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Closing (or at least narrowing) the explanatory gap.Katalin Farkas - 2022 - In Peter R. Anstey & David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 125-142.details
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Transparency and the explanatory gap.Kelly Trogdon - forthcoming - In G. Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.details
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Philosophical Puzzles Evade Empirical Evidence: Some Thoughts and Clarifications Regarding the Relation Between Brain Sciences and Philosophy of Mind.Işık Sarıhan - 2017 - In Jon Leefmann & Elisabeth Hildt (eds.), The Human Sciences after the Decade of the Brain. London, Vereinigtes Königreich: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 14-23.details
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Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.details
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Epistemology and possibility.Rebecca Hanrahan - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):627-652.details
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For-Me-Ness, For-Us-Ness, and the We-Relationship.Felipe León - 2018 - Topoi 39 (3):547-558.details
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How to be a (sort of) A Priori physicalist.D. Gene Witmer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.details
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The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2020 - Philosophia 49:495-506.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.details
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Abusing the notion of what-it's-like-ness: A response to Block.J. Weisberg - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):438-443.details
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The overdetermination argument revisited.Agustín Vicente - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):331-47.details
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On the causal completeness of physics.Agustín Vicente - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.details
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The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.details
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A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
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Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties.Matthew Tugby - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-16.details
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Voices and noises in the theory of speech acts.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2004 - Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (1):105-151.details
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Physicalism and sparse ontology.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.details
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Grounding-mechanical explanation.Kelly Trogdon - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1289-1309.details
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Grounding: necessary or contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.details
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Explaining causal closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.details
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Causation in Physics and in Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):471-488.details
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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
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In Defence of Powerful Qualities.John H. Taylor - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.details
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Conceptualizing physical consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness.Thomas Sturm & Falk Wunderlich - 2010 - History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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A grounding physicalist solution to the causal exclusion problem.Robin Stenwall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11775-11795.details
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My Body: Is It Me?Thomas W. Smythe - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):179.details
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Mario Bunge’s Materialist Theory of Mind and Contemporary Cognitive Science.Peter Slezak - 2012 - Science & Education 21 (10):1475-1484.details
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Mario Bunge: Matter and Mind: A Philosophical Inquiry.Peter Slezak - 2012 - Science & Education 21 (8):1213-1221.details
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In favor of (plain) phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.details
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Content, character, and color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.details
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Type‐Identity Statements and the Explanatory Gap: An Argument for Compatibility.Itay Shani & Sungho Choi - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):485-502.details
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Eden Benumbed: A Critique of Panqualityism and the Disclosure View of Consciousness.Itay Shani - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (1):233-256.details
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John Searle’s Naturalism as a Hybrid (Property-Substance) Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism.Dmytro Sepetyi - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (52):23-44.details
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On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.details
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Kant and Cognitive Science Revisited.Tobias Schlicht & Albert Newen - 2015 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 18 (1):87-113.details
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Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus.Tobias Schlicht - 2007 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 10 (1):113-136.details
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Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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No ground to bridge the gap.Elisabetta Sassarini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7981–7999.details
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Transparent Contents and Trivial Inferences.Mirco Sambrotta - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):9-28.details
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The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):1-11.details
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Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.details
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