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  1. Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.
    – We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural (...)
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  • An Expressivist Analysis of the Indicative Conditional with a Restrictor Semantics.John Cantwell - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (2):487-530.
    A globally expressivist analysis of the indicative conditional based on the Ramsey Test is presented. The analysis is a form of ‘global’ expressivism in that it supplies acceptance and rejection conditions for all the sentence forming connectives of propositional logic (negation, disjunction, etc.) and so allows the conditional to embed in arbitrarily complex sentences (thus avoiding the Frege–Geach problem). The expressivist framework is semantically characterized in a restrictor semantics due to Vann McGee, and is completely axiomatized in a logic dubbed (...)
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  • Indicative Conditionals and Graded Information.Ivano Ciardelli - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3):509-549.
    I propose an account of indicative conditionals that combines features of minimal change semantics and information semantics. As in information semantics, conditionals are interpreted relative to an information state in accordance with the Ramsey test idea: “if p then q” is supported at a state s iff q is supported at the hypothetical state s[p] obtained by restricting s to the p-worlds. However, information states are not modeled as simple sets of worlds, but by means of a Lewisian system of (...)
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  • Elementary Iterated Revision and the Levi Identity.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - forthcoming - In Jake Chandler & Richard Booth (eds.), Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI 2019).
    Recent work has considered the problem of extending to the case of iterated belief change the so-called `Harper Identity' (HI), which defines single-shot contraction in terms of single-shot revision. The present paper considers the prospects of providing a similar extension of the Levi Identity (LI), in which the direction of definition runs the other way. We restrict our attention here to the three classic iterated revision operators--natural, restrained and lexicographic, for which we provide here the first collective characterisation in the (...)
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  • Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.
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  • A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.
    This chapter presents a new semantics for inductive empirical knowledge. The epistemic agent is represented concretely as a learner who processes new inputs through time and who forms new beliefs from those inputs by means of a concrete, computable learning program. The agent’s belief state is represented hyper-intensionally as a set of time-indexed sentences. Knowledge is interpreted as avoidance of error in the limit and as having converged to true belief from the present time onward. Familiar topics are re-examined within (...)
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  • (1 other version)Doxastic Logic.Michael Caie - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 499-541.
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  • Relation-changing modal operators: Fig. 1.Carlos Areces, Raul Fervari & Guillaume Hoffmann - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (4):601-627.
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  • Bisimulation and expressivity for conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief.Mikkel Birkegaard Andersen, Thomas Bolander, Hans van Ditmarsch & Martin Holm Jensen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2447-2487.
    Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may contain too much information. A proper notion (...)
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  • Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-seven Iterated Theory Change Operators.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Jacek Malinowski David Makinson & Wansing Heinrich (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Springer. pp. 269–296.
    Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change of belief (...)
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  • Indicative conditionals:Factual or Epistemic?John Cantwell - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (1):157-194.
    It is argued that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having truth conditions (and so they are in part factual) but that these truth conditions are ‘gappy’ which leaves an explanatory gap that can only be filled by epistemic considerations (and so indicative conditionals are in part epistemic). This dual nature of indicative conditionals gives reason to rethink the relationship between logic viewed as a descriptive discipline (focusing on semantics) and logic viewed as a discipline with a normative import (focusing (...)
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  • (1 other version)A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction.John Cantwell - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):303-329.
    A semantics is presented for belief-revision in the face of common announcements to a group of agents that have beliefs about each other's beliefs. The semantics is based on the idea that possible worlds can be viewed as having an internal structure, representing the belief independent features of the world, and the respective belief states of the agents in a modular fashion. Modularity guarantees that changing one aspect of the world (a belief independent feature or a belief state) has no (...)
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  • AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty-five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original (...)
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  • Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
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  • Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM.Hans Rott - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.
    According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to endorse that (...)
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  • Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision.Hans Rott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
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  • Segerberg on the Paradoxes of Introspective Belief Change.Sebastian Enqvist & Erik J. Olsson - unknown
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  • Changing minds about climate change: Belief revision, coherence, and emotion.Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 329--345.
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  • Stability, strength and sensitivity: Converting belief into knowledge.Hans Rott - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.
    In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...)
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  • Belief revision and projection in the epistemic situation calculus.Christoph Schwering, Gerhard Lakemeyer & Maurice Pagnucco - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence 251 (C):62-97.
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  • Dynamic doxastic logic: why, how, and where to?Hannes Leitgeb & Krister Segerberg - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):167-190.
    We investigate the research programme of dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) and analyze its underlying methodology. The Ramsey test for conditionals is used to characterize the logical and philosophical differences between two paradigmatic systems, AGM and KGM, which we develop and compare axiomatically and semantically. The importance of Gärdenfors’s impossibility result on the Ramsey test is highlighted by a comparison with Arrow’s impossibility result on social choice. We end with an outlook on the prospects and the future of DDL.
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  • Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies.Sebastian Enqvist - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (3):453-479.
    I develop a dynamic logic for reasoning about "interrogative belief revision", a new branch of belief revision theory that has been developed in a small number of papers, beginning with E. J. Olsson and D. Westlund's paper "On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change" [12]. In interrogative belief revision, epistemic states are taken to include a research agenda, consisting of questions the agent seeks to answer. I present a logic for revision of such epistemic states based on (...)
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  • Dynamic logic for belief revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
    We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show how various abstract postulates for (...)
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  • On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change.Erik J. Olsson & David Westlund - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):165 - 183.
    The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...)
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  • Krister Segerberg on Logic of Actions.Robert Trypuz (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
    Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 3(4), 535–553. Segerberg, K. (1995). Conditional action. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas, & A. Herzig (Eds.), Conditionals: From philosophy to computer science, Studies ...
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  • A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections from the Point of View of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (1):113-136.
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but are (...)
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  • Revision by Comparison.Eduardo Fermé & Hans Rott - 2004 - Artificial Intelligence 157 (1):5-47.
    Since the early 1980s, logical theories of belief revision have offered formal methods for the transformation of knowledge bases or “corpora” of data and beliefs. Early models have dealt with unconditional acceptance and integration of potentially belief-contravening pieces of information into the existing corpus. More recently, models of “non-prioritized” revision were proposed that allow the agent rationally to refuse to accept the new information. This paper introduces a refined method for changing beliefs by specifying constraints on the relative plausibility of (...)
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  • A Kripke-Lewis semantics for belief update and belief revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2025 - Artificial Intelligence 339 (C):104259.
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  • Revocable Belief Revision.Hans van Ditmarsch - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (6):1185-1214.
    Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief revision. By this we not merely (...)
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  • Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision.Brian Hill - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):291-323.
    In the companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part I), a general framework for realistic modelling of instantaneous states of belief and of the operations involving them was presented and motivated. In this paper, the framework is applied to the case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, firstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-specified, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators (...)
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  • The incorporation of Moorean type information by introspective agents.Jiahong Guo - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (3):470-482.
    The main task is to discuss the issue in belief dynamics in which philosophical beliefs and rational introspective agents incorporate Moorean type new information. First, a brief survey is conducted on Moore’s Paradox, and one of its solutions is introduced with the help of Update Semantics. Then, we present a Dynamic Doxastic Logic (DDL) which revises the belief of introspective agents put forward by Lindström & Rabinowicz. Next, we attempt to incorporate Moorean type new information within the DEL (DDL) framework, (...)
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  • Elementary Belief Revision Operators.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (1):267-311.
    Discussions of the issue of iterated belief revision are commonly accompanied by the presentation of three “concrete” operators: natural, restrained and lexicographic. This raises a natural question: What is so distinctive about these three particular methods? Indeed, the common axiomatic ground for work on iterated revision, the AGM and Darwiche-Pearl postulates, leaves open a whole range of alternative proposals. In this paper, we show that it is satisfaction of an additional principle of “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”, inspired by the literature (...)
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  • Dynamic graded epistemic logic.Minghui Ma & Hans van Ditmarsch - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):663-684.
    Graded epistemic logic is a logic for reasoning about uncertainties. Graded epistemic logic is interpreted on graded models. These models are generalizations of Kripke models. We obtain completeness of some graded epistemic logics. We further develop dynamic extensions of graded epistemic logics, along the framework of dynamic epistemic logic. We give an extension with public announcements, i.e., public events, and an extension with graded event models, a generalization also including nonpublic events. We present complete axiomatizations for both logics.
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  • Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.) - 2014 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
    This book illustrates the program of Logical-Informational Dynamics. Rational agents exploit the information available in the world in delicate ways, adopt a wide range of epistemic attitudes, and in that process, constantly change the world itself. Logical-Informational Dynamics is about logical systems putting such activities at center stage, focusing on the events by which we acquire information and change attitudes. Its contributions show many current logics of information and change at work, often in multi-agent settings where social behavior is essential, (...)
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  • Preservation and Postulation: Lessons from the New Debate on the Ramsey Test.Hans Rott - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):609–626.
    Richard Bradley has initiated a new debate, with Brian Hill and Jake Chandler as further participants, about the implications of a number of so-called triviality results surrounding the Ramsey test for conditionals. I comment on this debate and argue that ‘Inclusion’ and ‘Preservation’, which were originally introduced as postulates for the rational revision of factual beliefs, have little to recommend them in the first place when extended to languages containing conditionals. I question the philosophical method of postulation that was applied (...)
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  • Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic.Sebastian Enqvist - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527-548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has (...)
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  • Logic of Change, Change of Logic.Hans van Ditmarsch, Brian Hill & Ondrej Majer - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):227 - 234.
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  • Default logic as dynamic doxastic logic.Krister Segerberg - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):333-352.
    Dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) is used in connexion with theories of belief revision. Here we try to show that languages of DDL are suitable also for discussing aspects of default logic. One ingredient of our analysis is a concept of coherence-as-ratifiability.
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  • (1 other version)A formal model of multi-agent belief-interaction.John Cantwell - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):397-422.
    A semantics is presented for belief revision in the face of common announcements to a group of agents that have beliefs about each other’s beliefs. The semantics is based on the idea that possible worlds can be viewed as having an internal-structure, representing the belief independent features of the world, and the respective belief states of the agents in a modular fashion. Modularity guarantees that changing one aspect of the world (a belief independent feature or a belief state) has no (...)
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  • A Structuralist Framework for the Logic of Theory Change.Sebastian Enqvist - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 105--135.
    Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be (...)
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