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Shallow versus deep response-dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.details
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Putnam, Searle, and externalism.Amir Horowitz - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.details
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A puzzle about pejoratives.Christopher Hom - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):383-405.details
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Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.details
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Of brains and planets: on a causal criterion for mind-brain identities.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189.details
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Realism, reference & perspective.Carl Hoefer & Genoveva Martí - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-22.details
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The Structure of Content is Not Transparent.Thomas Hodgson - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):425-437.details
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Race and Reference.Adam Hochman - 2019 - Biology and Philosophy 34 (2):32.details
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Ascriptions of propositional attitudes. An analysis in terms of intentional objects.Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):747-768.details
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Anthropic reasoning does not conflict with observation.Dien Ho & Bradley Monton - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):42–45.details
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The identification game: deepfakes and the epistemic limits of identity.Carl Öhman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-19.details
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Varieties of dispositional essentialism about natural laws.Salim Hirèche - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-28.details
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The strong arm of the law: a unified account of necessary and contingent laws of nature.Salim Hirèche, Niels Linnemann, Robert Michels & Lisa Vogt - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10211-10252.details
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The modal status of the laws of nature. Tahko’s hybrid view and the kinematical/dynamical distinction.Salim Hireche, Niels Linnemann, Robert Michels & Lisa Vogt - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-15.details
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A Lewisian Argument Against Platonism, or Why Theses About Abstract Objects Are Unintelligible.Jack Himelright - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):3037–3057.details
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Why Not Just Features? Reconsidering Infants’ Behavior in Individuation Tasks.Frauke Hildebrandt, Jan Lonnemann & Ramiro Glauer - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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