Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Flow and presentness in experience.Giuliano Torrengo & Daniele Cassaghi - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):109-130.
    In the contemporary landscape about temporal experience, debates concerning the “hard question” of the experience of the flow—as opposed to debates concerning more qualitative aspects of temporality, such as change, movement, succession and duration—are gaining more and more attention. The overall dialectics can be thought of in terms of a debate between the realists (who take the phenomenology of the flow of time seriously, and propose various account of it) and deflationists (who take our description of temporal phenomenology as “flowy” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1717-1742.
    Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an explanatory burden. If, as they maintain, the world seems to us in experience as though it is non-dynamical, then why do we represent time as dynamical? This paper takes up the challenge of investigating, on the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Perceiving Direction in Directionless Time.Matt Farr - 2023 - In Kasia M. Jaszczolt (ed.), Understanding Human Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 199-219.
    Modern physics has provided a range of motivations for holding time to be fundamentally undirected. But how does a temporally adirectional metaphysics, or ‘C-theory’ of time, fit with the time of experience? In this chapter, I look at what kind of problem human time poses for C-theories. First, I ask whether there is a ‘hard problem’ of human time: whether it is in principle impossible to have the kinds of experience we do in a temporally adirectional world. Second I consider (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Experimental philosophy on time.James Norton - 2021 - Philosophy Compass (11).
    Appeals to the ‘common sense’, or ‘naïve’, or ‘folk’ concept of time, and the purported phenomenology as of time passing, play a substantial role in philosophical theorising about time. When making these appeals, philosophers have been content to draw upon their own assumptions about how non-philosophers think about time. This paper reviews a series of recent experiments bringing these assumptions into question. The results suggest that the way non-philosophers think about time is far less metaphysically demanding than philosophers have assumed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • C‐theories of time: On the adirectionality of time.Matt Farr - 2020 - Philosophy Compass (12):1-17.
    “The universe is expanding, not contracting.” Many statements of this form appear unambiguously true; after all, the discovery of the universe’s expansion is one of the great triumphs of empirical science. However, the statement is time-directed: the universe expands towards what we call the future; it contracts towards the past. If we deny that time has a direction, should we also deny that the universe is really expanding? This article draws together and discusses what I call ‘C-theories’ of time — (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Temporal dynamism and the persisting stable self.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowledge Arguments for Time 12 23 2022.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Jackson (1982) introduced the Knowledge Argument to elucidate the phenomenal, interior aspects of experience. In 1908 McTaggart defined two series that characterize one dimension of time, the A-series and the B-series. The A-series is usually thought to be phenomenal Farr (2019), SEP (2018). Thus there is the possibility of giving a Knowledge Argument for time. One (informal) statement of the classical Knowledge Argument might be “Mary knows all the facts about color qualia but lives in a black-and-white room. Upon being (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against Passage Illusionism.Kristie Miller - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
    Temporal dynamists typically hold that it seems to us as though time robustly passes, and that its seeming so is explained by the fact that time does robustly pass. Temporal non-dynamists hold that time does not robustly pass. Some non-dynamists nevertheless hold that it seems as though it does: we have an illusory phenomenal state whose content represents robust passage. Call these phenomenal passage illusionists. Other non-dynamists argue that the phenomenal state in question is veridical and represents something other than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Three-Times Problem: Commentary on Physical Time within Human Time.Matt Farr - 2023 - Frontiers in Psychology 14:1130228.
    In the two feature articles for this volume, Gruber et al and Buonomano & Rovelli focus on what the former call the 'two-times problem', in short, the apparent lack of fit between time as described by physical science and our own temporal experience, where 'experience' involves things like memory, anticipation, and perception of change and motion. In this short note I'll make the case that the twotimes problem is less serious than it is often made out to be in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Relational Passage of Time.Matias Slavov - 2022 - New York: Routledge.
    This book defends a relational theory of the passage of time. The realist view of passage developed in this book differs from the robust, substantivalist position. According to relationism, passage is nothing over and above the succession of events, one thing coming after another. Causally related events are temporally arranged as they happen one after another along observers’ worldlines. There is no unique global passage but a multiplicity of local passages of time. After setting out this positive argument for relationism, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Agents of change: temporal flow and feeling oneself act.Nick Young - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2619-2637.
    Here, I put forward a new account of how experience gives rise to the belief that time passes. While there is considerable disagreement amongst metaphysicians as to whether time really does pass, it has struck many as a default, ‘common sense’ way of thinking about the world. A popular way of explaining how such a belief arises is to say that it seems perceptually as though time passes. Here I outline some difficulties for this approach, and propose instead that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Einstein's Train in Fragmentalist Presentism.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    It is often thought the relativity of simultaneity is inconsistent with presentism. This would be troubling as it conflicts with common sense and—arguably—the empirical data. This note gives a novel fragmentalist-presentist theory that allows for the (non-trivial) relativity of simultaneity. A detailed account of the canonical moving train argument is considered. Alice, standing at the train station, forms her own ontological fragment, in which Bob’s frame of reference, given by the moving train, is modified by the Lorentz transformations. On the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Perspectivalism, A-theorism, and their Interpretation of QM.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Abstract We motivate and develop an A-theory of time and probe its implied interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will emerge that, as a first take, the time of relativity is a B-series and the time of quantum mechanics is an A-series. There is philosophical motivation for the idea that mutual quantum measurement happens when and only when the systems’ A-series become one mutual A-series. This accounts almost trivially for many quantum phenomena, including that the electrons of a Bell pair do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Bergson should have said about special relativity.Peter Kügler - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10273-10288.
    The debate between Einstein and Bergson is a salient episode in the history of modern physics and a telling example of the interaction between science and philosophy. This paper initially discusses five reasons why Bergson criticised Einstein for giving up absolute time. The most important one was Bergson’s commitment to an intuitionist, anti-Kantian metaphysics informed by common sense. Apart from that, he knew that the theory of special relativity permits “duration” in the form of the passage of proper time, to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Theory of the Big Bang in McTaggart’s Time.Paul Merriam - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (3):685-696.
    There are long-standing questions about the Big Bang: What were its properties? Was there nothing before it? Was the universe always here? Many conceptual issues revolve around time. This paper gives a novel model based on McTaggart’s temporal distinction between the A-series (future-present-past) and B-series (earlier-times to later-times). These series are useful while situated in a Presentist and Fragmentalist account of quantum mechanics, one in which the consistency with the Special Relativity (in particular the relativity of simultaneity) will be made (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation