- On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Inference Without the Taking Condition.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 130-146.details
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Doxastic Justification and Testimonial Beliefs.Emmanuel Smith - 2023 - Episteme (N/A):1-14.details
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Epistemic control without voluntarism.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109.details
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What the tortoise should do: A knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation.Lisa Miracchi Titus & J. Adam Carter - 2024 - Noûs.details
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Forgiveness: Overcoming versus Forswearing Blame.Julius Schönherr - 2024 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 41 (1):66-84.details
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Can the Epistemic Basing Relation be a Brain Process?Dwayne Moore - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (2):1-19.details
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The Argument from Reason and the Dual Process Reply.Dwayne Moore - 2022 - Philosophia Christi 24 (2):217-239.details
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Mental Imagery and the Epistemology of Testimony.Daniel Munro - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):428-449.details
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Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause.Julius Schönherr - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-18.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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Group Belief for a Reason.Jessica Brown - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):1-22.details
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No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations.Hamid Vahid - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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Reasons, Rationalization, and Rationality.Erhan Demircioglu - 2021 - Philosophia 51 (1):113-137.details
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Creative reasoning.John Turri - 2014 - In John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-226.details
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Reasons and basing in commonsense epistemology: evidence from two experiments.John Turri - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge.details
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Sustaining rules: a model and application.John Turri - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):702-718.details
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What the Debasing Demon Teaches Us About Wisdom.Kevin McCain - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):521-530.details
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The Basis of Debasing Scepticism.Joe Cunningham - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):813-833.details
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Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.details
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(1 other version)Moderate Epistemic Akrasia.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):69-97.details
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Experimental, Cross-Cultural, and Classical Indian Epistemology.John Turri - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):501-516.details
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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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(1 other version)Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Basing for the Bayesian.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3815-3840.details
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Baseless Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (50):211-231.details
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Justified group belief is evidentially responsible group belief.Paul Silva - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):262-281.details
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Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.details
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Social Knowledge and Supervenience Revisited.Mark Povich - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):1033-1043.details
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The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1615-1630.details
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Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification.Patrick Bondy & Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3811-3820.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.details
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Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):561-582.details
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Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations.Patrick Bondy - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):542-569.details
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Knowing how to put knowledge first in the theory of justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.details
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The basing relation and the impossibility of the debasing demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):203.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Testimonial Reasons.David Matheson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):757-774.details
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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.details
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Reasons, Causes, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Daniel Pearlberg & Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):41-57.details
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Truthy psychologism about evidence.Veli Mitova - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.details
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The Epistemic Argument for Mental Causation.Dwayne Moore - 2014 - Philosophical Forum 45 (2):149-168.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Justification and Cognitive Algorithms.Luis Rosa - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):503-515.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.details
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