- A Higher-Order Account of the Phenomenology of Particularity.Jacob Berger - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Robot Pain.Pete Mandik - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. New York: Routledge. pp. 200-209.details
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Self in Mind. A Pluralist Account of Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière - 2020 - Dissertation, details
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Higher-Order Awareness of What?Callum Zavos MacRae - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2083-2095.details
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Conciencia, primera persona y contenido no conceptual (en) Contenido y fenomenología de la percepción. Aproximaciones filosóficas.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Barcelona, España: Gedisa. Edited by A. Y. Cervieri Pelaez.details
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Rosenthal on mental qualities.Alex Byrne - 2022 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Conceptualizing Consciousness.Jacob Berger & Richard Brown - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (5):637-659.details
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Rosenthal's Representationalism.Jacob Berger & Richard Brown - 2022 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)In Praise of Poise.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. new york: MIT Press.details
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A Euthyphro Dilemma for Higher-order Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - In G. Rabin (ed.), Grounding and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.details
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On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):421-441.details
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Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness.Jonathan Farrell - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2743-2761.details
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How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists.Jacob Berger - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):503-526.details
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A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness.Joseph LeDoux & Richard Brown - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (10):E2016-E2025.details
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The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.details
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Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):79-98.details
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The idols of inner-sense.Chad Kidd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1759-1782.details
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The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.details
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Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Conscious-state Anti-realism.Pete Mandik - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited: With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Cham: Springer. pp. 184-197.details
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The problem of higher-order misrepresentation.Graham Peebles - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (6):842-861.details
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A Seeming Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Jesse M. Mulder - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (3):449-465.details
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Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.details
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Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About It: Confusions, Virtues and Challenges of Higher-order Theories (in) Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal.Miguel Angel Sebastian - forthcoming - Cambridge, Reino Unido: Cambridge University Press.details
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Abusing the notion of what-it's-like-ness: A response to Block.J. Weisberg - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):438-443.details
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The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.details
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What is the Structure of Self-Consciousness and Conscious Mental States?Rocco J. Gennaro - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):295-309.details
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Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg.N. Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):443-448.details
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The persistent problem of targetless thought.Adrienne Prettyman - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 82 (C):102918.details
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A Defence of the Resemblance Meaning of ‘What it’s like’.Richard Gaskin - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):673-698.details
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First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):947-969.details
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Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.details
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Change Blindness and Misrepresentation.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):37-56.details
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(1 other version)Empty Higher Order States in Higher Order Theories of Consciousness.Sinem Elkatip Hatipoglu - 2022 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 22 (64):91-100.details
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Is Higher-Order Misrepresentation Empirically Plausible? An Argument From Corruption.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:804896.details
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Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories.Vincent Picciuto - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):555-575.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness and intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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