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The sensory basis of the epistemic gap: an alternative to phenomenal concepts.Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2105-2124.details
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Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts.Peter Fazekas - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.details
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The distributed pineal gland.Martha J. Farah - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):209-209.details
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Is consciousness of perception really separable from perception?Martha J. Farah - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):254-255.details
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Explaining Temporal Qualia.Matt Farr - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.details
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Normative relations, mind points and social ontology.Michael Esfeld & Guillaume Köstner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-15.details
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Hypothetical identities: Explanatory problems for the explanatory argument.Markus I. Eronen - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):571-582.details
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Does time help to understand consciousness?Andreas K. Engel, Pascal Fries, Peter König, Michael Brecht & Wolf Singer - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):260-68.details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):474-500.details
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Enactivism and the New Teleology: Reconciling the Warring Camps.Ralph D. Ellis - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):173-198.details
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Discussion of the Propounded Identicalness Thesis for Proper Nouns, Physical Situations and Mental Situations in Kripke.Vedat Çelebi̇ - 2017 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):51-74.details
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Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind.Giuseppina D’oro, Paul Giladi & Alexis Papazoglou - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (5):477-503.details
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Breakthrough on the consciousness front or much ado about nothing?N. F. Dixon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):253-254.details
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Relier la conscience phénoménale et éliminer le fossé explicatif.Maria Dias - 2008 - Philosophiques 35 (2):513-524.details
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Exclusion endures: How compatibilism allows dualists to bypass the causal closure argument.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):587-594.details
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The Sublime of Consciousness.Takuya Niikawa & Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.details
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The first-personal argument against physicalism.Christian List - manuscriptdetails
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Three Perspectives on Perspective.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Green Mitchell & Michel Jan (eds.), William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993).Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.) - 1994 - Vienna: Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.details
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A Critique Of Type Identity Theory.Tsz Ha Clarence Chen Chen - forthcoming - The Schola.details
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Some Reflections on Conventions.Carlo Penco & Massimiliano Vignolo - 2019 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):375-402.details
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The Semiotic Mind: A Fundamental Theory of Consciousness.Marc Champagne - 2014 - Dissertation, York Universiydetails
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A Kantian account of the knowledge argument.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2018 - Kant-e-Print 13 (3):32-55.details
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What We Can Learn about Phenomenal Concepts from Wittgenstein’s Private Language.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2016 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2):125-152.details
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Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2020 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7.details
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If Simulation Hypothesis is Possible, Illusionism is False.Wang Zihao - manuscriptdetails
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Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model.Roberto de Sá Pereira - 2020 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7:1-7.details
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Do Psychiatric Diagnoses Explain? A Philosophical Investigation.Hane Htut Maung - 2017 - Dissertation, Lancaster Universitydetails
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Grounding Physicalism and "Moorean" Connections.Alex Moran - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.details
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Mind-Body Parallelism and Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind.Ruben Noorloos - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
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Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.details
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Is Intentionality a Relation? A Dialogue.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - Argumenta.details
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Das Bewusstsein erklären.Michael Schmitz - 2005 - Dissertation, Universität Konstanzdetails
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Panpsychism, Conceivability, and Dualism Redux.Hane Htut Maung - 2019 - Synthesis Philosophica 34 (1):157-172.details
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An externalist's guide to inner experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.details
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Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A General Framework.Christian List - manuscriptdetails
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Humility Regarding Intrinsic Properties.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Physicalist Solution to the Explanatory Gap.Yanssel Garcia - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Rochesterdetails
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A critical approach to sensorimotor contingency theory: brain as agent and conscious mind as a guide of action.Jonas Gonçalves Coelho - 2019 - Sofia 8 (1):67-80.details
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Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The philosophy of neuroscience.John Bickle, Pete Mandik & Anthony Landreth - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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