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  1. Carnap’s Transformation of Epistemology and the Development of His Metaphilosophy.Thomas Uebel - 2018 - The Monist 101 (4):367-387.
    Carnap’s lectures at the 1935 Paris Congress for the Unity of Science marked the beginning of his mature metaphilosophy. This paper considers what role remained for epistemology once it was “purified” of all psychological elements as Carnap there demanded. It is argued that while this did mean the end of traditional epistemology, room was found for nontraditional versions in the course of the further development of Carnap’s logic of science.
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  • Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws.Clinton Tolley - 2006 - Philosophical Topics 34 (1-2):371-407.
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  • Characterizing generics are material inference tickets: a proof-theoretic analysis.Preston Stovall - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):668-704.
    An adequate semantics for generic sentences must stake out positions across a range of contested territory in philosophy and linguistics. For this reason the study of generic sentences is a venue for investigating different frameworks for understanding human rationality as manifested in linguistic phenomena such as quantification, classification of individuals under kinds, defeasible reasoning, and intensionality. Despite the wide variety of semantic theories developed for generic sentences, to date these theories have been almost universally model-theoretic and representational. This essay outlines (...)
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  • Hilbert's axiomatic method and Carnap's general axiomatics.Michael Stöltzner - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:12-22.
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  • Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):143-162.
    In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the (...)
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  • Logic in the 1930s: type theory and model theory.Georg Schiemer & Erich H. Reck - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (4):433-472.
    In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style of Principia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics (...)
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  • Logic in the 1930s: Type Theory and Model Theory.Georg Schiemer & Erich H. Reck - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (4):433-472.
    In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style ofPrincipia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of (...)
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  • Carnap's Untersuchungen: Logicism, Formal Axiomatics, and Metatheory.Georg Schiemer - 2012 - In R. Creath (ed.), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Springer Verlag. pp. 13--36.
    This paper discusses Carnap’s attempts in the late 1920s to provide a formal reconstruction of modern axiomatics.1 One interpretive theme addressed in recent scholarly literature concerns Carnap’s underlying logicism in his philosophy of mathematics from that time, more specifically, his attempt to “reconcile” the logicist approach of reducing mathematics to logic with the formal axiomatic method. For instance, Awodey & Carus characterize Carnap’s manuscript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik from 1928 as a “large-scale project to reconcile axiomatic definitions with logicism, and (...)
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  • Carnap’s early metatheory: scope and limits.Georg Schiemer, Richard Zach & Erich Reck - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):33-65.
    In Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik and Abriss der Logistik, Carnap attempted to formulate the metatheory of axiomatic theories within a single, fully interpreted type-theoretic framework and to investigate a number of meta-logical notions in it, such as those of model, consequence, consistency, completeness, and decidability. These attempts were largely unsuccessful, also in his own considered judgment. A detailed assessment of Carnap’s attempt shows, nevertheless, that his approach is much less confused and hopeless than it has often been made out to (...)
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  • Carnap’s Early Semantics.Georg Schiemer - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):487-522.
    This paper concerns Carnap’s early contributions to formal semantics in his work on general axiomatics between 1928 and 1936. Its main focus is on whether he held a variable domain conception of models. I argue that interpreting Carnap’s account in terms of a fixed domain approach fails to describe his premodern understanding of formal models. By drawing attention to the second part of Carnap’s unpublished manuscript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik, an alternative interpretation of the notions ‘model’, ‘model extension’ and ‘submodel’ (...)
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  • Carnap, Feyerabend, and the Pragmatic Theory of Observation.Daniel Kuby - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (2):432-470.
    Paul Feyerabend once made a remark to the effect that his pragmatic theory of observation can be traced back to proposals put forward by leading Logical Empiricists during the height of the protocol sentence debate. In this paper I want to vindicate the systematic side of Feyerabend’s remark and show that a pragmatic theory of observation can in fact be found in Rudolf Carnap’s writings of 1932. I first proceed to dispel a misunderstanding concerning the term “pragmatic” raised by Thomas (...)
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  • Carnap’s Defense of Impredicative Definitions.Vera Flocke - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):372-404.
    A definition of a property P is impredicative if it quantifies over a domain to which P belongs. Due to influential arguments by Ramsey and Gödel, impredicative mathematics is often thought to possess special metaphysical commitments. It seems that an impredicative definition of a property P does not have the intended meaning unless P already exists, suggesting that the existence of P cannot depend on its explicit definition. Carnap (1937 [1934], p. 164) argues, however, that accepting impredicative definitions amounts to (...)
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  • Going Global: Carnap’s Voluntarism and Price’s Expressivism.A. W. Carus - 2018 - The Monist 101 (4):441-467.
    Huw Price has sketched a program for a globalized expressivism in support of which he has repeatedly invoked Rudolf Carnap. This paper argues that this is entirely appropriate, as Carnap had something quite similar in mind. However, it also argues that Price’s recent attempts to integrate Robert Brandom’s inferentialism to this program are less successful, and that a more empirically-oriented descriptive pragmatics along Carnapian lines would be a better fit with his original program than Brandom’s explicitly hermeneutical agenda.
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  • Developments in Logic: Carnap, Gödel, and Tarski.Erich H. Reck - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 546-571.
    Analytic philosophy and modern logic are intimately connected, both historically and systematically. Thinkers such as Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein were major contributors to the early development of both; and the fruitful use of modern logic in addressing philosophical problems was, and still is, definitive for large parts of the analytic tradition. More specifically, Frege's analysis of the concept of number, Russell's theory of descriptions, and Wittgenstein's notion of tautology have long been seen as paradigmatic pieces of philosophy in this tradition. (...)
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  • Pasch's empiricism as methodological structuralism.Dirk Schlimm - 2020 - In Erich H. Reck & Georg Schiemer (eds.), The Pre-History of Mathematical Structuralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 80-105.
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  • The limits and basis of logical tolerance: Carnap’s combination of Russell and Wittgenstein.Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2016 - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Wilmington, Delaware, United States: Vernon Press.
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  • Logicism and Carnap's logical syntax.Adrian Frey - 2011 - .
    Although logicism played a significant role in Carnap's philosophical thinking, the relation of his philosophy of mathematics to the main tenets of the logicist tradition is complex and variable. is paper examines one aspect of this relation by discussing the following question: What elements of Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, if any at all, indicate a real commitment to that tradition? It will be shown that although important aspects of Frege-Russell logicism are incorporated into the framework developed in that book, (...)
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  • Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbia
    My dissertation explores the ways in which Rudolf Carnap sought to make philosophy scientific by further developing recent interpretive efforts to explain Carnap’s mature philosophical work as a form of engineering. It does this by looking in detail at his philosophical practice in his most sustained mature project, his work on pure and applied inductive logic. I, first, specify the sort of engineering Carnap is engaged in as involving an engineering design problem and then draw out the complications of design (...)
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  • The Methodological Roles of Tolerance and Conventionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics: Reconsidering Carnap's Logic of Science.Emerson P. Doyle - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    This dissertation makes two primary contributions. The first three chapters develop an interpretation of Carnap's Meta-Philosophical Program which places stress upon his methodological analysis of the sciences over and above the Principle of Tolerance. Most importantly, I suggest, is that Carnap sees philosophy as contiguous with science—as a part of the scientific enterprise—so utilizing the very same methods and subject to the same limitations. I argue that the methodological reforms he suggests for philosophy amount to philosophy as the explication of (...)
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