- Pluralismo, Monismo e Relativismo Lógico.Diogo Dias - 2018 - Revista de Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea 6 (2):21-36.details
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Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon Problem.John Alton Christmann - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):55-61.details
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Endurance, Dualism, Temporal Passage, and Intuitions.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):851-862.details
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Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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Holism and meaning.James O. Young - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (3):309 - 325.details
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Noncomparabilism in epistemology.Mark Emerson Wunderlich - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):133 - 151.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Predicting the Past from Minimal Traces: Episodic Memory and its Distinction from Imagination and Preservation.Markus Werning - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):301-333.details
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Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution.Ju Wang - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2357-2374.details
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Contextualismo integrativo: una manera de ordenar las distintas nociones de justificación epistémica.Ricardo Vázquez & Jonatan García - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (1):27-44.details
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Ideal Epistemic Situations and the Accessibility of Realist Truth.Giorgio Volpe - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (1):13-29.details
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Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier.Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (2):175-200.details
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Basic beliefs and the perceptual learning problem: A substantial challenge for moderate foundationalism.Bram Vaassen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):133-149.details
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Scepticism, context and modal reasoning.Andrej Ule - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):9-30.details
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Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.details
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A New Paradigm for Epistemology From Reliabilism to Abilism.John Turri - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Keith Lehrer on the basing relation.Hannah Tierney & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):27-36.details
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Selfless assertions and the Knowledge Norm.Nicholas Tebben - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-20.details
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Belief isn’t voluntary, but commitment is.Nicholas Tebben - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1163-1179.details
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Knowledge requires commitment (instead of belief).Nicholas Tebben - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):321-338.details
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Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.details
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Survey-Driven Romanticism.Simon Cullen - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.details
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The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):733-762.details
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The Effort of Reasoning: Modelling the Inference Steps of Boundedly Rational Agents.Anthia Solaki - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (4):529-553.details
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A Tale of Two Nortons.Patrick Skeels - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 83:28-35.details
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Rational social and political polarization.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Jiin Jung, Karen Kovaka, Anika Ranginani & William J. Berger - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2243-2267.details
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Plato on the Traditional Definition of Knowledge.José Lourenço Pereira da Silva - 2018 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 23:167-204.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.details
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The origins of perceptual knowledge.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):311-328.details
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Third-person internalism: A critical examination of externalism and a foundation-oriented alternative. [REVIEW]Gerhard Schurz - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):9-28.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.details
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Optimality justifications: new foundations for foundation-oriented epistemology.Gerhard Schurz - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3877-3897.details
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Coherence reasoning and reliability: a defense of the Shogenji measure.Stefan Schubert - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):305-319.details
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Basic factive perceptual reasons.Ian Schnee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1103-1118.details
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The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses.Bruce Russell - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):105-131.details
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Stability, strength and sensitivity: Converting belief into knowledge.Hans Rott - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.details
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Reconsidering the lessons of the lottery for knowledge and belief.Glenn Ross - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):37-46.details
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Revisiting knowledge from Falsehood.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):705-724.details
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Coherentism, truth, and witness agreement.William A. Roche - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):243-257.details
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A reply to Cling’s “The epistemic regress problem”.William A. Roche - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276.details
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How to think about fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.details
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Warrant, Conclusive Reason, and Failure-Of-Transfer-Of-Warrant.Murali Ramachandran - 2018 - Problemos 94:35.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Counterexamples and prophylactics.Terry L. Price - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (3):273 - 282.details
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Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems.Ted Poston - 2022 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):83-111.details
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Basic reasons and first philosophy: A coherentist view of reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.details
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Realism, Naturalism, and Hazlett’s Challenge Concerning Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):73-91.details
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Justification and False Belief: Gettier’s First Point.Michael Perrick - 2016 - Open Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):446-454.details
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Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge.Paul Thagard - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (1):28-47.details
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