- Introduction to the Philosophy of Colour.Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson - 2021 - In Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
A Defense of Hume's Dictum.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
|
|
Closing (or at least narrowing) the explanatory gap.Katalin Farkas - 2022 - In Peter R. Anstey & David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 125-142.details
|
|
Transparency and the explanatory gap.Kelly Trogdon - forthcoming - In G. Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.details
|
|
Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.details
|
|
Moral Perception.Nourbakhshi Hamid - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Tehrandetails
|
|
Constitutive Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
in Drift wijsgerig festival.Deva Waal (ed.) - 2014 - Drift.details
|
|
Placement, grounding, and mental content.Kelly Trogdon - 2015 - In C. Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. New York, NY, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 481-496.details
|
|
Semantic supervenience.Luca Gasparri - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Humility Regarding Intrinsic Properties.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Why I am not a dualist.Karen Bennett - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:208-231.details
|
|
Illusionism's discontent.Katalin Balog - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):40-51.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.details
|
|
Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Philosophical Critique.Anthony F. Peressini - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):180-206.details
|
|
The Resilience of a Refined Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Lee-Anna T. Sangster - unknowndetails
|
|
The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism.Paul M. Churchland - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.details
|
|
First-Person Investigations of Consciousness.Brentyn Ramm - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National Universitydetails
|
|
Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California Los Angelesdetails
|
|
How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists.Adam Pautz - 2019 - In Blockheads!details
|
|
Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2012 - Dissertation, Sussexdetails
|
|
The Emperor's New Phenomenology? The Empirical Case for Conscious Experience without First-Order Representations.Hakwan Lau & Richard Brown - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. MIT Press.details
|
|
Filosofía de la mente: El estado de la cuestión (philosophy of mind: The state of the art).Josep L. Prades - 2006 - Theoria 21 (3):315-332.details
|
|
The Structure of Consciousness.Lowell Keith Friesen - unknowndetails
|
|
Phenomenal Acquaintance.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Dissertation, Umass Amherstdetails
|
|
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
|
|
Causal after all : a model of mental causation for dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Dissertation, Umeå Universitydetails
|
|
Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debate.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2):99-122.details
|
|
The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Marca do Cognitivo e Cognição 4E.Bernardo Gonçalves Alonso & Ronaldo de Oliveira Ramos - 2022 - Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (Ufrn) 29 (58):24-48.details
|
|
Physicalism in an infinitely decomposable world.Barbara Montero - 2006 - Erkentnis 64 (2):177-191.details
|
|
Thinking about phenomenal concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2011 - Synthesis Philosophica 26 (2):391-402.details
|
|
Quality-space theory in olfaction.Benjamin D. Young, Andreas Keller & David Rosenthal - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
|
|
The challenge presented by dissociations and synaesthesia for the neo-dualism of David Chalmers and Tim Bayne.Robert Fletcher - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
|
|
Concepts and definitions of consciousness.David Rosenthal - unknown - In P. W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.details
|
|
Self in Mind. A Pluralist Account of Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière - 2020 - Dissertation, details
|
|
The Debate on the Problem of For-me-ness: A Proposed Taxonomy.Alberto Barbieri - 2021 - Argumenta.details
|
|
Exclusion.Daniel Lim - 2015 - In God and Mental Causation. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.details
|
|
The phenomenal concept strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):212-236.details
|
|
What is Really Wrong with Representationalism?Søren Harnow Klausen - 2004 - Res Cogitans 1 (1).details
|
|
Conceptos Fenoménicos.Diana Couto - 2020 - Enciclopedia de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica.details
|
|
Consciousness: A Four-fold taxonomy.J. Jonkisz - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):55-82.details
|
|
Experiencing a Hard Problem?Dimitris Platchias - 2008 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):115-30.details
|
|
An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content.Todd Buras - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.details
|
|