachs of people with gastritis. Warren and Marshall were soon led to the hypothesis that peptic ulcers are generally caused, not by excess acidity or stress, but by a bacterial infection. Initially, this hypothesis was viewed as preposterous, and it is still somewhat controversial. In 1994, however, a U. S. National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Panel concluded that infection appears to (...) play an important contributory role in the pathogenesis of peptic ulcers, and recommended that antibiotics be used in their treatment. Peptic ulcers are common, affecting up to 10% of the population, and evidence has mounted that many ulcers can be cured by eradicating the bacteria responsible for them. (shrink)

We focus on Karmiloff-Smith's Representational redescription model, arguing that it poses some problems concerning the architecture of a redescribing system. To discuss the topic, we consider the implicit/explicit dichotomy and the relations between natur al language and the language of thought. We argue that the model regards how knowledge is employed rather than how it is represented in the system.

Future professionals should be prepared for scientific reasoning, i.e., to construct and apply scientific knowledge, in order to analyze and solve problems in their professional practice. Yet, future practitioners’ scientific reasoning skills often seem to be deficient when solving practical problems. This dissertation explores to what extent collaboration may foster the engagement of future practitioners in scientific reasoning: i.e., in epistemic processes and in referring to scientific content knowledge. Therefore, two studies were conducted to compare collaborative and individual problem solving (...) of pre-service teachers regarding their scientific reasoning. Study 1 investigates the effect of group heterogeneity with respect to problem solving scripts on scientific reasoning. Study 2 explores to what extent Epistemic Network Analysis can serve as a methodological approach for measuring scientific reasoning. As part of Study 1, pre-service teachers solved an educational problem either as individuals or as pairs. Collaboration showed a mixed effect on scientific reasoning processes: pairs engaged more in explaining and reasoning about the problem and drew more conclusions, while individuals engaged more in generating solutions. Additional analyses showed that the more heterogeneous pairs were regarding their members’ problem solving scripts the more they engaged in hypothesizing and evaluating evidence and the less they engaged in generating solutions. Finally, pairs less often referred to scientific content than individuals did during problem solving. Study 2 further analyzed the data by applying Epistemic Network Analysis. This method has the advantage of analyzing patterns of connections between epistemic processes, i.e., epistemic networks of scientific reasoning. The central epistemic process for pairs was evidence evaluation, which they frequently used in combination with hypothesizing and communicating and scrutinizing. On the other hand, the most characteristic process in individuals’ scientific reasoning was solution generation, which very often co-occurred with hypothesizing and evidence evaluation. The overall results indicate that if the aim is to develop a more reflective understanding of the problem, future practitioners should collaborate with each other, especially in heterogeneous settings. However, they should be supported to share knowledge regarding scientific theories and evidence as well as to reach a mutual understanding on the problem after a certain time so as to be able to have the capacity of generating solutions. Moreover, the different effects of collaboration on the process and content aspects of scientific reasoning imply that scientific reasoning might not be a unidimensional construct, and its process and content levels should be differentiated in future research. A further important methodological implication is that the process aspect of scientific reasoning can be analyzed as a network of interconnected skills and such analysis might bring more explanatory value than the mere reliance on frequencies of occurrences of isolated activities. (shrink)

As mentioned in French secondary school official texts, teaching science implies teaching scientific process. This poses the problem of how to teach epistemology, as traditional science teaching is mostly dogmatic and based on contents. Previous studies show that pupils, science students and teachers mostly own positivist and realist spontaneous conceptions of science and scientific discovery. Here, we present the evaluation of the didactic impact of a network game, Eleusis+Nobel, on third year biology students who aim at becoming teachers. This cards (...) game, based on a Popperian epistemology, has been designed to reproduce the scientific discovery process in a community. In the limits of our study, results obtained with classical social psychology tools indicate that students who played this game specifically assimilated the subjective dimension of knowledge and the role of the community in their conception of science, on the contrary to negative control students, who did not play. (shrink)

The term conceptual simulation refers to a type of everyday reasoning strategy commonly called “what if” reasoning. It has been suggested in a number of contexts that this type of reasoning plays an important role in scientific discovery; however, little direct evidence exists to support this claim. This article proposes that conceptual simulation is likely to be used in situations of informational uncertainty, and may be used to help scientists resolve that uncertainty. We conducted two studies to investigate the relationship (...) between conceptual simulation and informational uncertainty. Study 1 was an in vivo study of expert scientists; the results suggest that scientists do use conceptual simulation in situations of informational uncertainty, and that they use conceptual simulation to make inferences from their data using the analogical reasoning process of alignment by similarity detection. Study 2 experimentally manipulated experts' level of uncertainty and provides further support for the hypothesis that conceptual simulation is more likely to be used in situations of informational uncertainty. Finally, we discuss the relationship between conceptual simulation and other types of reasoning using qualitative mental models. (shrink)

A productive way to think about imagistic mental models of physical systems is as though they were sources of quasi‐empirical evidence. People depict or imagine events at those points in time when they would experiment with the world if possible. Moreover, just as they would do when observing the world, people induce patterns of behavior from the results depicted in their imaginations. These resulting patterns of behavior can then be cast into symbolic rules to simplify thinking about future problems and (...) to reveal higher order relationships. Using simple gear problems, three experiments explored the occasions of use for, and the inductive transitions between, depictive models and number‐based rules. The first two experiments used the convergent evidence of problem‐solving latencies, hand motions, referential language and error data to document the initial use of a model, the induction of rules from the modeling results, and the fallback to a model when a rule fails. The third experiment explored the intermediate representations that facilitate the induction of rules from depictive models. The strengths and weaknesses of depictive modeling and more analytic systems of reasoning are delineated to motivate the reasons for these transitions. (shrink)

Humans appear to follow normative rules of inductive reasoning in "premise diversity tasks" that is, they know that dissimilar rather than similar evidence is better for generalising hypotheses. In three experiments, we use a "hypothesis limitation task" to compare a related inductive reasoning skill knowing how to limit hypotheses by using a negative test strategy. Participants are told that one category member has some property (e.g. Dogs have a merocrine gland) and are asked what evidence they would test to ensure (...) that either all (generalisation) or only (limitation) category members have that property (e.g. All/Only mammals have merocrine glands; tests: wolf, bull, crocodile). Despite participants' reluctance to use negative tests in the Wason 2-4-6 task and other reasoning tasks, participants do use normatively correct negative tests in the hypothesis limitation task as often as they use diverse positive tests in the premise diversity task. Moreover, when given a hypothesis limitation task before a rule evaluation task (similar to the 2-4-6 task), the use of negative tests increases. Thus, when testing hypotheses, people can and do use the right kind of test strategy for the task. (shrink)

Why does one need creativity? On a personal level, improvisation with available resources is needed for online coping with unforeseen environmental stimuli when existing knowledge and apparent action strategies do not work. On a cultural level, the exploitation of existing cultural means and norms for the deliberate production of novel and valuable artifacts is a basis for cultural and technological development and extension of human action possibilities across various domains. It is less clear, however, how creativity develops and how exactly (...) one arrives at generating new action possibilities and producing multiple alternative action strategies using familiar objects. In this theoretical paper, we first consider existing accounts of the creative process in the Alternative Uses Task and then present an alternative interpretation, drawing on sociocultural views and an embodied cognition approach. We explore similarities between the psychological processes underlying the generation of new uses in the Alternative Uses Task and children’s pretend play. We discuss possible cognitive mechanisms and speculate how the generation of new action possibilities for common objects in pretend play can be related to adults’ ability to generate new action strategies associated with object use. Implications for creativity development in humans and embodied artificial agents are discussed. (shrink)

In this interdisciplinary article, we investigate the relationship between creativity and the immune system; the creative features of the immune system and how the immune system and its role in regulating homeostasis might be related to creative cognition. We argue that within a multivariate approach of creativity, the immune system is a contributing factor. New directions for research are also discussed. When astronauts and cosmonauts venture into the new and extreme environment of outer space, their immune system needs to instantly (...) adapt and find new answers to survive biologically and psychologically. Many astronauts report interest in creative activities and therefore represent an interesting group to investigate creativity in relation with the immune system. Little is known regarding how the immune system interacts with and supports creative cognition and behavior, if an individual’s immune system, interacting with cognition, adapts more originally to a new environment compared to another’s; in other words, if there is creativity in the domain of the immune system, and the creative properties and functions of the immune system itself. (shrink)

Self-generation of knowledge can activate deeper cognitive processing and improve long-term retention compared to the passive reception of information. It plays a distinctive role within the concept of inquiry-based learning, which is an activity-oriented, student-centered collaborative learning approach in which students become actively involved in knowledge construction. This approach allows students to not only acquire content knowledge, but also an understanding of investigative procedures/inquiry skills – in particular the control-of-variables strategy (CVS). From the perspective of cognitive load theory, generating answers (...) and solutions during inquiry-based learning is inefficient as it imposes an intrinsic and extraneous load on learners. Previous research on self-generation of content knowledge in inquiry-based learning has demonstrated that (1) a high cognitive load impairs retention of the generated information, (2) feedback is a fundamental requirement for self-generation of complex content knowledge, (3) self-generation success is key to long-term retention and (4) generating and rereading place different demands on learners. However, there is still no research on the self-generation of scientific reasoning skills and the interaction between the retention of these skills with prior knowledge, feedback and self-generation success. That is why this experiment was conducted. The focus of this research is to analyze the distinctive role of self-generation of scientific reasoning skills within the concept of inquiry-based learning and to identify the influence of prior knowledge and self-generation success on short-term and long-term retention. For this purpose, an experiment involving 133 6th and 7th graders was conducted. An inquiry activity that included the self-generation of scientific reasoning skills was compared to an inquiry task that had students simply read information about the experimental design. We used both an immediate and a delayed test to examine which treatment better developed a deeper understanding of CVS and an ability to apply this knowledge to novel problems (transfer). Direct instruction was clearly superior to self-generation in facilitating students’ acquisition of CVS immediately after the inquiry task. However, after a period of one week had elapsed, both treatment conditions turned out to be equally effective. A generation effect was only found among students with high self-generation success after a 1-week delay. (shrink)

We propose another positive illusion that fits with McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) criteria for adaptive misbeliefs. This illusion is pervasive in adult reasoning but we focus on its prevalence in children's developing theories. It is a strongly held conviction arising from normal functioning of the doxastic system that confers adaptive advantage on the individual.

In this paper we propose the multiple complex systems approach for assessing domain-general complex problem-solving skills and its processes knowledge acquisition and knowledge application. After defining the construct and the formal frameworks for describing complex problems, we emphasise some of the measurement issues inherent in assessing CPS skills with single tasks. With examples of the MicroDYN test and the MicroFIN test, we show how to adequately score problem-solving skills by using multiple tasks. We discuss implications for problem-solving research and the (...) assessment of CPS skills in general. (shrink)