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Raw Feeling

Philosophical Review 105 (1):94 (1996)

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  1. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee? [REVIEW]Michael Tye - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):289-317.
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  • Animal subjectivity.Peter Carruthers - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
    Carruthers, P. . Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy.
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  • On characterizing the physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
    How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components: 1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that 2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality) Here I explore the extent to which the appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (“no fundamental mentality”) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, (...)
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  • Perceptual experience, conscious content, and nonconceptual content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
    One of the promising approaches to the problem of perceptual consciousness has been the representational theory, or representationalism. The idea is to reduce the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experiences to the representational content of those experiences. Most representationalists appeal specifically to non-conceptual content in reducing phenomenal character to representational content. In this paper, I discuss a series of issues involved in this representationalist appeal to non-conceptual content. The overall argument is the following. On the face of it, conscious perceptual (...)
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  • (1 other version)Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind. The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of.
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  • Conscious experience versus conscious thought.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
    Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of selfreference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking, one that would leave the (...)
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  • Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
    It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am (...)
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  • A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness.Robert W. Lurz - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6.
    Recently, Peter Carruthers has advanced the debate over first-order representationalist theories and higher-order representationalist theories of consciousness by offering two innovative arguments in support of dispositionalist HORs. In this article, I offer a limited defense of actualist FORs by showing that Carruthers' two arguments either beg the question against such accounts, equivocate on important concepts, or rest on suspect claims about our abilities to attribute phenomenal consciousness to animals. In addition, I argue that dispositionalist HORs face an apparent counterexample, one (...)
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  • The elephant and the blind: the experience of pure consciousness: philosophy, science, and 500+ experiential reports.Thomas Metzinger - 2024 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    The Elephant and the Blind is a book about why we need a new culture of consciousness, and how to get it. A culture of consciousness (or Bewusstseinskultur) is a culture that values and cultivates the mental states of its members in an ethical and evidence-based way.
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  • The language of research and the importance of the tacit dimension.A. Martin Gough - unknown
    I consider the nature of research, both as a mode of learning about the world, with the focus on the object of research, and as a role for staff and students in the higher education sector, with the focus on the practice to be learned, on the pedagogy of research. The domain of research and researchers has, like other domains of higher education and like education more widely, has received a good deal of policy attention. In the UK, there has (...)
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  • The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model.Klaus R. Scherer - 2009 - Cognition and Emotion 23 (7):1307-1351.
    Emotion is conceptualised as an emergent, dynamic process based on an individual's subjective appraisal of significant events. It is argued that theoretical models of emotion need to propose an architecture that reflects the essential nature and functions of emotion as a psychobiological and cultural adaptation mechanism. One proposal for such a model and its underlying dynamic architecture, the component process model, is briefly sketched and compared with some of its major competitors. Recent empirical evidence in support of the model is (...)
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  • Color and the duplication assumption.Erik Myin - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):61-77.
    Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due (...)
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  • Distracted drivers and unattended experience.Wayne Wright - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):41-68.
    Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists happily accept, but (...)
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  • Consciousness-dependence and the explanatory gap.Neil Campbell Manson - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):521-540.
    Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an (...)
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  • The explanatory stopgap.Eric Lormand - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):303-57.
    Is there an explanatory gap between raw feels and raw material? Some philosophers argue, and many other people believe, that scientific explanations of conscious experience cannot be as satisfying as typical scientific explanations elsewhere, even in our wildest dreams. The underlying philosophical claims are.
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  • Don't PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousness.Alex Byrne - 2001 - A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    _Consciousness, Color, and Content_ is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye.
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  • (1 other version)Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Can naturalism explain consciousness? A critique.Rajakishore Nath - 2017 - AI and Society 32 (4):563-571.
    The problem of consciousness is one of the most important problems both in cognitive science and in philosophy. There are different philosophers and different scientists who define consciousness and explain it differently. In philosophy, ‘consciousness’ does not have a definition in terms of genus and differentia or necessary and sufficient conditions. In this paper, I shall explore the very idea of machine consciousness. The machine consciousness has offered causal explanation to the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of consciousness, but they fail to (...)
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  • Powers, Non‐Consent and Freedom.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):136-152.
    There are a number of dispositionalist solutions to the free will problem based on freedom consisting in the agent's exercise of a power. But if a subject a is free when they exercise their power P, there is an objection to be overcome from the possibility of power implantation. A brainwasher, rather than directly manipulating a subject's movements, can instead implant in them a desire, to be understood as a disposition to act, and allow the subject to exercise such a (...)
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  • The Body of the Mind-Body Problem.Barbara Montero - 1999 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 9 (4):207-217.
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  • (1 other version)Constrained inversions of sensations.Erik Myin - 2001 - Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):31-40.
    Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments won't work. The first problem is (...)
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  • Do unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings?Michael Lacewing - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):81-104.
    The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings, unconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for (...)
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  • Consciousness, permanent self-awareness, and higher-order monitoring.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (3):517-540.
    RÉSUMÉ: Les discussions philosophiques actuelles sur le problème de la conscience [consciousness] se concentrent sur la question des qualia, ou qualités sensorielles. Mais les auteurs traditionnels au sujet de la conscience—tels que Kant et William James—s'intéressaient davantage à un autre aspect de l'expérience consciente, à savoir le fait que lorsqu'on est conscient [conscious], on est en même temps, et de façon permanente, conscient de soi-même [aware of oneself] comme sujet de l'expérience. Cet article explore trois modèles représentationnels du phénomène de (...)
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  • Physical realization.Robert Kirk - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):148-156.
    Sydney Shoemaker thinks the ‘most revealing characterization of physicalism’ is in terms of realization . He offers a meticulously worked out account of physical realization and goes on to apply it to a range of major topics: mental causation, personal identity, emergence, three-dimensional versus four-dimensional accounts of temporal persistence, qualia. 1 He also discusses constitution by micro-entities, functional properties, causation by ‘second-order’ properties, ‘phony’ and ‘genuine’ properties, and whether mental properties strongly supervene on physical ones. Several parts of the book (...)
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  • How physicalists can avoid reductionism.Robert Kirk - 1996 - Synthese 108 (2):157-70.
    Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false.
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  • The nature of normativity.C. S. Jenkins - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):156-166.
    This is a big-picture book, 2 written with a breadth of focus which I find admirable. It exhibits what's come to be known as the ‘intersubdiscplinary’ approach to philosophy, which is not restricted by traditional boundaries within the discipline but rather proceeds with an eye to all sorts of areas of philosophy where relevant arguments, results, analogies and strategies might be lurking. I approve of this way of doing philosophy; it seems to me that all too often that wheels are (...)
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  • The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago.Todd E. Feinberg & Jon Mallatt - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  • The challenge presented by dissociations and synaesthesia for the neo-dualism of David Chalmers and Tim Bayne.Robert Fletcher - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Reading
    This thesis has, as its primary target, the neo-cartesianism, or property dualism of certain philosophers of mind: David Chalmers, Tim Bayne, and others. All begin with a pre-theoretic commitment to the view that all perceptual states are conscious. They define consciousness by saying that it is synonymous with having ‘qualia’ – a term directed at phenomenal properties which defy reduction to physical states. The thesis argues that this position is challenged by certain neurological conditions, - blindsight, visual form agnosia etc- (...)
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  • Wisdom beyond language in research and the place of narrative.A. Martin Gough - unknown
    My aim in this paper is chiefly one of conceptual clarification, linking with issues arising within certain current debates. I propose a typology to underpin the various applications of the “tacit” and the “non-discursive” for describing our state of knowledge as regards respectively both the practice and the object of research. The tacit/explicit dichotomy is a different one from the non-discursive/discursive one. This is key if we are to understand how the process of learning to research, as well as learning (...)
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  • Reply to Kirk and Melnyk.David Papineau - 2003 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind 4 (1).
    I am lucky to have two such penetrating commentators as Robert Kirk and Andrew Melnyk. It is also fortunate that they come at me from different directions, and so cover different aspects of my book. Robert Kirk has doubts about the overall structure of my enterprise, and in particular about my central commitment to a distinctive species of phenomenal concepts. Andrew Melnyk, by contrast, offers no objections to my general brand of materialism. Instead he focuses specifically on my discussion of (...)
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  • Consciousness without awareness?Eric Saidel - 1999 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5.
    I argue that Carruthers' arguments that animals are unable to have conscious experience relies on a human-centered view of consciousness. Once we abandon those characteristics of consciousness that are typically human, such as the ability to reason about one's conscious experience, it becomes clear that animals may have conscious experience, although such experience may not be available as the subject of thought. Consideration of evidence from human conscious experience, child development, and evolution supports this suggestion.
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  • Phenomenal projection.Zoltan Jakab - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    In this paper I shall defend a projectivist view of sensory experience. The case I shall focus on is that of color experience. Projectivism has recently been criticized by some authors who claim that it is unintelligible, or at least implausible, and that it makes a severe category mistake. I shall argue that despite some prima facie impressions of implausibility, projectivism can be made intelligible, and plausible, if its details are spelled out in a reasonable way. In addition, projectivism is (...)
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  • Thinking about Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness.Robert Kirk - 2002 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind [December 4 (1).
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