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  1. Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.
    Two compelling principles, the Reasonable Range Principle and the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle, are necessary conditions that any response to peer disagreements ought to abide by. The Reasonable Range Principle maintains that a resolution to a peer disagreement should not fall outside the range of views expressed by the peers in their dispute, whereas the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle maintains that a resolution strategy should be able to preserve unanimous judgments of evidential irrelevance among the peers. No standard (...)
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  • Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment.Bruno de Finetti - 1979 - Wiley.
    First issued in translation as a two-volume work in 1975, this classic book provides the first complete development of the theory of probability from a subjectivist viewpoint. It proceeds from a detailed discussion of the philosophical mathematical aspects to a detailed mathematical treatment of probability and statistics. De Finetti’s theory of probability is one of the foundations of Bayesian theory. De Finetti stated that probability is nothing but a subjective analysis of the likelihood that something will happen and that that (...)
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  • Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Unspecific evidence calls for imprecise credence. My aim is to vindicate this thought. First, I will pin down what it is that makes one's imprecise credences more or less epistemically valuable. Then I will use this account of epistemic value to delineate a class of reasonable epistemic scoring rules for imprecise credences. Finally, I will show that if we plump for one of these scoring rules as our measure of epistemic value or utility, then a popular family of decision rules (...)
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  • Gambling with Truth.Isaac Levi - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):261-263.
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