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Mind and the World-Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge

New York,: Dover Publications (1956)

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  1. Scientific phenomena and patterns in data.Pascal Ströing - 2018 - Dissertation, Lmu München
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  • Verification: The Hysteron Proteron Argument.Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (6).
    This paper investigates the strange case of an argument that was directed against a positivist verification principle. We find an early occurrence of the argument in a talk by the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden at the 1934 International Congress of Philosophy in Prague, where Carnap and Neurath were present and contributed short rejoinders. We discuss the underlying presuppositons of the argument, and we evaluate whether the attempts by Carnap (especially) actually succeed in answering this argument. We think they don’t, and offer (...)
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  • Phänomenologie und Realismus. Die Frage nach der Wirklichkeit im Streit zwischen Husserl und Ingarden.Vittorio De Palma - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (1):1-18.
    I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden’s critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl’s phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl’s thinking do not (...)
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  • A Precis of Intentionality and the Myths of the Given.Carl Sachs - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):547-551.
    This precise provides an synopsis of my book "Intentionality and the Myths of the Given" (Routledge 2014). I describe the problem of intentionality in terms of the need to (1) do justice to both discursive intentionality (the intentionality of 'sapient' thought and talk) and somatic or bodily intentionality while also (2) avoiding the various Myths of the Given, including the epistemic and semantic Myths. I locate an early version to accomplish this project in C. I. Lewis. The argument shows why (...)
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  • Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):93-108.
    Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
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  • Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (8).
    This article examines how Quine and Sellars develop informatively contrasting responses to a fundamental tension in Carnap’s semantics ca. 1950. Quine’s philosophy could well be styled ‘Essays in Radical Empiricism’; his assay of radical empiricism is invaluable for what it reveals about the inherent limits of empiricism. Careful examination shows that Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s semantics in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ fails, that at its core Quine’s semantics is for two key reasons incoherent and that his hallmark Thesis of Extensionalism (...)
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  • Neuropsychology and the cognitive nature of the emotions.W. Gerrod Parrott & Jay Schulkin - 1993 - Cognition and Emotion 7 (1):43-59.
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  • A Lewisian Semantics for S2.Edwin Mares - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):53-67.
    This paper sets out a semantics for C.I. Lewis's logic S2 based on the ontology of his 1923 paper ‘Facts, Systems, and the Unity of the World’. In that article, worlds are taken to be maximal consistent systems. A system, moreover, is a collection of facts that is closed under logical entailment and conjunction. In this paper, instead of defining systems in terms of logical entailment, I use certain ideas in Lewis's epistemology and philosophy of logic to define a class (...)
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  • Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness.Thomas Sturm & Falk Wunderlich - 2010 - History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71.
    We argue that Kant’s views about consciousness, the mind-body problem, and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant did never use the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility (...)
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  • Mimicking Foundationalism: on Sentiment and Self‐control.Christopher Hookway - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):156-174.
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  • Knowing, being, and wisdom: A comparative study.Yang Guorong - 2005 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 5 (1):57-72.
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  • C. I. Lewis: The Last Great Pragmatist. By Murray G. Murphey. [REVIEW]Robert Sinclair - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):718-725.
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  • Defeating the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism.John M. DePoe - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
    Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer’s account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer’s premise that all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings. (...)
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  • Current German epistemology: The significance of Gerold Prauss.Karl Ameriks - 1982 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):125 – 138.
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  • (1 other version)The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane - 2005 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sense-perception—the awareness or apprehension of things by sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste—has long been a preoccupation of philosophers. One pervasive and traditional problem, sometimes called “the problem of perception”, is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? The present entry is about how these possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of the phenomenon of (...)
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  • Description, Language, Other Minds, Reduction, and Phenomenology.Timur Uçan - 2023 - Philosophy Study 13 (9):395-408.
    How to think a unique and determinative turn in analytic philosophy of mind? To answer this question this article first presents an attempt to render clear that analytic phenomenology, by contrast with conceptions of phenomenology of the XXth century, beneficially dispenses with several methodological and conceptual assumptions that were assumed to be compulsory, as phenomenological reduction, a notion of synthesis, and a philosophical notion of the a priori. It then presents some eventual difficulties to the achievement of a phenomenological turn (...)
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  • Dissolving some dilemmas for acquaintance foundationalism.Ryan Daniel Cobb - unknown
    This essay purports to be a “negative” defense of acquaintance foundationalism. It is “negative” in that I do not do much in the way of advancing novel argument for the position, nor do I extend the position very much. Rather, I focus on demonstrating that the position has the resources to overcome objections that have been proposed to it. In particular, I argue that it can overcome the dilemma proposed by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by Laurence BonJour against foundationalism, as (...)
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  • Rates of passage.James van Cleve - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):141-170.
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  • Multiculturalism as a Cognitive Virtue of Scientific Practice.Ann E. Cudd - 1998 - Hypatia 13 (3):43 - 61.
    I argue that science will be better, by its own criteria, if it pursues multiculturalism, by which I mean an ethnic- and gender-diverse set of scientists. I argue that minority and women scientists will be more likely to recognize false, prejudiced assumptions about race and gender that infect theories. And the kinds of changes that society will undergo in pursuing multiculturalism will help reveal these faulty assumptions to scientists of all races and genders.
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  • The subjunctive conditional as relevant implication.John Bacon - 1971 - Philosophia 1 (1-2):61-80.
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  • The Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn in the History of Philosophy.Shane Ralston - 2011 - Human Affairs 21 (2):280-293.
    Did the pragmatic turn encompass the linguistic turn in the history of philosophy? Or was the linguistic turn a turn away from pragmatism? Some commentators identify the so-called “eclipse” of pragmatism by analytic philosophy, especially during the Cold War era, as a turn away from pragmatist thinking. However, the historical evidence suggests that this narrative is little more than a myth. Pragmatism persisted, transforming into a more analytic variety under the influence of Quine and Putnam and, more recently, a continental (...)
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  • Qualia and the Psychophysiological Explanation of Color Perception.Austen Clark - 1985 - Synthese 65 (3):377-405.
    Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or 'qualia' are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia. A paradigm case of qualia is provided by simultaneous color contrast effects, in which a neutral grey patch is made to (...)
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  • Pragmatisms and Logical Empiricisms: Response to Misak and Klein.Thomas Uebel - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (5).
    This paper responds to the generous comments by Alexander Klein and Cheryl Misak on my “American Pragmatism and the Vienna Circle: The Early Years”. First, besides offering some clarification of my original thesis, I argue that Jerusalem was not liable to the anti-Spencerian criticisms by James that Klein adduces in the course of defending James against the charge of psychologism. Then I investigate the impact of Wittgenstein’s Ramsey-derived pragmatism, importantly foregrounded by Misak, on the Vienna Circle and argue that it (...)
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  • (1 other version)What anti-individualists cannot know a priori.Susana Nuccetelli - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):48-51.
    Note first that knowledge of one's own thought-contents would not count as a priori according to the usual criteria for knowledge of this kind. Surely, then, incompatibilists are using this term to refer to some other, stipulatively defined, epistemic property. But could this be, as suggested by McKinsey { 1 99 1: 9), the property of being knowable 'just by thinking' or 'from the armchair'? Certainly not if these were metaphors for knowledge attainable on the basis of reason alone, since (...)
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  • Presentation and Content.John Bengson - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):795-807.
    Susanna Siegel's _The Contents of Visual Experience_ (2010) offers a novel defense of the thesis that experiences have representational content. Her argument aims to move from an observation about *all experiences presenting properties* to the conclusion that *all experiences convey content*. While Siegel's emphasis on presentation is an important contribution, I argue that her argument fails. For there are _two_ types of presentation, 'contentful' and 'objectual,' and Siegel's reasoning does not apply to both. I conclude by discussing an implication for (...)
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  • (1 other version)Die Welt und die Evidenz. Zu Husserls Erledigung des Cartesianismus.Vittorio De Palma - 2012 - Husserl Studies 28 (3):201-224.
    Der Aufsatz will nachweisen, dass Husserls Denken in der Tat eine Erledigung des Cartesianismus darstellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Husserls Denken eine ganz andere Auffassung der Wahrnehmung und der Evidenz als Descartes zugrunde liegt. Denn – im Vorgriff auf eine Einsicht, die gegenwärtig in der analytischen Philosophie vertreten wird – meint Husserl, eine Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz könne nur aufgrund anderer Wahrnehmungen oder Evidenzen bezweifelt werden. Deshalb setzt jede solche Bezweifelung das Vertrauen in die Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz voraus und kann nicht (...)
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  • Schlick, Conventionalism, and Scientific Revolutions.Steven Bland - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (3):307-323.
    Abstract Schlick quite clearly maintains that the shift from classical physics to the theories of relativity is not necessitated by experience, but motivated by the pragmatic payoff of simplifying space-time ontology. However, there is in his work another, heretofore unrecognized argument for the revolutionary shift from classical to relativistic physics. According to this conceptual line of argument, the principles that define simultaneity and motion in classical physics fail to establish a univocal correspondence to physical quantities, and therefore must be revised, (...)
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  • Why is 'incommensurability' a problem?Nancy J. Nersessian - 1982 - Acta Biotheoretica 31 (4):205-218.
    The origins of the ‘ incommensurability problem’ and its central aspect, the ‘ meaning variance thesis’ are traced to the successive collapse of several distinctions maintained by the standard empiricist account of meaning in scientific theories. The crucial distinction is that between a conceptual structure and a theory. The ‘thesis’ and the ‘problem’ follow from critiques of this distinction by Duhem, Quine and Feyerabend. It is maintained that, rather than revealing the ‘problem’, the arguments leading to it simply show the (...)
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  • The status of blindsight: Near-threshold vision, islands of cortex and the riddoch phenomenon.Robert W. Kentridge & Charles A. Heywood - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):3-11.
    In this introductory paper, we assess the current status of blindsight -- the phenomenon in which patients with damage to their primary visual cortex retain the ability to detect, discriminate and localize visual stimuli presented in areas of their visual field in which they report that they are subjectively blind. Blindsight has garnered a great deal of interest and critical research, in part because of its important implications for the philosophy of mind. We briefly consider why this is so, and (...)
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  • Rorty's critique of foundationalism.Timm Triplett - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (1):115 - 129.
    Rorty's critique concentrates on one aspect of foundationalism: the claim that nonpropositional sensory awareness serves as the basis for propositional justification. This claim is an essential component of classical foundationalism, though not necessarily of the more moderate versions of foundationalism that have been proposed. Thus even if it were a successful critique it would tell against only one type of foundationalism. But nothing in Rorty's argument provides any reason to doubt the plausibility of a classical foundationalist explanation of why sensory (...)
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  • The signatures of conscious access and its phenomenology are consistent with large-scale brain communication at criticality.Enzo Tagliazucchi - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 55:136-147.
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  • Quine and Conceptual Pragmatism.Robert Sinclair - 2012 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (3):335-355.
    In comparing his conception of empiricism with that of other like-minded philosophers at the end of his 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism,' W. V. Quine famously emphasized the broader scope of his pragmatist commitment in these terms:Carnap, Lewis, and others take a pragmatic stand on the question of choosing between language forms, scientific frameworks; but their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic. In repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more thorough pragmatism.Such remarks have (...)
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  • Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism: Addressing the Eclipse Narrative.Matthew Silk - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (1):89-119.
    The story of the rise and fall of pragmatism is sometimes called the eclipse narrative. This paper addresses a specific version of this narrative that the logical empiricists arrived in North America in the 1930s and within 30 years had supplanted the pragmatists as the dominant philosophy there. Philosophers such as Alan Richardson and Cheryl Misak have challenged this view by emphasizing the similarities between these two movements. While both seem to admit that there is a distinction between the two (...)
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  • A reasonable reply to Hume's scepticism.Richard H. Schlagel - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (4):359-374.
    According to Hume, no knowledge attainable by human beings would ever justify rational belief in recurrent physical properties and causal effects. He arrived at this conclusion because he denied the possibility of knowing--but not the reality of--either the 'inner natures' or the 'secret powers' of objects which would enable one to intuit or to demonstrate a 'necessary connection' between the internal structures of objects and their observable properties, or between the causal powers of entities and their effects. The purpose of (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Phenomenological Claims and the Myth of the Given.Jean-Michel Roy - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):1-32.
    Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...)
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  • As antinomias metaéticas entre cegos e não cegos e o problema do realismo moral.Léo Peruzzo Júnior - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (1):62-74.
    O presente artigo apresenta o cognitivismo moral pragmático como forma de superar as antinomias clássicas entre cegos e não-cegos e a possibilidade de representação mental do conteúdo moral. Esta posição é sustentada a partir da reconstrução do debate metaético instaurado entre cognitivistas e não-cognitivistas, especialmente nas interpretações fornecidas pelo realismo moral de McDowell e pelo quase-realismo de Blackburn. Assim, o pressuposto comum a essas duas teorias metaéticas [cognitivismo e não-cognitivismo] pretende ser superado pelo cognitivismo pragmático, uma vez que suas falsas (...)
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  • (1 other version)“Till at last there remain nothing”: Hume’s Treatise 1.4.1 in contemporary perspective.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3305-3323.
    In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something that reduces to nothing, but it is something other (...)
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  • (1 other version)Phenomenalism in epistemology and physicalism in aesthetics.Jacques Morizot - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3):439-452.
    O ponto de partida deste artigo é a observação intrigante de que Goodman defendeu um ponto de vista fenomenalista em suas obras epistemológicas, e fenomenalista em suas obras sobre estética. Na verdade, seria certamente mais preciso dizer que seu foco era antifisicalista em epistemologia e antifenomenalista na estética. De qualquer maneira, a maioria dos interpretadores teria, espontaneamente, esperado a escolha oposta, de fato mais consistente com as posições tomadas pelos representantes dessas áreas. Contudo, a estratégia de Goodman não é arbitrária, (...)
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  • Creencia no evidencial y certeza vital.Rafael Miranda Rojas - 2016 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 54:71-85.
    This paper argues that the notion of explicit belief in Ortega y Gasset (1946) and Wittgenstein (1969) requires a non-intellectualist understanding of certainty, what is called vital certainty. It is argued that the normative role of the hinge propositions prevents skeptic doubt and, in turn, enables epistemology. This normative role is understood as a-epistemic, even if we can affirm a sui generis use of ''I know''. Finally, skeptical reading is discussed as a possible case of loss of certainty, and how (...)
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  • Cliometric metatheory III: Peircean consensus, verisimilitude, and asymptotic method.Paul E. Meehl - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):615-643.
    Statistical procedures can be applied to episodes in the history of science in order to weight attributes to predict short-term survival of theories; an asymptotic method is used to show that short-term survival is a valid proxy for ultimate survival; and a theoretical argument is made that ultimate survival is a valid proxy for objective truth. While realists will appreciate this last step, instrumentalists do not need it to benefit from the actuarial procedures of cliometric metatheory. Introduction A plausible proxy (...)
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  • Hill on phenomenal consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):851-860.
    I argue that it is at least open to a proponent of type materialism for phenomenal consciousness to accept Hill’s representational theory of experiential awareness of perceptual qualia.
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  • Intensions, belief and science: Kuhn’s early philosophical outlook.Juan V. Mayoral de Lucas - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):175-184.
    Between 1940 and 1945, while still a student of theoretical physics and without any contact with the history of science, Thomas S. Kuhn developed a general outline of a theory of the role of belief in science. This theory was well rooted in the philosophical tradition of Emerson Hall, Harvard, and particularly in H. M. Sheffer’s and C. I. Lewis’s logico-philosophical works—Kuhn was, actually, a graduate student of the former in 1945. In this paper I reconstruct the development of that (...)
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  • Critical study: Joseph Levine's purple haze.William G. Lycan - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):448 – 463.
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality: Bifurcated or Intertwined?Steven Levine - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):551-558.
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  • Sensory experience and intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
    Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing.
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  • (1 other version)Geochronometrie und geometrodynamik.Bernulf Kanitscheider - 1973 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (2):261-302.
    Die Frage, ob die Gültigkeit alternativer begrifflicher Strukturen empirisch entscheidbar oder eine Sache der willkürlichen Festsetzung ist, wird, eingeschränkt auf den Fall der physikalischen Geometrie, diskutiert. Die erkenntnistheoretischen Komponenten der empirischen Bestimmung von metrischen und topologischen Eigenschaften des physikalischen Raumes werden in der neueren Wissenschaftstheorie verfolgt. In Anschluß an die Auseinandersetzung zwischen A. Grünbaum und H. Putnam wird eine Interpretation des semantischen Status des Kongruenzprädikates vorgeschlagen, die Schwierigkeiten im Verhältnis von Intension und Extension dieses Terms beseitigen soll. Bei der Konfrontation (...)
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  • Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism.Daniel Enrique Kalpokas - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):715-738.
    In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.
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  • The Needlessness of Adverbialism, Attributeism and its Compatibilty with Cognitive Science.Hilla Jacobson & Hilary Putnam - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):555-570.
    Although adverbialism is not given much attention in current discussions of phenomenal states, it remains of interest to philosophers who reject the representationalist view of such states, in suggesting an alternative to a problematic ‘act-property’ conception. We discuss adverbialism and the formalization Tye once offered for it, and criticize the semantics he proposed for this formalization. Our central claim is that Tye’s ontological purposes could have been met by a more minimal view, which we dub “attributeism”. We then show that (...)
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  • Knowledge, certainty and probability.Herbert Heidelberger - 1963 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 6 (1-4):242 – 250.
    In this essay, I discuss some of the important logical principles governing the concepts of knowledge, certainty and probability. In the first section, I suggest a series of definitions of epistemic terms, employing as primitive the locution ?p is epistemi?cally possible to S? In the second section, I develop an epistemic concept of probability and compare it to the concepts of certainty and knowledge. In the third section, I relate the epistemic concepts of certainty and probability to the quantifiers of (...)
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  • Consciousness and the superfunctionality claim.Craig DeLancey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):433-451.
    The superfunctionality claim is that phenomenal experiences are more than functional (objective, causal) relations. This is one of the most widely used but least attacked claims in the anti-physicalist literature on consciousness. Coupled with one form of structuralism, the view that science only explains functional relations, the superfunctionality claim entails that science will not explain phenomenal experience. The claim is therefore essential to many anti-physicalist arguments. I identify an open question argument for the superfunctionality claim that expresses an intuition deserving (...)
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