- Bayes et les biais. Le « biais de confirmation » en question.Marion Vorms - 2021 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 112 (4):567-590.details
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Policymaking under scientific uncertainty.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Making Confident Decisions with Model Ensembles.Joe Roussos, Richard Bradley & Roman Frigg - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (3):439-460.details
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Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):495-515.details
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Norms of Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madisondetails
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A Theory of Epistemic Risk.Boris Babic - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):522-550.details
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Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.details
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Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.details
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Logical and Epistemic Modality.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemic Expansions.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):217-236.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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A Graded Bayesian Coherence Notion.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):843-869.details
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The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):701-723.details
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Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection.Kenny Easwaran - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):119-142.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reflection and conditionalization: Comments on Michael Rescorla.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):539-552.details
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An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1013-1041.details
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Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment.Jeremy Shipley - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):339-361.details
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(1 other version)On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability.Joseph Berkovitz - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):1-48.details
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Cognitive Success: A Consequentialist Account of Rationality in Cognition.Gerhard Schurz & Ralph Hertwig - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (1):7-36.details
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Accuracy, Verisimilitude, and Scoring Rules.Jeffrey Dunn - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):151-166.details
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The Tripartite Role of Belief: Evidence, Truth, and Action.Kenny Easwaran - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):1-18.details
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Is reliabilism a form of consequentialism?Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):183-194.details
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Is Strict Coherence Coherent?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):411-424.details
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In Defense of Reflection.Simon M. Huttegger - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):413-433.details
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Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.details
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Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.details
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Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.details
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(1 other version)On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability.Joseph Berkovitz - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):25.details
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The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):576-590.details
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Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2737-2776.details
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Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.details
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A modesty proposal.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3581-3601.details
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A New Argument for Kolomogorov Conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):1-16.details
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Bayesian Measures of Confirmation from Scoring Rules.Steven J. van Enk - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):101-113.details
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We ought to agree: A consequence of repairing Goldman's group scoring rule.Matthew Kopec - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):101-114.details
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Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem.Adam J. L. Harris, Anne S. Hsu & Jens K. Madsen - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):311 - 343.details
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(1 other version)What probability probably isn't.C. Howson - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):53-59.details
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(1 other version)What probability probably isn't.C. Howson - unknowndetails
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The Evolution of Bayesian Updating.Samir Okasha - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):745-757.details
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Epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia.details
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The Representation of Belief.Isaac Wilhelm - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):715-732.details
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The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?Ulrike Hahn - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Aggregating infinitely many probability measures.Frederik Herzberg - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (2):319-337.details
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Accurate believers are deductively cogent.Matthew Hewson - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):763-786.details
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Strategy and the pursuit of truth.Christoph Merdes - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):117-138.details
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Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw025.details
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