When did historians begin to put quotation marks around the wordreal? There are many examples of this habit and some of them will be set forth as evidence in what follows. But before doing so we might ask a preliminary question: What are the quotation marksthemselvessupposed to mean? Today we find them so familiar they hardly need to be written and they are more frequently consigned to the everyday repertoire of silent gesture: two fingers on either hand clutch at the (...) air as if they meant to tickle the flanks of the invisible beast between them. The popular term is “scare-quotes,” a pun on the word “scarecrow.” Its etymology is revealing: just as a mere representation of a body in a field may scare off birds, so too scare-quotes permit someone to deploy a word without sincere commitment to what it normally means. But further reflection tells us that the effects are not so similar after all: To use a term without sincerity robs it of its original meaning and holds up its lifeless corpse to ridicule. The more knowing sort of crow can settle on the shoulder of the figure on the pole precisely because it recognizes that such a sorry excuse for a man can in fact harm no one. Similarly when one putsrealityin quotation marks we are put in mind of the living concept but we are immediately alerted to the fact that, for the user at least, the new term enjoys no metaphysical prestige. How did this happen? When and why did the single most privileged word in the entire lexicon of metaphysics begin to lose its authority such that in certain spheres of intellectual sophistication its sincere use would only seem an embarrassment and a sign of naïveté? (shrink)

Epistemology has had a strongly individualist orientation, at least since Descartes. Knowledge, for Descartes, starts with the fact of one’s own thinking and with oneself as subject of that thinking. Whatever else can be known, it must be known by inference from one’s own mental contents. Achieving such knowledge is an individual, rather than a collective, enterprise. Descartes’s successors largely followed this lead, so the history of epistemology, down to our own time, has been a predominantly individualist affair.

Problem solving has recently become a central topic both in the philosophy of science and in cognitive science. This paper integrates approaches to problem solving from these two disciplines and discusses the epistemological consequences of such an integration. The paper first analyzes problem solving as getting a true answer to a question. It then explores some stages of cognitive activity relevant to question answering that have been delineated by historians and philosophers of science and by cognitive psychologists and artificial intelligencers. (...) The traditional opposition between discovery and justification is challenged. It is suggested that epistemology may be conceptualized, in part, as the critical assessment of problem-solving strategies. (shrink)

Many recent results suggest that quantum theory is about information, and that quantum theory is best understood as arising from principles concerning information and information processing. At the same time, by far the simplest version of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics, is concerned, not with information but with the behavior of an objective microscopic reality given by particles and their positions. What I would like to do here is to examine whether, and to what extent, the importance of information, observation, and (...) the like in quantum theory can be understood from a Bohmian perspective. I would like to explore the hypothesis that the idea that information plays a special role in physics naturally emerges in a Bohmian universe. (shrink)

Among the literature of the 1970s which enthusiastically emphasized the externalist approach to the history of science was an article by John Farley and Gerald L. Geison which has often been referred to. It gave an interpretation of the spontaneous generation debate of 1859–64 between Louis Pasteur and Félix A. Pouchet, which suggests that Pasteur's victory was largely due to religious and political factors which favoured him rather than to experimental evidence. Although this view has been challenged by Nils Roll-Hansen, (...) no historian has yet appreciated the full context of the debate which involves the French Academy of Sciences. The Academy had fostered research through prize-questions on spontanteous generation and related issues for nearly twenty years. This new evidence radically alters the feasibility of Pouchet's support for spontaneous generation.A closer examination of Pouchet's writings shows that his religious beliefs influenced his work at least as much as in the case of Pasteur. Pouchet's deeply held commitment to spontaneous generation was not open to modification in the light of new experimental evidence. It was therefore a clear case of a research programme which was not ‘progressive’ and did not deserve to succeed. (shrink)

It is shown how the historiographic purport of Lakatosian methodology of mathematics is structured on the theme of analysis and synthesis. This theme is explored and extended to the revolutionary phase around 1800. On the basis of this historical investigation it is argued that major innovations, crucial to the appraisal of mathematical progress, defy reconstruction as irreducibly rational processes and should instead essentially be understood as processes of social-cognitive interaction. A model of conceptual change is developed whose essential ingredients are (...) the variability of rational responses to new intellectual and practical challenges arising in the cultural environment of mathematics, and the shifting selective pressure of society. The resulting view of mathematical development is compared with Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms in the light of some personal communications. (shrink)

To understand the role of expert systems as a medium for transferring knowledge and skills within organisations requires an understanding of the nature of expertise within working life contexts. Central to this issue of transfer is the debate on the nature of tacit/implicit knowledge and the problem of formalising it in explicit form. This paper considers the British approach to the development of knowledge-based systems, which is regarded as being predominantly rationalistic, and compares it with the Scandinavian approach, which is (...) regarded as being predominantly humanistic. The paper proposes that crucial to the debate on the transfer of knowledge and skills is the development of expert systems as communications media which aims at enhancing and sharing the knowledge and skills of users. A human-centred approach for the future is proposed which brings the above two traditions together thereby providing a developmental framework for knowledge based systems. (shrink)

The aim of the present volume is to draw the balance of naturalism's success so far.

The ArgumentBehind the dispute over the relative priority of theory and experiment lie conflicting philosophical images of the nature of scientific inquiry. One crucial image arose in the 1920s, when the logical positivists agitated for a “unity of science” that would ground all meaningful scientific activity on an observational foundation. Their goals and rhetoric dovetailed with the larger movements of architectural, literary, and philosophical modernism. Historians of science followed the positivists by tracking experimental science as the basis for scientific progress. (...) After World War II, historians and philosophers of science created an antipositivist movement, inverting the positivist idea that observation had epistemic priority. But this counter-movement retained the modernist aspiration to unity, now chaining observation to theory. Once again historians of science, following their philosophical colleagues, illustrated the new modernism with historical instances of observation dominated by theory.Either reductionist scheme, by privileging one activity over the other, dictates an overly constrictive periodization. We need a wider class of periodization models that will allow instrumentation, experimentation, and theory a partial autonomy without granting any one the sole legitimate narrative standpoint. Such a heterogeneous representation of historical traditions may, surprisingly, make better sense of the perceived coherence of activity across theoretical transitions than the monolithic modernist representation of science it displaces. (shrink)

An assessment of Joel Isaac’s recent, well-researched attempt to provide a context for the emergence of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. That context consisted in the open space for cross-disciplinary projects between the natural and social sciences that existed at Harvard during the presidency of James Bryant Conant, from the early 1930s to the early 1950s. Isaac’s work at the Harvard archives adds interesting detail to a story whose general contours are already known. In particular, he reinforces the view (...) that the guiding intellectual presence of what Isaac dubs Harvard’s “interstitial academy” was the biochemist Lawrence Henderson, someone who was enamored of Vilfredo Pareto’s version of scientism and was materially supported by the Rockefeller Foundation’s interest in increasing worker productivity. Isaac fails to consider the normative implications of Henderson’s vision, which influenced Talcott Parsons even more deeply than Kuhn. Isaac’s book is read in light of this concern, which reveals a profound sense of what is required of the sort of future elite policy maker that Harvard hoped to train: namely, a systems-based orientation that is at the same time tolerant of considerable intrasystemic incommensurability. The epistemological and ethical aspects of this prescription are analyzed. (shrink)

For the last four years I have been working on a book on the origins and\nimpacts of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolution. I have\nsubtitled the book a ’philosophical history’ because one of my aims is to\nrevive the lost art of passing judgement on history, in this case the history\nof our own times. This is not an easy art to practise even in the best of\ntimes, and ours is not one of them. As I delved more deeply into Kuhn’s\nbackground (...) and influence, it became clear that he was indeed correct to\nhave disowned the more radical sociological readings of Structure that\nplaced all disciplines on an equal epistemic footing. However, in the long\nterm these misreadings have unwittingly served to contain the critical\nimpulses of the would-be radicals, a result that should meet with Kuhn’s\napproval and certainly the approval of his mentor, Harvard president and\nCold Warrior James Bryant Conant, the man to whom Structure is dedicated.\nIn terms of the new sociology of science associated with the Edinburgh\nschool and its successors, ’Kuhnification’ has affected both the form\nand the content of their inquiries. In form, most of the work consists of\n’normal science’ that speaks to a narrow community of specialists rather\nthan to scientists or society at large. In content, it continues to centre on\nscience as a society in the small, at the expense of science’s role in society\nat large. While it is indeed possible, as feminists have shown, to study the\nscientific workplace as a microcosm of the injustices perpetrated in the\ngreater society, such studies have been in the minority, thanks to a lingering\nKuhnian sense of what is properly within the domain of ’science\nstudies’. (shrink)

I respond to Rupert Read's highly critical review of my Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul Science . In contrast to my pro-Popper take on the debate, Read promotes a Wittgenstein-inflected Kuhn, whom I dub "Kuhnenstein." Kuhnenstein is largely the figment of Read's—and others'—fertile philosophical imagination as channeled through scholastic philosophical practice. Contra Read, I argue that Kuhnenstein provides not only a poor basis for social epistemology but Kuhnenstein's prominence itself exemplifies a poor social epistemology for philosophy. Nevertheless, (...) like Read, I wish to speak in favor of amateurism in philosophy; for me, the exemplar is the dialectical Popper rather than the gnomic and dogmatic Kuhnenstein. Key Words: Kuhnenstein • social epistemology • Kuhn • Popper • Wittgenstein • skepticism • language therapy • amateurism. (shrink)

The primary instrument of dispute management in political liberalism is a form of political thinking and talking that tries to reconcile opposed positions with an impartial settlement based on fair arrangements and mutual respect, one that is careful to treat rival views equitably, and reasoned through from start to finish with open methods that lead to a public justification understandable to the disputants. But this model of reasoning is notoriously deficient in resolving disputes among radically different communities. A more effective (...) form of political reasoning for these disputes that yet respects the background values of liberalism is found in the languages of state depicted in realist accounts of international relations. These languages avoid liberal appeals to be reasonable, reciprocity controlled by moral criteria, and the quest for common reasons. They represent a deliberative search for an accord that will meet the interests of the disputing parties as they define these interests and understand the settlements, and in this sense are welcome models to manage divisive issues in pluralist democracies. A complete version of political reasoning would contain both liberal and realpolitik models and a mechanism to adjudicate the appropriate uses of each model. (shrink)

The argument of this article is that, philosophically, there are but three broad conceptual models that Western thought employs in thinking about the meaning of God. At the level of greatest generality, these are the models known as classical theism, pantheism, and panentheism. The essay surveys and updates these three conceptual models in light of recent writings, finds more flaws in classical theism and panentheism than in pantheism, and suggests a feminist response to each.

J C Forge; A Role for Philosophy of Science in the Teaching of Science, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 109–117, http.