Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. A Semantics for Hyperintensional Belief Revision Based on Information Bases.Sena Bozdag - 2022 - Studia Logica 110 (3):679-716.
    I propose a novel hyperintensional semantics for belief revision and a corresponding system of dynamic doxastic logic. The main goal of the framework is to reduce some of the idealisations that are common in the belief revision literature and in dynamic epistemic logic. The models of the new framework are primarily based on potentially incomplete or inconsistent collections of information, represented by situations in a situation space. I propose that by shifting the representational focus of doxastic models from belief sets (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accommodating Iterated Beliefs And Ramsey Conditionals Within DDL.Sten Lindström & Wiodek Rabinowicz - 1997 - In Jan Odelstad, Lars Lindahl, Paul Needham & Rysiek Sliwi Nski (eds.), For Good Measure.
    In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are of the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter. Then we distinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on the doxastic states of a rational agent but also rationality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty-five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • New Foundations for a Relational Theory of Theory-revision.Neil Tennant - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (5):489-528.
    AGM-theory, named after its founders Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson, is the leading contemporary paradigm in the theory of belief-revision. The theory is reformulated here so as to deal with the central relational notions 'J is a contraction of K with respect to A' and 'J is a revision of K with respect to A'. The new theory is based on a principal-case analysis of the domains of definition of the three main kinds of theory-change (expansion, contraction and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.
    Probabilistic belief contraction has been a much neglected topic in the field of probabilistic reasoning. This is due to the difficulty in establishing a reasonable reversal of the effect of Bayesian conditionalization on a probabilistic distribution. We show that indifferent contraction, a solution proposed by Ramer to this problem through a judicious use of the principle of maximum entropy, is a probabilistic version of a full meet contraction. We then propose variations of indifferent contraction, using both the Shannon entropy measure (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Changing minds about climate change: Belief revision, coherence, and emotion.Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 329--345.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Cooperation in Philosophy.Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Theoria 65 (1):1-2.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Revision of Probabilistic Belief States.Craig Boutilier - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):158-183.
    In this paper we describe two approaches to the revision of probability functions. We assume that a probabilistic state of belief is captured by a counterfactual probability or Popper function, the revision of which determines a new Popper function. We describe methods whereby the original function determines the nature of the revised function. The first is based on a probabilistic extension of Spohn's OCFs, whereas the second exploits the structure implicit in the Popper function itself. This stands in contrast with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Ramsey test revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - In G. Crocco, Luis Fariñas del Cerro & Andreas Herzig (eds.), Conditionals: from philosophy to computer science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131-182.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Belief change for introspective agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.
    We discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) for introspective agents: agents who have the ability to form higher-order beliefs. Such agents can reflect upon and change their minds about their own beliefs. The project of constructing such a logic, full DDL or DDL unlimited, is ridden with difficulties due to the fact that the agent's own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality he is trying to explore. When an introspective agent learns more about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1991 - In Andre Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change: Workshop, Konstanz, FRG, October 13-15, 1989, Proceedings. Springer. pp. 93--126.
    In earlier papers (Lindström & Rabinowicz, 1989. 1990), we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather thanas a function on theories (or belief sets). The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain way an approach to belief (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Decision theory, intelligent planning and counterfactuals.Michael John Shaffer - 2008 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):61-92.
    The ontology of decision theory has been subject to considerable debate in the past, and discussion of just how we ought to view decision problems has revealed more than one interesting problem, as well as suggested some novel modifications of classical decision theory. In this paper it will be argued that Bayesian, or evidential, decision-theoretic characterizations of decision situations fail to adequately account for knowledge concerning the causal connections between acts, states, and outcomes in decision situations, and so they are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • DDL unlimited: Dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):353-385.
    The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the proper sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural language — ordinary mathematical English — to characterize the mathematical structures that are under study. Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal logical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Bayesian confirmation of theories that incorporate idealizations.Michael J. Shaffer - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (1):36-52.
    Following Nancy Cartwright and others, I suggest that most (if not all) theories incorporate, or depend on, one or more idealizing assumptions. I then argue that such theories ought to be regimented as counterfactuals, the antecedents of which are simplifying assumptions. If this account of the logic form of theories is granted, then a serious problem arises for Bayesians concerning the prior probabilities of theories that have counterfactual form. If no such probabilities can be assigned, the the posterior probabilities will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David C. Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.
    We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from one-place probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probability corresponding to familiar variants of qualitative belief change, and conversely. Likewise, we explain how recent work on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - London and Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
    This book is a sustained defense of the compatibility of the presence of idealizations in the sciences and scientific realism. So, the book is essentially a detailed response to the infamous arguments raised by Nancy Cartwright to the effect that idealization and scientific realism are incompatible.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Iterated AGM Revision Based on Probability Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2023 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 32 (4):657-675.
    Close connections between probability theory and the theory of belief change emerge if the codomain of probability functions is extended from the real-valued interval [0, 1] to a hyperreal interval with the same limits. Full beliefs are identified as propositions with a probability at most infinitesimally smaller than 1. Full beliefs can then be given up, and changes in the set of full beliefs follow a pattern very close to that of AGM revision. In this contribution, iterated revision is investigated. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Basis for AGM Revision in Bayesian Probability Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (6):1535-1559.
    In standard Bayesian probability revision, the adoption of full beliefs (propositions with probability 1) is irreversible. Once an agent has full belief in a proposition, no subsequent revision can remove that belief. This is an unrealistic feature, and it also makes probability revision incompatible with belief change theory, which focuses on how the set of full beliefs is modified through both additions and retractions. This problem in probability theory can be solved in a model that (i) lets the codomain of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework.Craig Boutilier - 1994 - Artificial Intelligence 68 (1):33-85.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Functional vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 253--268.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Ramsey test revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):131-182.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • A Plea for Accuracy.Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott - 1998 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 8 (3):221-224.
    ABSTRACT In his paper ?On Having Bad Contractions, Or: No Room for Recovery? [Te97], N. Tennant attacks the AGM research program of belief revision. We show that he misrepresents the state of affairs in this field of research.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the significance of conditional probabilities.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):311 - 344.
    The orthodoxy that conditional probabilities reflect what are for a subject evidential bearings is seconded. This significance suggests that there should be principles equating rationally revised probabilities on new information with probabilities reached by conditionalizing on this information. Several principles, two of which are endorsed, are considered. A book is made against a violator of these, and it is argued that there must be something wrong with a person against whom such books can be made. Appendices comment on Popper-functions, elaborate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Contracting Intuitionistic Theories.Neil Tennant - 2005 - Studia Logica 80 (2-3):369-391.
    I reformulate the AGM-account of contraction (which would yield an account also of revision). The reformulation involves using introduction and elimination rules for relational notions. Then I investigate the extent to which the two main methods of partial meet contraction and safe contraction can be employed for theories closed under intuitionistic consequence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):195-237.
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test : If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision as a relation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations