Este artículo presenta una interpretación de dos discutidos pasajes de Metafísica VI 3 y XI 8 en los que se encuentra la argumentación de Aristóteles encaminada a evitar la necesidad universal con base en la existencia de las coincidencias. Esta argumentación ha suscitado múltiples e incompatibles interpretaciones desde la Antigüedad hasta nuestros días. En ellas se ha presentado la argumentación del Estagirita en un abanico que va desde comprenderla como una postura compatible con el más fuerte determinismo, hasta una que (...) requiere un muy generalizado indeterminismo. En diálogo con estas interpretaciones, se defenderá una lectura según la cual estos pasajes están diseñados para argumentar no contra el determinismo causal sino contra la predeterminación. (shrink)

Se examina la interpretación aristotélica del azar como causa accidental en el ámbito de los fines de aquello que puede ser realizado por la naturaleza o por el pensamiento. ¿Por qué un acontecimiento fortuito pertenece al orden de los fines? ¿Qué quiere decir que los sucesos fortuitos son "para algo"? Se repasan las principales respuestas de los especialistas, se indican algunas deficiencias y se propone una lectura no causal-explicativa de la expresión ἓνεκά του, diferente de la teleología del como-si, como (...) explicación de la finalidad del acontecimiento fortuito. The Aristotelian interpretation of randomness is examined as an accidental cause in the sphere of ends of that which can be brought about by nature or by thought. Why would a fortuitous event belong to the order of ends? What does it mean to say that fortuitous events are "for something"? The main responses to specialists are reviewed, some deficiencies are noted, and a non-causal-explicative reading is proposed for the expression ἓνεκά του. This reading differs from the "as-if teleology" as an explanation of the finality of the fortuitous event. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Physics I-II into Portuguese, with commentaries. Tradução para o português dos livros I e II da Física de Aristóteles, com comentários.

This dissertation explores Aristotle’s use of teleology as a principle of explanation, especially as it is used in the natural treatises. Its main purposes are, first, to determine the function, structure, and explanatory power of teleological explanations in four of Aristotle’s natural treatises, that is, in Physica (book II), De Anima, De Partibus Animalium (including the practice in books II-IV), and De Caelo (book II). Its second purpose is to confront these findings about Aristotle’s practice in the natural treatises with (...) the theoretical picture of the structure of teleological explanations gained from Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration. For this purpose a new interpretation of Analytica Posteriora II.11 is presented. This study thereby contributes to recent scholarship on the relation between Aristotle’s philosophy of science and his philosophy of nature, while at the same time adding to our knowledge of Aristotle’s notion of teleology in terms of its explanatory merits and limits. (shrink)

Each Aristotelian science consists in the causal investigation of a specific department of reality. If successful, such an investigation results in causal knowledge; that is, knowledge of the relevant or appropriate causes. The emphasis on the concept of cause explains why Aristotle developed a theory of causality which is commonly known as the doctrine of the four causes. For Aristotle, a firm grasp of what a cause is, and how many kinds of causes there are, is essential for a successful (...) investigation of the world around us. (shrink)

I will argue for the similarity between some aspects of Aristotle’s doctrine of causes and a particular kind of interventionist theory of causality. The interventionist account hypothesizes that there is a connection between causation and human intervention: the idea of a causal relation between two events is generated by the reflection of human beings on their own operating. This view is remindful of the Aristotelian concept of αἴτιον, which is linked to the figure of the αἴτιος, the person who is (...) responsible of an action. Aristotle conceives of the efficient cause as the active element which, in the φύσις, gives rise to movement and imposes the form, in analogy with the active element that in τέχνη operates the production: the craftsman. This analogy suggests that Aristotle conceives of the causation on the basis of the human ability to modify the environment with aims. Within the debate on the manipulative theory the classical accounts worked out by Collingwood, Gasking and von Wright have been recently criticized by Woodward. von Wright’s reductive account explains causation on the basis of human free action, while Woodward regards this reduction as a dangerous move which makes causal explanations too much anthropomorphic. I will show that Aristotle’s doctrine of causes is more similar to von Wright’s account and that the Aristotelian analysis of becoming supports von Wright’s reductive interventionism against Woodward’s criticism. Furthermore, I will draw a comparison between interventionism and dispositionalism, where the latter is another contemporary account of causation that claims Aristotelian roots. (shrink)

This is my first professional philosophical essay. I wrote "The twofold meaning of being" in 1996 when I was a student of Nunzio Incardona at University of Palermo (Italy) and before my degree thesis, "The difference in Aristotle’s Metaphysics". It still waits to be published.

I offer a new analysis of Aristotle's concept of an accidental cause. Using passages fromMetaphysics Δ and Ε, as well as Physics II, I argue that accidental causes are causally inert. After defending this reading against some objections, I draw some conclusions about Aristotle's basic understanding of causation.

In Physics 2.4–6, Aristotle offers an account of things that happen “by luck” and “spontaneously”. Many of these things are what we might think of as “lucky breaks”: cases where things go well for us, even though we don’t expect them to. In Physics 2.5, Aristotle illustrates this idea with the case of a man who goes to the market for some reason unrelated to collecting a debt he is owed. While he is there, this man just so happens to (...) run into his debtor and get his money back—which is what he “wanted” all along. This case has a number of features that have proved puzzling. Most notably, Aristotle seems to think that while “it happened accidentally to him to come and to do this for the sake of getting the money”, nevertheless the man “did not come for the sake of this”—though he “would have”. What must such a proceeding be like to be described in these ways? Physics 2.4–6 makes several important moves towards answering this question. One of them—among the earliest and seemingly a foundational one—is the claim that “for the sake of something are as many things as could be done by thought and by nature”. The aim of this paper is to identify the role that this claim plays in Aristotle’s account of spontaneous proceedings. It defends two main claims. First, Aristotle’s suggestion that spontaneous proceedings could be done by nature and by thought is the product of a more general strategy. His approach is to sketch an intuitive pattern of explanation for proceedings that happen for the sake of something in the ordinary—non-spontaneous—way, and then to try to extend that model to the case of things that do so spontaneously, preserving as much of it as possible. Applying this strategy reveals that whereas nature and thought in fact function as efficient causes of ordinary proceedings that are for the sake of something, this cannot be the case in spontaneous ones. Instead, nature and thought could function as their causes. Second, I argue that Aristotle’s implementation of this strategy is rooted in his account of causation and especially Physics 2.3’s list of “modes” of causes. When he claims that spontaneous proceedings “could” be done by nature and by thought, he is saying that nature and thought are their efficient causes in capacity. In the practical case, spontaneous proceedings are caused by agents who have certain capacities, connected with their desires and abilities. In the right circumstances, these agents would actively exercise those capacities in acting for the sake of a given end. (shrink)

Se examina la interpretación aristotélica del azar como causa accidental en el ámbito de los fines de aquello que puede ser realizado por la naturaleza o por el pensamiento. ¿Por qué un acontecimiento fortuito pertenece al orden de los fines? ¿Qué quiere decir que los sucesos fortuitos son “para algo” (ἓνεκά του)? Se repasan las principales respuestas de los especialistas, se indican algunas deficiencias y se propone una lectura no causal-explicativa de la expresión ἓνεκά του, diferente de la teleología del (...) como-si, como explicación de la finalidad del acontecimiento fortuito. (shrink)