The G7 should address new, unprecedented and highly disruptive issues that characterize our complex world, rather than well-understood international problems that fit into existing categories. We argue that the G7 can do this by playing to its strengths – informality and like-mindedness in particular – in addressing emerging and transversal issues such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cryptocurrencies.

A concise review of skeptician in the Carterian model with a discussion of the reframing of the Cartesian paradigm by John McDowell in the 20th century.

FISIOLOGIA DA REPRODUÇÃO BOVINA: 2 - ESTRO E SERVIÇO -/- -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- -/- A identificação de vacas em cio (estro ou cio) é, sem dúvida, a prática mais importante no manejo da reprodução do rebanho leiteiro. Apesar dos avanços no conhecimento da fisiologia da reprodução a nível celular e molecular, a identificação de vacas em estro continua sendo o problema reprodutivo mais importante e o que mais causa prejuízos econômicos. Na indústria de laticínios no Brasil, seu impacto não foi (...) estimado, porém, a estimativa feita por países como os Estados Unidos onde se perdem 300 milhões de dólares por ano pode dar uma ideia, atribuída apenas à baixa eficiência na detecção de estros. Por que é cada vez mais difícil detectar vacas em estro? A resposta está relacionada aos aspectos intrínsecos da vaca leiteira moderna, associadas as práticas de manejo dos rebanhos atuais, caracterizados por possuírem grande número de vacas nos plantéis. -/- -/- 2.1 Como saber que uma vaca está em cio/estro? -/- -/- O comportamento estral é causado por um aumento no estradiol sérico produzido pelo folículo ovulatório. O aumento do estradiol provoca mudanças de comportamento e modificações na genitália externa e interna. A vaca mostra-se inquieta, sua vocalização aumenta, ela anda mais, tenta montar em outras vacas e aceita montar no touro ou em outra vaca, bem como urinam com mais frequência (micção frequente). A vulva fica levemente inflamada, à palpação retal o útero pode ser visto com tônus ou turgor (duro e contraído) e ao massagear o colo do útero observa-se que sai abundante muco cristalino da vulva. O mecanismo clássico proposto na regulação do estro é baseado principalmente no papel do estradiol; no entanto, estudos recentes indicam que o GnRH pode participar da regulação do estro ao nível do hipotálamo. O estro possui duração entre 8 e 18 horas e a intensidade do mesmo é afetada por fatores ambientais e intrínsecos a vaca moderna (figuras de 1 a 6). -/- -/- -/- Figura 2: A observação do grupo sexualmente ativo facilita a identificação das vacas em estro. -/- Figura 1: As vacas em estro formam grupos ativos (grupo sexualmente ativo) separados do resto das vacas. A conformação desses grupos facilita a observação do estro. -/- -/- A formação de grupos de vacas é um fator ideal para a detecção de vacas em cio, elas ficam juntas e começam a montar uma nas outras, a cheirar a urina de ambas etc. comportamentos que podem ser visualizados de longe pelo tratador e diagnosticado o cio o mais breve possível para o manejo reprodutivo adotado pela propriedade seja para monta natural ou controlada e/ou inseminações artificiais (IA) e artificiais em tempo fixo (IATF). -/- -/- Figura 3: O único comportamento positivo do estro é a aceitação da monta de outra vaca. É frequente que a vaca que realiza a monta também esteja em estro, o que só será afirmado até que ela aceite a monta de outra vaca. -/- -/- Figura 4: Cada monta dura de 5 a 7 segundos -/- Figura 5: A vaca leiteira aceita de 5 a 30 montas distribuídas entre 8 e 18 horas. -/- Figura 6: Além das mudanças comportamentais, os estrogênios causam alterações na genitália interna. Uma delas é a produção de muco cervical, que juntamente com o turgor uterino, constituem os sinais genitais do estro. -/- -/- O cio pode ser dividido em três fases, a inicial, a fase de cio verdadeiro e a fase final. O cio verdadeiro quando é observado, é caracterizado pelo momento em que a vaca aceita claramente a monta. Por sua vez, os sinais de início e final de cio se misturam, apresentam nervosismo e inquietação, cheiram e lambem a vagina e a urina de outras vacas, apoiam a cabeça na garupa de outras fêmeas etc. (figura 7). Uma das sugestões adotadas nas propriedades para facilitar a identificação do cio em um rebanho é realizada pelos funcionários com a utilização de um bastão ou fita de coloração da garupa das vacas. -/- Figura 7: Principais sinais que demonstram que a vaca está entrando em cio. As imagens mostram o início do cio, cio verdadeiro e final do cio. -/- CONTINUA. BAIXE O PDF!!! -/- RESUMO -/- -/- < >Nos Estados Unidos, 300 milhões de dólares são perdidos devido à baixa eficiência na detecção do estro. A eficiência na detecção do estro no Brasil é de 40 a 50%. A meta de eficiência para detecção de estro é > 60%. Com a observação das vacas em dois períodos diários de três horas cada (manhã e tarde), consegue-se uma eficiência na detecção de estro de 80%. Menos de 20 por cento das vacas devem ter um intervalo de serviço duplo e nenhum de mais de 48 dias. A taxa de prenhez é obtida multiplicando-se a eficiência na detecção do estro pela porcentagem de concepção e dividindo por 100 (50 * 30/100 = 15%). A taxa de prenhez em rebanhos norte-americanos é de 15%. Nos Estados Unidos, para cada ponto percentual que diminui a taxa de prenhez, não há mais de US$ 12 a US$ 15 por vaca por ano. No Brasil, para cada ponto percentual que aumenta a taxa de prenhez, na faixa de 15 a 20%, é gerada uma renda anual adicional de $ 190 reais por vaca. Não mais que 25% das vacas devem estar vazias no 150º dia pós-parto. Não mais do que 8% devem as vacas ser cobertas no 250º dia pós-parto. 8% das vacas devem engravidar a cada mês. O estro ocorre 48 a 120 horas após o tratamento com PGF2α. 80% é a precisão na palpação do corpo lúteo. Quatorze dias devem decorrer entre duas injeções de PGF2α. Menos de 25% das vacas incluídas no programa de pré-sincronização devem chegar à IATF. No momento da ovulação, a primeira injeção de GnRH deve ser aplicada entre o quinto e o nono dia do ciclo estral. A inseminação cronometrada é realizada 14-16 horas após a segunda injeção de GnRH. O tratamento com dispositivos intravaginais liberadores de progesterona dura 12 dias. Se a duração do tratamento é menor deve-se injetar PGF2α ao retirá-lo. -/- -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- -/- ATUESTA, Jorge; DIAZA, Angela Gonella. Control hormonal del ciclo estral en bovinos y ovinos. Spei Domus, v. 7, n. 14, 2011. -/- COLAZO, Marcos Germán; MAPLETOFT, Reben. Fisiología del ciclo estral bovino. Ciencia Veterinaria, v. 16, n. 2, p. 31-46, 2017. -/- Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. Belo Jardim: IFPE, 2020. -/- Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. Belo Jardim: IFPE, 2020. -/- DOBSON, H. et al. The high‐producing dairy cow and its reproductive performance. Reproduction in domestic animals, v. 42, p. 17-23, 2007. -/- DO VALLE, Ezequlel Rodrigues. O ciclo estral de bovinos e métodos de controle. EMBRAPA-CNPGC., 1991. -/- FURTADO, Diego Augusto et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo em bovinos de corte. Revista científica eletrônica de medicina veterinária, v. 16, p. 1-25, 2011. -/- GALON, Nadav. The use of pedometry for estrus detection in dairy cows in Israel. Journal of Reproduction and Development, v. 56, n. S, p. S48-S52, 2010. -/- HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. -/- LOPEZ, H.; SATTER, L. D.; WILTBANK, M. C. Relationship between level of milk production and estrous behavior of lactating dairy cows. Animal reproduction science, v. 81, n. 3-4, p. 209-223, 2004. -/- MACMILLAN, Keith L. Recent advances in the synchronization of estrus and ovulation in dairy cows. Journal of Reproduction and development, v. 56, n. S, p. S42-S47, 2010. -/- MUNIS DE OLIVEIRA, G. Fisiologia da Reprodução Bovina e Métodos de Controle do Ciclo Estral. Trabalho de conclusão do curso de especialização em Reprodução e Produção de Bovinos–UCB. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, 2006. -/- O'CONNOR, MICHAEL L. Estrus detection. In: Current therapy in large animal theriogenology. WB Saunders, 2007. p. 270-278. -/- RIPPE, Christian A. El ciclo estral. In: Dairy Cattle Reproduction Conference. 2009. p. 111-116. -/- ROELOFS, Judith et al. When is a cow in estrus? Clinical and practical aspects. Theriogenology, v. 74, n. 3, p. 327-344, 2010. -/- VIVEIROS, Ana Tereza de Mendonça. Fisiologia da reprodução de bovinos. Lavras: UFLA, p. 62, 1997. (shrink)

Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta (...) and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma. (shrink)

Demonstratives seem to have posed a severe difficulty for Frege’s philosophy of language, to which his doctrine of incommunicable senses was a reaction. In “The Thought,” Frege briefly discusses sentences containing such demonstratives as “today,” “here,” and “yesterday,” and then turns to certain questions that he says are raised by the occurrence of “I” in sentences (T, 24-26). He is led to say that, when one thinks about oneself, one grasps thoughts that others cannot grasp, that cannot be communicated. However, (...) nothing could be more out of the spirit of Frege’s account of sense and thought than an incommunicable, private thought. In the first part of the paper, I explain the problem demonstratives pose for Frege, and explore three ways he might have dealt with it. I argue that none of these ways provides Frege with a solution to his problem consistent with his philosophy of language. The first two are plausible as solutions, but contradict his identification of the sense expressed by a sentence with a thought. The third preserves the identification, but is implausible. In the second part, I suggest that Frege was led to his doctrine of incommunicable senses as a result of some appreciation of the difficulties his account of demonstratives faces, for these come quickly to the surface when we think about “I.” I argue that incommunicable senses won’t help. I end by trying to identify the central problem with Frege’s approach, and sketching an alternative. (shrink)

We think we have lots of substantial knowledge about the future. But contemporary wisdom has it that indeterminism prevails in such a way that just about any proposition about the future has a non-zero objective chance of being false.2, 3 What should one do about this? One, pessimistic, reaction is scepticism about knowledge of the future. We think this should be something of a last resort, especially since this scepticism is likely to infect alleged knowledge of the present and past. (...) One anti-sceptical strategy is to pin our hopes on determinism, conceding that knowledge of the future is unavailable in an indeterministic world. This is not satisfying either: we would rather not be hostage to empirical fortune in the way that this strategy recommends. A final strategy, one that we shall explore in this paper, is one of reconciliation: knowledge of a proposition is compatible with a subject’s belief having a non-zero objective chance of error.4 Following Williamson, we are interested in tying knowledge to the presence or absence of error in close cases, and so we shall explore the connections between knowledge and objective chance within such a framework. We don’t want to get tangled up here in complications involved in attempting to formulate a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge in terms of safety. Instead, we will assume the following rough and ready necessary condition: a subject knows P only if she could not easily have falsely believed P.5 Assuming that easiness is to be spelt.. (shrink)

We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we provide evidence that the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology could be a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.

Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority (...) of subjects were willing to attribute moral understanding to an agent lacking moral motivation. However, our attempts to replicate this study yielded quite different results, and we identified a number of problems with Nichols' experimental paradigm. The results from a series of surveys designed to rule out these problems show that people are more willing to attribute moral understanding than mor.. (shrink)

Published in Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson, and Alessio Cavallaro (eds), _Prefiguring Cyberculture: an intellectual history_ (MIT Press and Power Publications, December 2002). Please do send comments: email me. Back to my main publications page . Back to my home page.

The evolution of life on Earth has produced an organism that is beginning to model and understand its own evolution and the possible future evolution of life in the universe. These models and associated evidence show that evolution on Earth has a trajectory. The scale over which living processes are organized cooperatively has increased progressively, as has its evolvability. Recent theoretical advances raise the possibility that this trajectory is itself part of a wider developmental process. According to these theories, the (...) developmental process has been shaped by a yet larger evolutionary dynamic that involves the reproduction of universes. This evolutionary dynamic has tuned the key parameters of the universe to increase the likelihood that life will emerge and produce outcomes that are successful in the larger process (e.g. a key outcome may be to produce life and intelligence that intentionally reproduces the universe and tunes the parameters of ‘offspring’ universes). Theory suggests that when life emerges on a planet, it moves along this trajectory of its own accord. However, at a particular point evolution will continue to advance only if organisms emerge that decide to advance the developmental process intentionally. The organisms must be prepared to make this commitment even though the ultimate nature and destination of the process is uncertain, and may forever remain unknown. Organisms that complete this transition to intentional evolution will drive the further development of life and intelligence in the universe. Humanity’s increasing understanding of the evolution of life in the universe is rapidly bringing it to the threshold of this major evolutionary transition. (shrink)

A fruitful way to approach The Idea of Phenomenology is through Husserl’s claim that consciousness is not a bag, box, or any other kind of container. The bag conception, which dominated much of modern philosophy, is rooted in the idea that philosophy is restricted to investigating only what is really immanent to consciousness, such as acts and sensory contents. On this view, what Husserl called the riddle of transcendence can never be solved. The phenomenological reduction, as Husserl develops it in (...) The Idea of Phenomenology, opened up a new and broader sense of immanence that embraces the transcendent, making it possible both to solve the riddle and to escape the bag conception once and for all. The essay will discuss ways in which this new conception of immanence is tied to the key Husserlian themes of appearance, phenomenon, essence, seeing or intuiting, and constitution. (shrink)

The move from good to ought, a premise form found in many justifications of environmental ethics, is itself in need of justification. Of the potential moves from good to ought surveyed, some have considerable promise and others less or none. Those without much promise include extrapolations of obligations based on human goods to nonsentient natural entities, appeals to educated judgment, precautionary arguments, humanistic consequentialist arguments, and justifications that assert that our obligations to natural entities are neither directly to those entities (...) nor derived from our obligations to humans. Some arguments that extrapolate obligations based on goods involving sentience from humans to sentient animals are promising, but whether they are sufficient is controversial. Gandhian andAristotlian arguments are also promising, provided we can justify their ought premises. (shrink)

Skeptics argue that the acquisition of knowledge is impossible given the standing possibility of error. We present the limiting convergence strategy for responding to skepticism and discuss the relationship between conceivable error and an agent’s knowledge in the limit. We argue that the skeptic must demonstrate that agents are operating with a bad method or are in an epistemically cursed world. Such demonstration involves a significant step beyond conceivability and commits the skeptic to potentially convergent inquiry.

Richard Peters argued for a general education based largely on the study of truth-seeking subjects for its own sake. His arguments have long been acknowledged as problematic. There are also difficulties with Paul Hirst's arguments for a liberal education, which in part overlap with Peters'. Where justification fails, can historical explanation illuminate? Peters was influenced by the prevailing idea that a secondary education should be based on traditional, largely knowledge-orientated subjects, pursued for intrinsic as well as practical ends. Does history (...) reveal good reasons for this view? The view itself has roots going back to the 16th century and the educational tradition of radical Protestantism. Religious arguments to do with restoring the image of an omniscient God in man made good sense, within their own terms, of an encyclopaedic approach to education. As these faded in prominence after 1800, old curricular patterns persisted in the drive for ‘middle-class schools’, and new, less plausible justifications grew in salience. These were based first on faculty psychology and later on the psychology of individual differences. The essay relates the views of Peters and Hirst to these historical arguments, asking how far their writings show traces of the religious argument mentioned, and how their views on education and the development of mind relate to the psychological arguments. (shrink)

Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A (...) critical discussion of David Lewis's perceptual descriptivist views is also provided, including a defense of the logical possibility of systematic misperception or perceptual error for a perceiver, in spite of its empirical improbability. (shrink)

The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. (...) However, such a reflexive, naturalistic causal theory must compete with well entrenched, supposedly equally naturalistic theories of perception that are based on some concept of information, so the paper also includes some basic logical, naturalistic and explanatory criticisms of such informational views. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework. The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception in that, according to the RTP, any (...) X-caused and X-directed dispositions are genuinely perceptual—including affective, attitudinal, and immediately activated purely action-directed behavioral dispositions. Thus the RTP has the potential to provide the foundations for a broadly behavioral counter-revolution in cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very (...) same worldly perceived objects or properties that caused them--will be defended as one legitimate such naturalistic theory. (shrink)

Contemporary critical instincts, in early modern studies as elsewhere in literary theory, often dismiss invocations of mind and cognition as inevitably ahistorical, as performing a retrograde version of anachronism. Arguing that our experience of time is inherently anachronistic and polytemporal, we draw on the frameworks of distributed cognition and extended mind to theorize cognition as itself distributed, cultural, and temporal. Intelligent, embodied action is a hybrid process, involving the coordination of disparate neural, affective, cognitive, interpersonal, ecological, technological, and cultural resources. (...) Because the diverse elements of such coupled systems each have their own histories and dynamics, many distinctive or competing times are built in to the very mechanisms of remembering and reasoning. We make this argument by means of two distinct case histories: a reading of the site-specific audio walk of Canadian artist Janet Cardiff; and an extended discussion of a famously anachronistic moment in William Shakespeare’s King Lear. These readings reveal the inherent polytemporalities of human mental and social life. (shrink)

-/- A variable binding term operator (vbto) is a non-logical constant, say v, which combines with a variable y and a formula F containing y free to form a term (vy:F) whose free variables are exact ly those of F, excluding y. -/- Kalish-Montague proposed using vbtos to formalize definite descriptions, set abstracts {x: F}, minimalization in recursive function theory, etc. However, they gave no sematics for vbtos. Hatcher gave a semantics but one that has flaws. We give a correct (...) semantic analysis of vbtos. We also give axioms for using them in deductions. And we conjecture strong completeness for the deductions with respect to the semantics. The conjecture was later proved independently by the authors and by Newton da Costa. -/- The expression (vy:F) is called a variable bound term (vbt). In case F has only y free, (vy:F) has the syntactic propreties of an individual constant; and under a suitable interpretation of the language vy:F) denotes an individual. By a semantic analysis of vbtos we mean a proposal for amending the standard notions of (1) "an interpretation o f a first -order language" and (2) " the denotation of a term under an interpretation and an assignment", such that (1') an interpretation o f a first -order language associates a set-theoretic structure with each vbto and (2') under any interpretation and assignment each vb t denotes an individual. (shrink)

Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing that qualia have (...) the features are epistemically on a par with reasons for believing that ways things seem have the features, and you know that ways things seem do not have the features, then those reasons cannot justify your belief that qualia have the features. I argue that the reasons are epistemically on a par in this way. (shrink)

In this paper Lucas suggests that many of his critics have not read carefully neither his exposition nor Penrose’s one, so they seek to refute arguments they never proposed. Therefore he offers a brief history of the Gödelian argument put forward by Gödel, Penrose and Lucas itself: Gödel argued indeed that either mathematics is incompletable – that is axioms can never be comprised in a finite rule and so human mind surpasses the power of any finite machine – or there (...) exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems, and he suggest that the second disjunct is untenable; on the other side, Penrose proposed an argument similar to Lucas’ one but making use of Turing’s theorem. Finally Lucas exposes again his argument and considers some of the most important objections to it. (shrink)

How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint? An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence. A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, (...) plus a double content analysis of perceptual interpretation, which permits non-supervenient, culturally autonomous modes of reference to be generated and artistically exploited even in a purely physical world. In addition, a functionalist concept of broad or 'spread' reference replaces the traditional precise intentional concept of reference, which previously made reference to non-existent items theoretically intractable. (shrink)

Distributed Cognition and Integrational Linguistics have much in common. Both approaches see communicative activity and intelligent behaviour in general as strongly con- text-dependent and action-oriented, and brains as permeated by history. But there is some ten- sion between the two frameworks on three important issues. The majority of theorists of distributed cognition want to maintain some notions of mental representation and computa- tion, and to seek generalizations and patterns in the various ways in which creatures like us couple with technologies, (...) media, and other agents; many also want to offer explanations at subpersonal levels which may undercut the autonomy of personal-level accounts. In contrast, dominant views in integrational linguistics reject all invocation of representation, resist the explanatory search for similarity across contexts and moments, and see linguistics as a lay dis- cipline which should not offer explanations in terms alien to ordinary agents. On each of these issues, I argue that integrationists could move closer to the distributed cognition frame- work without losing the most important aspects of their view: integrationist criticisms of mainstream or classical theories can be respected while alliances with revised cognitivist views about representation, context, and explanation are developed. Ó 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)

If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...) of mind. In occasional semi-serious psychogeographic speculation, this long-standing and strongly-felt intellectual attitude has been traced back to the influences of our light, land, or lifestyle (Devitt 1996, x; compare comments by Chalmers and O’Brien in Mitchell, 2006). Australasian work in philosophy of mind and cognition has become more diverse in the last 40 years, but is almost all still marked, in one way or another, by the history of these debates on materialism. (shrink)

A novel semantic naturalization program is proposed. Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as (...) being purely abstract, so that concrete cognitive states are only indexed by them rather than instantiating them. (shrink)

In this chapter we introduce concepts for analyzing proofs, and for analyzing undergraduate and beginning graduate mathematics students’ proving abilities. We discuss how coordination of these two analyses can be used to improve students’ ability to construct proofs. -/- For this purpose, we need a richer framework for keeping track of students’ progress than the everyday one used by mathematicians. We need to know more than that a particular student can, or cannot, prove theorems by induction or contradiction or can, (...) or cannot, prove certain theorems in beginning set theory or analysis. It is more useful to describe a student’s work in terms of a finer-grained framework that includes various smaller abilities that contribute to proving and that can be learned in differing ways and at differing periods of a student’s development. (shrink)

I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean beliefs of the omissive form(om) p and I don’t believe that p,and the commissive form(com) p and I believe that not-p,from which I extract a definition of Moorean absurdity. I then argue for an account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion. After neutralizing two objections to my whole account, I show that Roy Sorensen’s own account of the absurdity of his ‘iterated cases’(om1) p and I don’t believe that I believe that (...) p,and(com1) p and I believe that I believe that not-p,is unsatisfactory. I explain why it is less absurd to believe or assert (om1) or (com1) than to believe or assert (om) or (com) and show that despite appearances, subsequent iterations of (om1) or (com1) do not decrease the absurdity of believing or asserting them. (shrink)

An information recovery problem is the problem of constructing a proposition containing the information dropped in going from a given premise to a given conclusion that folIows. The proposition(s) to beconstructed can be required to satisfy other conditions as well, e.g. being independent of the conclusion, or being “informationally unconnected” with the conclusion, or some other condition dictated by the context. This paper discusses various types of such problems, it presents techniques and principles useful in solving them, and it develops (...) algorithmic methods for certain classes of such problems. The results are then applied to classical number theory, in particular, to questions concerning possible refinements of the 1931 Gödel Axiom Set, e.g. whether any of its axioms can be analyzed into “informational atoms”. Two propositions are “informationally unconnected” [with each other] if no informative (nontautological) consequence of one also follows from the other. A proposition is an “informational atom” if it is informative but no information can be dropped from it without rendering it uninformative (tautological). Presentation, employment, and investigation of these two new concepts are prominent features of this paper. (shrink)

Memory is studied across a bewildering range of disciplines and subdisciplines in the neural, cognitive, and social sciences, and the term covers a wide range of related phenomena. In an integrative spirit, this chapter examines two case studies in memory research in which empirically-informed philosophy and philosophically informed sciences of the mind can be mutually informative, such that the interaction between psychology and philosophy can open up new research problems—and set new challenges—for our understanding of certain aspects of memory. In (...) each case, there is already enough interdisciplinary interaction on specific issues to give some confidence in the potential productivity of mutual exchange: but in each case, residual gulfs in research style and background assumptions remain to be addressed. (shrink)

There are many different ways to think about what has happened before. I think about my own recent actions, and about what happened to me a long time ago; I can think about times before I lived, and about what will happen after my death. I know many things about the past, and about what has happened because people did things before now, or because some good or bad things happened to me.

Representationalists who hold that phenomenal character can be explained in terms of representational content currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve indeterminate perceptual content, such as in the case of objects seen blurrily by someone with poor eyesight, or objects seen vaguely in misty conditions. But this problem can be resolved via provision of a more sophisticated double content (DC) view, according to which the representational content of perception is structured in two nested levels. I start by outlining the DC view (...) via consideration of four closely related cases of perceptual imprecision. Then, after a demonstration that the DC view can also explain imprecise photographic content, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases. (shrink)

To naturalize religion, we must identify what religion is, and what aspects of it we are trying to explain. In this paper, religious social institutional behavior is the explanatory target, and an explanatory hypothesis based on shared primate social dominance psychology is given. The argument is that various religious features, including the high status afforded the religious, and the high status afforded to deities, are an expression of this social dominance psychology in a context for which it did not evolve: (...) high-density populations made possible by agriculture. (shrink)

I argue that the concept of representation is ambiguous: a picture of 'a man', when there is no actual man that it depicts, both does, in one sense, and does not, in another sense, represent 'a man'--hence the need for a distinction of internal from external representation. Internal representation is also defended from reductive, non-referential alternative views, and from 'prosthesis' views of picturing, according to which seeing a picture of an actual man just is seeing through the picture to that (...) actual man himself. The view also provides a strong foundation for a theory of reference to fictional entities. (shrink)

One cannot have the concept of a red object without having the concept of an extended object. But the word "red" doesn't contain the word "extended." In general, our concepts are interconnected in ways in which the corresponding words are not interconnected. This is not an accidental fact about the English language or about any other language: it is inherent in what a language is that the cognitive abilities corresponding to a person's abilities to use words cannot possibly be reflected (...) in semantic relations holding among those words. This fact in its turn is a consequence of the fact that expressions are, whereas concepts are not, digital structures, for which reason the ways in which cognitive abilities interact cannot possibly bear any significant resemblance to the ways in which expressions interact. Consequently, there is no truth to the contention that our thought-processes are identical with, or bear any resemblance to, the digital computations that mediate computer-activity. (shrink)

Sensation should be understood globally: some infant behaviors do not make sense on the model of separate senses; neonates of all species lack time to learn about the world by triangulating among different senses. Considerations of natural selection favor a global understanding; and the global interpretation is not as opposed to traditional work on sensation as might seem.

According to Gold & Stoljar, one cannot consistently be both reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then, I reject their characterization of reductionism. Reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. Modifying the (...) argument from unification as reduction, I defend a position weaker than the radical but stronger than the trivial neuron doctrine. (shrink)

Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...) prompting the perceiver herself to do something (hence. (shrink)

Advocates of communal living often urge that life in a commune provides the framework for a deeper knowledge of other people. I believe this is clearly true and because it is true, communal living is also instrumental in promoting self knowledge. The dialogue that is part of the life of a commune enables one to incorporate the insights of the other members into his understanding of himself and his world.

This paper discusses why speech regulations are logically necessary for any account of a moral right to free speech. My argument for limiting the right to free speech (and more widely any right to freedom) will be grounded in compossibility. Rights to freedom, formally speaking, are claims by an agent that other people not interfere with them; a compossible set of rights is one where the domains of permissible actions—permitted by each claim (and its correlative duty) within the set—do not (...) contradict one another across claims. I will argue that in order for claims to be coherent, they cannot generate contradictory domains, and that for a claim to non-interference to not generate contradictory domains across multiple people with the same claim, the claim must be restricted. This account as it currently stands can at least generate conclusions on the permissibility of incitement. (shrink)

In this article, seven strategies for dealing with cross-cultural ethical conflict are described. Conflict situations are classified on the basis of centrality and consensus on the values involved, influence of the decision maker, and urgency. A contingency model suggests appropriate strategies for different situations. The model is applied to representative cases of cross-cultural ethical conflict.

In this paper, we propose a mathematical model of subjective experience in terms of classes of hierarchical geometries of representations (“n-awareness”). We first outline a general framework by recalling concepts from higher category theory, homotopy theory, and the theory of (infinity,1)-topoi. We then state three conjectures that enrich this framework. We first propose that the (infinity,1)-category of a geometric structure known as perfectoid diamond is an (infinity,1)-topos. In order to construct a topology on the (infinity,1)-category of diamonds we then propose (...) that topological localization, in the sense of Grothendieck-Rezk-Lurie (infinity,1)-topoi, extends to the (infinity,1)-category of diamonds. We provide a small-scale model using triangulated categories. Finally, our meta-model takes the form of Efimov K-theory of the (infinity,1)-category of perfectoid diamonds, which illustrates structural equivalences between the category of diamonds and subjective experience (i.e.its privacy, self-containedness, and self-reflexivity). Based on this, we investigate implications of the model. We posit a grammar (“n-declension”) for a novel language to express n-awareness, accompanied by a new temporal scheme (“n-time”). Our framework allows us to revisit old problems in the philosophy of time: how is change possible and what do we mean by simultaneity and coincidence? We also examine the notion of “self” within our framework. A new model of personal identity is introduced which resembles a categorical version of the “bundle theory”: selves are not substances in which properties inhere but (weakly) persistent moduli spaces in the K-theory of perfectoid diamonds. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of awareness based on the idea of plurality. Instead of positing a singular principle, telos, or essence as noumenon, we model it as plurality accessible through multiple forms of awareness (“n-awareness”). In contrast to many other approaches, our model is committed to pluralist thinking. The noumenon is plural, and reality is neither reducible nor irreducible. Nothing dies out in meaning making. We begin by mathematizing the concept of awareness by appealing to the (...) mathematical formalism of higher category theory. The beauty of higher category theory lies in its universality. Pluralism is categorical. In particular, we model awareness using the theories of derived categories and (infinity, 1)-topoi which will give rise to our meta-language. We then posit a “grammar” (“n-declension”) which could express n-awareness, accompanied by a new temporal ontology (“n-time”). Our framework allows us to revisit old problems in the philosophy of time: how is change possible and what do we mean by simultaneity and coincidence? Another question which could be re-conceptualized in our model is one of soteriology related to this pluralism: what is a self in this context? A new model of “personal identity over time” is thus introduced. (shrink)

Mathematics has a long track record of refining the concepts by which we make sense of the world. For example, mathematics allows one to speak about different senses of "sameness", depending on the larger context. Phenomenology is the name of a philosophical discipline that tries to systematically investigate the first-personal perspective on reality and how it is constituted. Together, mathematics and phenomenology seem to be a good fit to derive statements about our experience that are, at the same time, well-defined, (...) precise, and significant to our inner lives. However, there are difficulties stemming from the fact that phenomenology deals with inherently subjective things. Phenomenological investigations seem to lose their appeal when trying to approach them in the clear-cut way afforded by mathematics. How to overcome this obstacle? We argue that the Arts play a special role in mediating between the precise statements of mathematics and the sometimes fuzzy nature of our experience. Mathematics and art are complementary ways to come to a comprehensive understanding of reality. (shrink)

A comprehensive review of diamonds, in the sense of Scholze, is presented. The diamond formulations of the Fargues-Fontaine curve and Bun_G are stated. Principal results centered on the diamond formalism in the global Langlands correspondence and the geometrization of the local Langlands correspondence are given. We conclude with a discussion of future geometrizations, and conjecture a diamond reformulation of quantum computational complexity towards a diamond ER = EPR.

We present colorful illustrations of particular properties of functorial diamonds, in the sense of Scholze; namely profinite reflections as categorical colors.We discuss sight as site using representable functors in the condensed formalism. We illuminate diamonds using our novel constructions of categorical Ozma and Cinderella, the site of Oz, and condensed Through the Looking-Glass.

Motivated by Scholze and Fargues' geometrization of the local Langlands correspondence using perfectoid diamonds and Clausen and Scholze's work on the K-theory of adic spaces using condensed mathematics, we introduce the Efimov K-theory of diamonds. We propose a pro-diamond, a large stable (infinity,1)-category of diamonds D^{diamond}, diamond spectra and chromatic tower, and a localization sequence for diamond spectra.

We develop an approach to temporal logic that replaces the traditional objective, agent- and event-independent notion of time with a constructive, event-dependent notion of time. We show how to make this event-dependent time entropic and hence well-defined. We use sheaf-theoretic techniques to render event-dependent time functorial and to construct memories as sequences of observed and constructed events with well-defined limits that maximize the consistency of categorizations assigned to objects appearing in memories. We then develop a condensed formalism that represents memories (...) as pure constructs from single events. We formulate an empirical hypothesis that human episodic memory implements a particular constructive functor. (shrink)

We present a colorful and novel discussion of mathematical techniques of visualizing a fourth spatial dimension. We first discuss notions of dimensionality including the homotopy dimension for objects in an (infinity,1)-topos. We try to visualize the fourth spatial dimension using color, and illustrate this with four-dimensional ice-cream. We apply categorical negative thinking to what we have called (infinity,1)-visual epistemology. The aim is that visualizations of higher spatial dimensions can occur functorially. We illustrate with five images five conjectural methods for how (...) to visualize the fourth spatial dimension. (shrink)

We recently presented our Efimov K-theory of Diamonds, proposing a pro-diamond, a large stable (∞,1)-category of diamonds (D^{diamond}), and a localization sequence for diamond spectra. Commensurate with the localization sequence, we now detail four potential applications of the Efimov K-theory of D^{diamond}: emergent time as a pro-emergence (v-stack time) in a diamond holographic principle using Scholze’s six operations in the ’etale cohomology of diamonds; a pro-Generative Adversarial Network and v-stack perceptron; D^{diamond}cryptography; and diamond nonlocality in perfectoid quantum physics.