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  1. Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory: A Multistage Account of Intentionality.Adam Pautz - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to explain his other intentional states.
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