- Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.details
|
|
Perception, attention and demonstrative thought: In defense of a hybrid metasemantic mechanism.Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (2):16-53.details
|
|
Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception.Arnon Cahen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2355-2383.details
|
|
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.details
|
|
Centering on Demonstrative Thought.Christopher Buford - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1135-1147.details
|
|
What we do and presuppose when we demonstrate.Eduarda Calado Barbosa & Felipe Nogueira De Carvalho - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 65 (3):e38525.details
|
|
The role of experience in demonstrative thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.details
|
|
Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought?Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6111-6138.details
|
|
A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
|
|
The Philosophical Significance of Attention.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.details
|
|
Belief, Re‐identification and Fineness of Grain.Bénédicte Veillet - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):229-248.details
|
|
Crowding, attention and consciousness: In support of the inference hypothesis.Henry Taylor & Bilge Sayim - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (1):17-33.details
|
|
Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
|
|
Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1159-1178.details
|
|
Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
|
|
Perception needs modular stimulus-control.Anders Nes - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-30.details
|
|
Intentions and Motor Representations: the Interface Challenge.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):317-336.details
|
|
Tropes, Bare Demonstratives, and Apparent Statements of Identity.Friederike Moltmann - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):346-370.details
|
|
Identificational Sentences.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Natural Language Semantics 21 (1):43-77.details
|
|
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, by David Papineau.Farid Masrour - forthcoming - Mind.details
|
|
On the Possibility of Hallucinations.Farid Masrour - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):737-768.details
|
|
‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15).details
|
|
Properties in sight and in thought.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7049-7071.details
|
|
Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.details
|
|
How to know one’s experiences transparently.Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-20.details
|
|
How to know one’s experiences transparently.Frank Hofmann - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1305-1324.details
|
|
Attentive Visual Reference.E. J. Green - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):3-38.details
|
|
A Theory of Perceptual Objects.E. J. Green - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):663-693.details
|
|
Against the speaker-intention theory of demonstratives.Christopher Gauker - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (2):109-129.details
|
|
Recognitional Identification and the Knowledge Argument.Erhan Demircioglu - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):325-340.details
|
|
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Nonconceptual mental content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Quantitative Character and the Composite Account of Phenomenal Content.Kim Soland - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherstdetails
|
|
Being and Time, §15: Around-for References and the Content of Mundane Concern.Howard Damian Kelly - 2013 - Dissertation, The University of Manchesterdetails
|
|
The psychology of time and its philosophical implications.Carlos Montemayor - 2009 - Dissertation, Rutgersdetails
|
|
Observational concepts and experience.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
|
|
A Role for the prefrontal cortex in supporting singular demonstrative reference.Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho & Albert Newen - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (11-12):133-156.details
|
|