Abstract:This paper explores an ontological approach to the issue of whether corporations, like individuals, are morally responsible for their actions. More specifically, we investigate the identity of organizations relative to the individuals that compose them. Based on general systems theory, the traditional assumption is that social collectives are more complex, variable, and loosely coupled than individuals. This assumption rests on two premises. The first is a view of the individual as simple, stable, and tightly coupled (i.e., unitary). The second premise (...) is that the relationship between social collectives and their members is characterized by the complete inclusion of individuals in higher order systems.We examine the social science literature that bears on these premises and conclude that they are false. The differences between organizations and individuals in the magnitude of complexity or variability appear to be minimal or nonexistent. An implication of our analysis is that individuals and organizations are coterminous and, therefore, inseparable as moral agents. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper we highlight the emergence of organizational ethics issues in health care as an important outcome of the changing structure of health care delivery. We emphasize three core themes related to business ethics and health care ethics: integrity, responsibility, and choice. These themes are brought together in a discussion of the process of Mission Discernment as it has been developed and implemented within an integrated health care system. Through this discussion we highlight how processes of institutional reflection, such (...) as Mission Discernment, can help health care organizations, as well as corporations, make critical choices in turbulent environments that further the core mission and values and fulfill institutional responsibilities to a broad range of stakeholders. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the feasibility of a restorative justice service in the context of work‐related deaths, specifically in Victoria. Section 1 provides a brief summary of restorative justice and the kind of processes that are most likely to be used in the context of work‐related death. Section 2 discusses an issue for the use of restorative justice in this context that is similar to the problem of whether it is fair or reasonable to assign personal criminal liability for (...) corporate fault. Section 3 looks at what it is that restorative justice can offer a bereaved family. Section 4 presents a range of suggestions as to how restorative justice could be used in this context—informed by real cases wherever possible. Section 5 presents a brief proposal regarding what may be the most effective and efficient strategy or model, in terms of developing a pilot restorative justice service in this area. Section 6 offers some preliminary guidance for a further consultation that would involve all the key stakeholders. (shrink)

For more than two decades, Peter French has been arguing in books, articles and symposia that corporations are genuine actors in the moral universe. Like adult human beings, they can and should take moral responsibility for their actions and be held accountable by the other actors in this universe. I have always argued with my students that the position is both metaphysically incorrect and practically harmful. Now (1995) French has redeveloped his position through 380 pages in Corporate Ethics, probably the (...) most challenging and original Business Ethics textbook yet to appear. It is a work of intellectual sophistication with real world applications. Using the metaphor invaders throughout the book, French argues not only that corporations are moral agents, but also that their moral agency has made the business world of the late twentieth century and of the coming century different from anything of preceding epochs. It is, in his argument, an agency of great potential danger and of great potential benefit, one in terms of which we can address every ethical problem of business. In the essay, I explore Corporate Ethics both on the metaphysical and the practical level. (shrink)

When we deal with complex things, like human subjects or organizations, we deal with identity – that which makes a person or an organization what it is and distinguishes him/her/it from other persons or organizations, a kind of “self”. Our identity determines how we think about and interact with others. It will be argued in this chapter that the self is constituted relationally. Moreover, when we are in the realm of the self, we are always already in the realm of (...) engaging with and mediating differences – the realm of ethics. The position which will be developed argues that approaching identity as a complex system allows us to resist thinking of identity as an easily identifiable and static entity. Identity is always being constituted within a complex and contingent world, where we have to make choices based on contingent values rather than on universal knowledge or the outcome of rational calculations. As a result, we have to keep in mind that our daily practices always already have an ethical component, and our decisions need to be continually evaluated and re-evaluated in the light of our (and others’) varying identities. (shrink)

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been traditionally framed within business ethics as a discourse attempting to identify certain moral responsibilities of corporations (as well as get these corporations to fulfill their responsibilities). This theory has often been normatively grounded in the idea that a corporation is (or ought to be treated as) a moral agent. I argue that it is a mistake to think of (or treat) corporations as moral agents, and that CSR’s impotency is a direct result of this (...) mistake. I then outline a distinction between business ethics and business politics, arguing that CSR might be better framed as a political goal – one which might be able to take better advantage of the resources of corporate governance and a renewed (albeit shifted) focus on agency theory. (shrink)

Business ethics denial refers to one of two claims about moral motivation in a business context: that there is no need for it, or that it is impossible. Neither of these radical claims is endorsed by serious theorists in the academic fields that study business ethics. Nevertheless, public commentators, as well as university students, often make claims that seem to imply that they subscribe to some form of business ethics denial. This paper fills a gap by making explicit both the (...) various forms that business ethics denial can take, and the reasons why such views are ultimately implausible. The paper argues that this type of serious engagement with business ethics denial should be an important part of the job description for teachers of business ethics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. The paper explores the philosophical intelligibility of contemporary defences of collective political forgiveness against a background of sceptical doubt, both general and particular. Three genera sceptical arguments are examined: one challenges the idea that political collectives exist; another challenges the idea that moral agency can be projected upon political collectives; a final argument challenges the attribution of emotions, especially anger, to collectives. Each of these sceptical arguments is rebutted. At a more particular level, the contrasts between individual forgiveness and (...) collective forgiveness gives rise to various problems and the ‘desiderata’ for their resolution - authority, specificity and temporal proximity - are briefly explored. (shrink)

This essay provides a critical overview of the debate about corporate moral responsibility. Parties to the debate address whether corporations are the kinds of entities that can be blamed when they cause unjustified harm. Proponents of CMR argue that corporations satisfy the conditions for moral agency and so they are fit for blame. Their opponents respond that corporations lack one or more of the capacities necessary for moral agency. I review the arguments on both sides and conclude ultimately that what (...) divides the two is not so much competing conceptions of the corporation as it is disagreement about what moral agency requires. Homing in on the real site of contention will, it is hoped, allow future participants in the debate to focus their efforts more productively. (shrink)

This paper concerns the influence of gender on a firm’s moral and economic performance. It supports Thomas White’s intimation of a male gender bias in the value system underlying extant business theory. We suggest that this gender bias may be corrected by drawing on the concept of substantive rationality inherent in virtue-ethics theory. This feminine-oriented relationship-based value system complements the essential nature of the firm as a nexus of relationships between stakeholders. Not only is this feminine firm morally desirable, but (...) it is also economically more efficient in that trust becomes a more feasible implicit contractual enforcement mechanism. In an organizational context, therefore, from both a moral and an economic perspective, long established economic man is dominated by nascent economic woman. (shrink)

Abstract:Should the responsibilities of business managers be understood independently of the social circumstances and “market forces” that surround them, or (in accord with empiricism and the social sciences) are agents and their choices shaped by their circumstances, free only insofar as they act in accordance with antecedently established dispositions, their “character”? Virtue ethics, of which I consider myself a proponent, shares with empiricism this emphasis on character as well as an affinity with the social sciences. But recent criticisms of both (...) empiricist and virtue ethical accounts of character deny even this apparent compromise between agency and environment. Here is an account of character that emphasizes dynamic interaction both in the formation and in the interplay between personal agency and responsibility on the one hand and social pressures and the environment on the other. (shrink)

There is a clear tendency in contemporary political/legal thought to limit agency to individual agents, thereby denying the existence and relevance of collective moral agency in general, and corporate agency in particular. This tendency is ultimately rooted in two particular forms of individualism – methodological and fictive (abstract) – which have their source in the Enlightenment. Furthermore, the dominant notion of moral agency owes a lot to Kant whose moral/legal philosophy is grounded exclusively on abstract reason and personal autonomy, to (...) the detriment of a due recognition of the socio-historical grounds of moral social conduct.I shall argue that an adequate theory of responsibility is needed, which does not only take into account individual responsibility, but also collective and corporate responsibility, capable of taking into consideration society and its problems. Furthermore, corporations are consciously and carefully structured organisations with different levels of management and have clearly defined aims and objectives, a central feature upon which I shall be focussing in this paper. (shrink)

Should we conceive of corporations as entities to which moral responsibility can be attributed? This contribution presents what we will call a political account of corporate moral responsibility. We argue that in modern, liberal democratic societies, there is an underlying political need to attribute greater levels of moral responsibility to corporations. Corporate moral responsibility is essential to the maintenance of social coordination that both advances social welfare and protects citizens' moral entitlements. This political account posits a special capacity of self-governance (...) that corporations can intelligibly be said to possess. Corporations can be said to be "administrators of duty" in that they can voluntarily incorporate moral principles into their decision-making processes about how to conduct business. This account supplements and partly transforms earlier pragmatic accounts of corporate moral responsibility by disentangling responsibility from its conventional linkages with accountability, blame and punishment. It thereby represents a distinctive way to defend corporate moral responsibility and shows how Kantian thinking can be helpful in disentangling the problems surrounding the concept. (shrink)

Kautilya (4th Century B.C.) is a legendary figure in India for not only writing Arthashastra, a treatise that deals extensively with the strategies for building and running a nation based on strong fundamentals of economics and the wisdom of the leader, but also for making Chandragupta Maurya the king of Magadha whose empire later on became the largest empire ever seen in the Indian history. This paper is an attempt to identify the dimensions of wise leadership to subsequently arrive at (...) a wise leadership development model for contemporary times based on the philosophy of Kautilya. (shrink)

Abstract:This article argues that the important organizational values to study are organizational moral values. It identifies five moral values (honest communication, respect for property, respect for life, respect for religion, and justice), which allow parallel constructs at individual and organizational levels of analysis. It also identifies dimensions used in differentiating organizations’ moral values. These are the act, actor, person affected, intention, and expected result. Finally, the article addresses measurement issues associated with organizational moral values, proposing that content analysis is the (...) appropriate measurement technique to be used for an organization-level conception of moral values. (shrink)

In regard to the explanation of actions that are governed by institutional rules, John R. Searle introduces the notion of a mental “background” that is supposed to explain how persons can acquire the capacity of following such rules. I argue that Searle’s internalism about the mind and the resulting poverty of his conception of the background keep him from putting forward a convincing explanation of the normative features of institutional action. Drawing on competing conceptions of the background of Heidegger and (...) Wittgenstein, I propose to revise Searle’s conception. The background of institutional agency can only provide a convincing explanation if it includes the context of actions and intersubjective structures of a shared life-world. I suggest that a further development of this idea would lead to the identification of the background with a web of social recognition. (shrink)

This section aims to summarize and conclude Part I in the form of a taxonomy of legitimate and illegitimate corporate moral responsibility attributions. I believe we can categorise four types of corporate moral responsibility attributions two of which are legitimate and two which are illegitimate with regard to our concept of moral agency and our moral intuition of fairness.

The orthodox account of the morality of war holds that the responsibility for resorting to war rests on the state’s political authorities and the responsibility for how the war is waged rests only on the state’s army and, thus, business firms have no special obligations in wartime. The purpose of this article is to reconsider the ethical responsibilities of business firms in wartime. I defend the claim that a plausible standard of liability in war must integrate the degree of the (...) agent’s contributions to posing an unjust threat, the nature of agent's behavior, and his/her intentions. If these premises are correct, it follows that the moral obligations of civilians and business corporations are fundamentally altered by war. Taking into consideration their relative contributions to the war effort, a taxonomy of business firms is developed. (shrink)

The academic debate over the propriety of attributing moral responsibility to corporations is decades old and ongoing. The conventional approach to this debate is to identify the sufficient conditions for moral agency and then attempt to determine whether corporations possess them. This article recommends abandoning the conventional approach in favor of an examination of the practical consequences of corporate moral responsibility. The article’s thesis is that such an examination reveals that attributing moral responsibility to corporations is ethically acceptable only if (...) it does not authorize the punishment of corporations as collective entities, and further, that this renders the debate over corporate moral responsibility virtually pointless. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines the claim that what is ‘really’ good for business will in the end harmonize with the requirements of morality. In searching for a plausible interpretation of what might be ‘really’ good for a business enterprise, the paper explores analogies to traditional philosophical accounts of the ‘true good’ of man. The conclusion is that while such accounts can make sense of the claim that a person's true good requires a moral commitment, they can suggest no solution applicable (...) to business. The reason is that the analogy between natural persons and business enterprises breaks down at a crucial point. It follows that any radical improvement in the moral quality of business activity cannot come from appealing to a ‘true good’ of business. And since external means of control are not sufficient, the paper concludes that we must rely on the moral motivation of individuals filling positions in business. What is indicated then is the need for a strengthened consciousness of the range of freedom and responsibility of persons in their work roles. (shrink)

Online retailers are using advances in data collection and computing technologies to “personalize” prices, i.e., offer goods for sale to shoppers at their reservation prices, or the highest price they are willing to pay. In this paper, I offer a criticism of this practice. I begin by putting online personalized pricing in context. It is not something entirely new, but rather a kind of price discrimination, a familiar pricing practice. I then offer a fairness-based argument against it. When an online (...) retailer personalizes prices, it competes unfairly for the social surplus created by a transaction. I defend this argument against objections, and offer a simple remedy: online retailers should either disclose that they are personalizing prices, or stop doing so. (shrink)

Quality of work life affects the quality of life. By applying amoral paradigms in decision making managers of business enterprises can cause a poor quality work life and reduce the quality of life. The explanation and prediction of ethical/unethical business behaviour should not always be attributed to individual managers, as it may result from strong culture and decision making systems. It is argued that the causes and the solutions to ethical dilemmas can often be found in a theory based on (...) integration of models of moral reasoning, decision schema, value congruence and corporate decision structures. The impact of exclusion of moral principles from the decision making process is illustrated by way of a case study. (shrink)

Issues management (IM) is becoming widely accepted in the business-and-society literature as a policy tool to enhance the social performance of corporations. Its acceptance is based on the presumption that firms have incorporated ethical norms into their decision-making process. This paper argues that IM is simply a technique to identify, analyze, and respond to social issues. It can be used either to improve or forestall corporate social performance. Different values will steer IM practitioners in different policy directions.If IM is to (...) be more than a social gadget, designed to promote the firm's narrow economic objectives, it must be self-consciously grounded in ethics. Stakeholder analysis and the comprehensive corporate ethic are concepts that can help forge links between ethics and the administrative process, between values and decision-making in IM. (shrink)

This paper criticizes De George's portrayal of theological ethics and its purported inability to make a distinctive contribution to business ethics with the following theses. (1) De George's understanding of the nature of theological ethics is faulty. Consequently his typology of the field is not an adequate description of the range of prevailing approaches. (2) A constructive proposal for religious ethics is offered which takes as its starting points (a) an aspect of human experience (self-transcendence) and (b) the human capacity (...) to reason in order to claim (via Kant, Rahner, Gamwell, and others) that practical reason is religious in nature. As such, a distinctive contribution of religious ethics is its capacity to evaluate business activity in terms of its consistency with our most fundamental, all-inclusive human loyalities and affirmations about the nature of reality itself. (shrink)

Moral responsibility for outcomes in corporate settings can be ascribed either to the individual members, the corporation, or both. In the latter case, the relationship between individual and corporate responsibility has been approached as inversely proportional, such that an increase in individual responsibility leads to a corresponding decrease in corporate responsibility and vice versa. In this article, we develop a non-proportionate approach, where, under specific conditions, individual and corporate moral responsibilities interact dynamically, leading to a mutual enhancement of responsibility: the (...) more the corporation is responsible, the more the individuals become responsible and vice versa. We develop this mutually enhancing approach in terms of normative ascriptions of responsibility, while leaving aside empirical implications in terms of mutual awareness of responsibility between individuals and corporations. We explore conceptually the conditions and mechanisms that generate this mutual enhancement and also discuss the implications for research and practice. (shrink)

This paper responds to the popular argument that business is like a game and is thus insulated from the demands of morality. In the first half of the paper, I offer objections to this argument as it is put forward by John Ladd in his well-known article, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations. I argue that Ladd''s analysis is flawed both because it deprives us of the ability to assert that a business is acting badly or that (...) its goals are irrational, and because it is internally inconsistent. In the second half of the paper, I give reasons for thinking that business is not like a game. (shrink)

Models of moral responsibility rely on foundational views about moral agency. Many scholars believe that only humans can be moral agents, and therefore business needs to create models that foster greater receptivity to others through ethical dialog. This view leads to a difficulty if no specific person is the sole causal agent for an act, or if something comes about through aggregated action in a corporate setting. An alternate approach suggests that corporations are moral agents sufficiently like humans to be (...) treated as persons, which leads to questions of intentionality and the organizational structure required to support the claim. In this article, I make an intermediate claim combining Goodpaster and Matthews' (60:132–141, 1982 ) view that a corporation may have a moral culture which affects subjective choices, with those of Painter-Morland (17(3):515–534, 2007 ) who points out that we should move from a model that posits discrete persons acting on each other to one where morality comes about through shared experience between agents who participate in each other’s lives. I argue that the discussion has been trapped in traditional dichotomies, and is better served by language that more accurately represents the dynamic interplay between organization and individual. I underwrite this claim by looking at recent changes in British and American legal approaches to corporate responsibility. These provide greater incentives for owners and business leaders to encourage employees to discuss the reflexive nature of legal and moral responsibility in business, facilitate workers to voice their moral concerns, and create structures and processes that allow those concerns to be heard. (shrink)

Business myth is generally treated in business ethics literature as a mental obstacle that must be removed in order to prepare the ground for rational thinking on the ethical aspect of business conduct. This approach, which focuses on the content of myth, does not explicate the nature and function of myth. Based on the study of myth in the fields of humanities and social sciences, this paper develops a theoretical framework and analytical tool-the revolving-door model-for researching myth in business. The (...) proposed framework (I) offers new perspectives on myth: the consumer's, the producer's, the mythologist's, and the ethicist's; (2) explicates various distortion mechanisms ofthe myth; and (3) enables a redefinition of the relation of business myth to business ethics. The applicability of this framework is demonstrated by means of a real case which sets the stage for examining a set of common myths. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper we highlight the emergence of organizational ethics issues in health care as an important outcome of the changing structure of health care delivery. We emphasize three core themes related to business ethics and health care ethics: integrity, responsibility, and choice. These themes are brought together in a discussion of the process of Mission Discernment as it has been developed and implemented within an integrated health care system. Through this discussion we highlight how processes of institutional reflection, such (...) as Mission Discernment, can help health care organizations, as well as corporations, make critical choices in turbulent environments that further the core mission and values and fulfill institutional responsibilities to a broad range of stakeholders. (shrink)

The paper reports on research undertaken in three organisations seeking to explore anomie at work. This research explores whether a distinction in the levels of anomie between people's perception of the work and non-work contexts exists in three organisations, that is whether people are more likely to feel more hopeless and helpless in their work or non-work life. It also looks at whether people in different organisations have significantly different levels of anomie. A significant difference in the non-work anomie between (...) organisations, but no significant difference in work anomie between organisations, was found. In the three organisations researched, the anomie score in the non-work context is lower than in the work context, indicating that respondents perceive the work context as more anomic. The work anomie for the total sample was found to be significantly higher that the non-work anomie. The implications for ethical behaviour at work and business ethics are discussed. (shrink)

As we enter the twenty-first century, a new set of unexamined assumptions that may be labelled managerialism is coming to dominate university life. In spite of the changes that have been taking place, semantics have largely remained stable. As a result, there has been little recognition of a need to examine the transformation carefully and critically. This paper seeks to explicate the changes, show how they express a common managerialist philosophy and critically analyze them. It does so by dividing the (...) topics to be discussed into two sections: People and Program. The first section shows how conceptual assumptions in regard to central components of the university have changed. Students are now thought of as consumers, administrators as managers, trustees as directors and faculty as employee stakeholders. These conceptual renderings are consistent with and support a managerialist philosophy. The second section shows how a previously accepted bright line between education and training has broken down so that what we thought of as education has become little more than ornamentation for what are basically training programs. In addition, the training programs have achieved a semantic victory by persuading us to refer to them as education. The program change is fully consonant with the people changes. The academy has become one more instance of the general management philosophy that dominates our societies. We have lost our role as autonomous critics and uncritically become a component of the larger arrangement. (shrink)

Corporations despite their status as legally fictitious persons are not such, and to confound them with real persons in even the minimal legal sense is to negate much of the force of the concept of rights when applied to the society. When corporations have rights individual rights become meaningless. While corporations may need some form of protection to make them financially feasible investments, they need not be given the full protection of rights which are assigned to the individual. A much (...) attenuated version of corporate rights is warranted. I would argue against Werhane's notion of a corporation possessing “secondary rights” which can be asserted only after the claims of individual rights have been met. Ibid., p. 62.One solution to the problems raised in this essay would be to ascribe rights to individuals only. This could occur without interfering with the financial independence of the corporation by a simple legal prescription that individuals within a corporation be held responsible for their activities and that the corporation p e r se not be blamed for individual actions. This is consistent with the judgments against the Nazi war criminals who were denied the defense of justifying their actions on the basis of following orders. Responsibility for those actions which are the result of the workings of the “invisible hand” cannot be ascribed to any individual or group of individuals. Donaldson is helpful on this point in recommending an “office of social responsibility” be created as part of the corporation to monitor those actions which otherwise escape scrutiny. Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, p. 207.A more radical solution is to restructure the corporation in such a way as to introduce the element of democracy in the workplace. Opponents would argue that such a practice would diminish the profit-making potential of the corporation by limiting the discretion of the corporate officers in making decisions. Similar arguments have been advanced against the democratic state. Yet democratic states have proven to be viable institutions capable of effective action and demonstrably more survivable than the authoritarian regimes which are the analogs of the corporation.Given the current hierarchical structure of the corporation and its ability to dissolve in the face of questions of responsibility, individual accountability is the only viable solution. This requires that members of the corporation not find cover behind the “invisible hand.” This in turn necessitates the granting of a greater degree of discretionary power to corporate functionaries at all levels. We cannot be responsible for a state of affairs over which we have no effective control. The courts would make the ultimate decision as to the assignation of responsibility in particular cases of corporate crime, with the stipulation that the ascription be to an individual and not “the corporation.” By making corporate officers individually responsible for their actions a much more effective deterrent to corporate crimes would be created. Corporations can easily afford most of the fines that are imposed on them, and corporations cannot be put in prison.The view of the corporation advanced here puts it in a legal and moral position greatly inferior to that of the individual as well as the state. Consequently, corporate needs and welfare must remain a tertiary concern. The rights of the individual must figure primarily, and the welfare of the state as preserver of those rights secondarily, in social policy decisions. The libertarian vision of the corporation is therefore a misguided result of the conflation of the corporation and the individual in the legal and moral realms. Corporations and individuals are ontologically distinct entities and must be recognized as such. The failure to do so has enabled corporations to abrogate individual rights with legal and moral impunity. Such a situation is inconsistent with the demands of a rights-based democracy. (shrink)

Arguing that the grounding of philosophical ethics is more complex than De George's reference to reason and human experience reflects, and that religious ethics is less doctrinaire and less given to indoctrination than De George suggests, Camenisch maintains that De George has portrayed an artifically wide gap between the two fields. Rejecting De George's typology of religious ethics as unhelpful, Camenisch suggests that the crucial distinction between philosophical and religious/theological ethics is the community or lived nature of the latter. The (...) implications of this dimension of religious ethics for business ethics is briefly explored in relation to the use of cases, the role of the lives of moral exemplars, corporate responsibility, and obligations to future generations, to indicate not that religious ethics generates answers different from those of philosophy, but that it provides a different perspective on some central moral matters. (shrink)

Integrating "ethics all the way through" an organization suggests that the issue of moral agency and the corporation be reconsidered. Is the corporation a moral agent in some sense or is it no more than the people who are a part of the organization? Views which stress the role of the individual lose sight of the whole corporate entity, and views which think of the corporation as a collective lose sight of the individual. A view which rejects both these alternatives (...) sees the corporation as a type of community where there is a dynamic tension between the corporation as a whole and the individuals who are part of the organization. This view has implications relative to the focus of efforts to integrate ethics throughout an organization. (shrink)

The Global Competitiveness Report raises ethical issues on multiple levels. The traditional high ranking accorded the US is largely attributable to fallacies, poor science and ideology. The ideological bias finds expression in two ways: the inclusion of indices that do not provide competitive advantage, but that fit the Anglo/US ideology; and the exclusion of indices that are known to offer competitive advantage, but that do not fit the Anglo/US ideology. This flaw is compounded by methodological problems that raise further doubt (...) as to the reliability and validity of the survey results. The resultant false high ranking of the US, a strong proponent of Anglo/US capitalism, pseudo-legitimizes the propensity of US-dominated institutions and entities to persuade, coerce and, in the worst-case force other countries and their constituents to adopt Anglo/US practices and behaviours. This is ethically reprehensible because research shows that these practices and behaviours, when compared with other approaches, are sub-optimal in the results they produce for individuals, corporations and nations. The report also unjustly and unnecessarily stigmatizes entire groups of countries with little conceivable benefit to anyone. Given the report’s gravitas through the profound global influence it exerts on the decisions of top government and business leaders, these are serious ethical and economic issues. (shrink)

Organisational Ethics could be more effectively taught if organisational agency could be better distinguished from activity in other group entities, and defended against criticisms. Some criticisms come from the side of what is called “methodological individualism”. These critics argue that, strictly speaking, only individuals really exist and act, and organisations are not individuals, real things, or agents. Other criticisms come from fear of the possible use of alleged “corporate personhood” to argue for a possible radical expansion of corporate rights e.g. (...) to claim a right to vote. Others say that if corporate businesses were persons, and judged as such, they would be sociopaths (Bakan 2004). Large corporate businesses are one kind of organisation, and if organisations were allowed to claim to be full persons, this would mean that the latter criticisms were valid. The proposed account goes between the horns of the above dilemma: impersonal aggregates or full persons. It avoids both the reductive individualism and expansive, full personhood account. It gives grounds for attributing and distributing praise and blame to organisations as whole complex entities, and to their parts. Primarily, responsibility belongs to Board incumbents within them, on the basis of their goals; their direction of the acts of the other main internal role incumbents, managers and staff, and enablers, in the role structure; their own ethical decision methods; the impact of their acts on external stakeholders like end-users, other players in the practice or local community, and on the state. These factors are picked out on the basis of a theory of meaning Aristotle’s theory of analogy of attribution, some architectonic features of his Philosophical Anthropology; and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (NAVE). The paper expounds a quasi-person model of organisations, (QPM), previously described in this journal (Ardagh 2011, 2012, 2013). This model identifies functional similarities at three levels, between capacities within natural persons (NPs) on the one hand and the roles/ incumbents within the structure of organisational artificial/quasi-persons (APs on the other). In each entity, we find an architectonic direction, sub-ordered operational entities, and enablers (a DOE structure) in a communicative structure or reporting chain of authority. The common elements between natural persons (NP) and artificial persons (AP) and their ethically relevant attributes are captured in an acronym –GRAEOS. Both persons and organisations have a “top” entity capable of having/choosing worthwhile ethically permissible goals, G; of architectonically directing the use of capacities/repertoires or incumbents in designed architectonic roles, R, within a DOE-type structure, well or badly; of using ethical decision making procedures, E; of execution of good choices for the person or organisation in action, A, with good or bad impacts on others, or with others, O, in the context practice or domain; and of having good relations with the law and the state, S. Application to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, and public sector organisations, is briefly discussed to illustrate the potential to deal with short or long case study narratives. (shrink)

In these essays, we are concerned with virtue in journalism and the media but are mindful of the tension between the commercial foundations of publishing and broadcasting, on the one hand, and journalism's democratic obligations on the other. Adam outlines, first, a moral vision of journalism focusing on individualistic concepts of authorship and craft. Next, Craft attempts to bridge individual and organizational concerns by examining the obligations of organizations to the individuals working within them. Finally, Cohen discusses the importance of (...) resisting the powerful corporate logic that pervades the news media in the United States and calls on journalists to be courageous. (shrink)

This article reviews the history of marketing thought in relation to social responsibility and business ethics. The main objective of the article is to show that business can be profitable and socially responsible at the same time by practising the societal marketing concept. More specifically, it presents the development of a marketing philosophy, discusses the influence of consumerism on the marketing concept and deals with ethics and social responsibility in marketing. It is argued that organisations who adopt the societal marketing (...) concept will be the ones most likely to make long-run profits as well as be beneficial to society as a whole. (shrink)