In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are of the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter. Then we distinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on the doxastic states of a rational agent but also rationality (...) constraints on the changes of doxastic state that may occur in such agents. An additional distinction is that between non-introspective theories and introspective ones. Non-introspective theories investigate agents that have opinions about the external world but no higher-order opinions about their own doxasticnstates. Standard AGM-type theories as well as the currently existing versions of Segerberg’s dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) are non-introspective. Hintikka-style doxastic logic is of course introspective but it is a static theory. Thus, the challenge remains to devise doxastic theories that are both dynamic and introspective. We outline the semantics for truly introspective dynamic doxastic logic, i.e., a dynamic doxastic logic that allows us to describe agents who have both the ability to form higher-order beliefs and to reflect upon and change their minds about their own (higher-order) beliefs. This extension of DDL demands that we give up the Preservation condition on revision. We make some suggestions as to how such a non-preservative revision operation can be constructed. We also consider extending DDL with conditionals satisfying the Ramsey test and show that Gärdenfors’ well-known impossibility result applies to such a framework. Also in this case, Preservation has to be given up. (shrink)

Sven-Ove Hansson and Erik Olsson studied in Hansson and Olsson, 103–119 1995) the logical properties of an operation of contraction first proposed by Isaac Levi in Levi. They provided a completeness result for the simplest version of contraction that they call Levi-contraction but left open the problem of characterizing axiomatically the more complex operation of value-based contraction or saturatable contraction. In this paper we propose an axiomatization for this operation and prove a completeness result for it. We argue that the (...) resulting operation is better behaved than various rival operations of contraction defined in recent years. (shrink)

This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...) on the reference sentence (although the posterior belief state does depend on it). Bounded revision satisfies the Darwiche–Pearl (DP) axioms for iterated belief change. If the reference sentence is fixed to be a tautology or a contradiction, two well-known one-dimensional revision operations result. Bounded revision thus naturally fills the space between conservative revision (also known as natural revision) and moderate revision (also known as lexicographic revision). I compare this approach to the two-dimensional model of ‘revision by comparison’ investigated by Fermé and Rott (Artif Intell 157:5–47, 2004 ) that satisfies neither the SBC nor the DP axioms. I conclude that two-dimensional revision operations add substantially to the expressive power of qualitative approaches that do not make use of numbers as measures of degrees of belief. (shrink)

This book is a sustained defense of the compatibility of the presence of idealizations in the sciences and scientific realism. So, the book is essentially a detailed response to the infamous arguments raised by Nancy Cartwright to the effect that idealization and scientific realism are incompatible.

Semi-contraction is a withdrawal operation defined by Fermé in "On the logic of theory change: Contraction without recovery." In this paper we propose: (1) an axiomatic characterization of semi-contraction; (2) an alternative construction for semi-contraction based on semi-saturatable sets, inspired by Levi's saturatable sets; (3) a special kind of semi-contraction that satisfies the Lindström and Rabinowicz interpolation thesis.

The ontology of decision theory has been subject to considerable debate in the past, and discussion of just how we ought to view decision problems has revealed more than one interesting problem, as well as suggested some novel modifications of classical decision theory. In this paper it will be argued that Bayesian, or evidential, decision-theoretic characterizations of decision situations fail to adequately account for knowledge concerning the causal connections between acts, states, and outcomes in decision situations, and so they are (...) incomplete. Second, it will be argues that when we attempt to incorporate the knowledge of such causal connections into Bayesian decision theory, a substantial technical problem arises for which there is no currently available solution that does not suffer from some damning objection or other. From a broader perspective, this then throws into question the use of decision theory as a model of human or machine planning. (shrink)

The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the proper sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural language — ordinary mathematical English — to characterize the mathematical structures that are under study. Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal logical (...) language: a dynamic modal logic. Inspired by these suggestions Krister Segerberg has developed a very general logical framework for reasoning about doxastic change: dynamic doxastic logic (DDL). This framework may be seen as an extension of standard Hintikka-style doxastic logic with dynamic operators representing various kinds of transformations of the agent's doxastic state. Basic DDL describes an agent that has opinions about the external world and an ability to change these opinions in the light of new information. Such an agent is non-introspective in the sense that he lacks opinions about his own belief states. Here we are going to discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents: full DDL or DDL unlimited. The project of constructing such a logic is faced with difficulties due to the fact that the agent’s own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality that he is trying to explore: when an introspective agent learns more about the world, then the reality he holds beliefs about undergoes a change. But then his introspective (higher-order) beliefs have to be adjusted accordingly. In the paper we shall consider various ways of solving this problem. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...) keep apart the very different roles that systems of spheres can play. Nozicks sensitivity account turns out to be closer to the stability analysis of knowledge (versions of which I identify in Plato, Descartes, Klein and Lehrer) than one might have suspected. (shrink)

In an earlier paper [Rational choice and AGM belief revision, _Artificial Intelligence_, 2009] a correspondence was established between the set-theoretic structures of revealed-preference theory (developed in economics) and the syntactic belief revision functions of the AGM theory (developed in philosophy and computer science). In this paper we extend the re-interpretation of those structures in terms of one-shot belief revision by relating them to the trichotomous attitude towards information studied in Garapa (Rev Symb Logic, 1–21, 2020) where information may be either (...) (1) fully accepted or (2) rejected or (3) taken seriously but not fully accepted. We begin by introducing the syntactic notion of _filtered belief revision_ and providing a characterization of it in terms of a mixture of both AGM revision and contraction. We then establish a correspondence between the proposed notion of filtered belief revision and the above-mentioned set-theoretic structures, interpreted as semantic _partial_ belief revision structures. We also provide an interpretation of the trichotomous attitude towards information in terms of the degree of implausibility of the information. (shrink)

This thesis investigates a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, the operation of making up one's mind, and its generalization, the operation of choice revision. Making up one's mind about a sentence is a belief change that takes the agent to a belief state in which either the sentence or its negation is believed. In choice revision, the input information is represented by a set of sentences, and the agent should make a choice on which sentences to be accepted. Apart from (...) being practically important, these operations are technically interesting since the standard approach of intersecting a set of optimal outcomes is not workable. Paper I provides a construction based on descriptor revision in which the operation of making up one's mind can be modelled in a ``select-direct'' way, which is different from the traditional ``select-and-intersect'' methodology employed in the AGM model. The article shows that this construction is axiomatically characterized with a set of plausible postulates, and investigates the additional postulates that correlate with properties of the construction. Paper II investigates a new modelling for sentential belief revision operations, which is based on a set of relations on sentences named believability relations. It demonstrates that two special kinds of such relations, i.e. H-believability relations and basic believability relations, are faithful alternative models of two typical sentential revision generated from descriptor revision. It also shows that traditional AGM revision operations can be reconstructed from a strengthened variant of the basic believability relation and there exists a close connection between this strengthened believability relation and the standard epistemic entrenchment relation. Paper III studies the constructions of choice revision based on descriptor revision and multiple believability relations, which extends the domain of believability relations from sentences to sets of sentences. It is shown that each of two variants of choice revision based on descriptor revision is axiomatically characterized with a set of plausible postulates, assuming that the object language is finite. Furthermore, without assuming a finite language, it is shown that choice revision constructed from multiple believability relations is axiomatically characterized with the same sets of postulates proposed for choice revision derived from descriptor revision, whenever these relations satisfy certain rationality conditions. Paper IV explores choice revision on belief bases. A generalized version of expansion operation called partial expansion is introduced for developing models of this kind of choice revision. Based on the partial expansion as well as two multiple contraction operations from the literature, two kinds of choice revision operators on belief bases are constructed. This paper proposes several postulates for such two operators and shows that they can be axiomatically characterized by such postulates. Furthermore, it investigates two kinds of making up one's mind operators generated from these two choice revision operators and presents the axiomatic characterizations of them. (shrink)

I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of interrogative games, (...) with respect to some issues in the theory of belief change. (shrink)

The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty-five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original (...) framework, iterated change, applications of the model, its connections with other formal frameworks, computatibility of AGM operations, and criticism of the model. (shrink)

We discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) for introspective agents: agents who have the ability to form higher-order beliefs. Such agents can reflect upon and change their minds about their own beliefs. The project of constructing such a logic, full DDL or DDL unlimited, is ridden with difficulties due to the fact that the agent's own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality he is trying to explore. When an introspective agent learns more about (...) the world (and himself), the reality he holds beliefs about undergoes a change in its doxastic part, which means that his introspective beliefs have to be adjusted accordingly. (shrink)

A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant (...) construction recipes for minimal changes of belief states. These relations, however, are required to satisfy rather demanding conditions. In the present paper we liberalize the concept of epistemic entrenchment by removing connectivity, minimality and maximality conditions. Correspondingly, we achieve a liberalization of the concept of rational belief change that does no longer presuppose the postulates of success and rational monotony. We show that the central results of Gärdenfors and Makinson are preserved in our more flexible setting. Moreover, the generalized concept of epistemic entrenchment turns out to be applicable also to relational and iterated belief changes. (shrink)

Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be (...) that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon. (shrink)

We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the rejection of (...) some information to maintain consistency, instead of being withdrawn it will be kept and introduced in a different layer with lower value. Throughout this development we will follow the principle of minimal change, being one of the important principles proposed in belief change theory, particularly emphasized in the AGM model. Regarding the reasoning part from the stratified belief base, the agent will obtain the inferences using an argumentative formalism. Thus, the argumentation framework will decide which information prevails when sentences of different layers are used for entailing conflicting beliefs. We will also illustrate how inferences are changed and how the status of arguments can be modified after a revision process. (shrink)

Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test : If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision as a relation (...) rather than as a function.In our semantic approach, the same relation is used to model belief revision and to give truth-conditions for conditionals. The approach validates a weak version of the Ramsey Test — essentially, a restriction of RT to maximally consistent belief states. (shrink)

If the logic of belief changes is extended to cover belief states which contain both factual and normative beliefs, it is easily shown that a change of a factual belief (an 'Is') in a mixed belief state can imply a change of a normative belief (an 'Ought') in the same state. With regard to Hume's so-called 'Is-Ought problem', this means that one has to distinguish its statics from its dynamics. When this is done, it becomes clear that changes of factual (...) beliefs can, for rational reasons, have far-reaching normative consequences. Similarly, a change of a factual belief can imply a change of a value belief. (shrink)

Although AGM theory contraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985; Alchourrón and Makinson, 1985) occupies a central position in the literature on belief change, there is one aspect about it that has created a fair amount of controversy. It involves the inclusion of the postulate known as Recovery. As a result, a number of alternatives to AGM theory contraction have been proposed that do not always satisfy the Recovery postulate (Levi, 1991, 1998; Hansson and Olsson, 1995; Fermé, 1998; Fermé and Rodriguez, 1998; (...) Rott and Pagnucco, 1999). In this paper we present a new addition, systematic withdrawal, to the family of withdrawal operations, as they have become known. We define systematic withdrawal semantically, in terms of a set of preorders, and show that it can be characterised by a set of postulates. In a comparison of withdrawal operations we show that AGM contraction, systematic withdrawal and the severe withdrawal of Rott and Pagnucco (1999) are intimately connected by virtue of their definition in terms of sets of preorders. In a future paper it will be shown that this connection can be extended to include the epistemic entrenchment orderings of Gärdenfors (1988) and Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) and the refined entrenchment orderings of Meyer et al. (2000). (shrink)

A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we (...) attend to some central philosophical issues in the theory of belief change, such as the choice of a representation for belief states and the meaning of an idealized rational agent. (shrink)

This book provides a critical examination of how the choice of what to believe is represented in the standard model of belief change. In particular the use of possible worlds and infinite remainders as objects of choice is critically examined. Descriptors are introduced as a versatile tool for expressing the success conditions of belief change, addressing both local and global descriptor revision. The book presents dynamic descriptors such as Ramsey descriptors that convey how an agent’s beliefs tend to be changed (...) in response to different inputs. It also explores sentential revision and demonstrates how local and global operations of revision by a sentence can be derived as a special case of descriptor revision. Lastly, the book examines revocation, a generalization of contraction in which a specified sentence is removed in a process that may possibly also involve the addition of some new information to the belief set. (shrink)

We introduce a simple generalization of Gardenfors and Makinson’s epistemic entrenchment called partial entrenchment. We show that preferential inference can be generated as the sceptical counterpart of an inference mechanism defined directly on partial entrenchment.

Two recent defences of the recovery postulate for contraction of belief sets are analyzed. It is concluded that recovery is defensible as a by-product of a formalization that is idealized in the sense of being simplified for the sake of clarity. However, recovery does not seem to be a required feature of the doxastic behaviour of ideal (perfectly rational) agents. It is reasonable to expect that there should be epistemic residues (remnants of rejected beliefs), but not that these should always (...) suffice to recover all the original beliefs if the discarded belief is reinstated. (shrink)

In studies of multi-agent interaction, especially in game theory, the notion of equilibrium often plays a prominent role. A typical scenario for the belief merging problem is one in which several agents pool their beliefs together to form a consistent "group" picture of the world. The aim of this paper is to define and study new notions of equilibria in belief merging. To do so, we assume the agents arrive at consistency via the use of a social belief removal function, (...) in which each agent, using his own individual removal function, removes some belief from his stock of beliefs. We examine several notions of equilibria in this setting, assuming a general framework for individual belief removal due to Booth et al. We look at their inter-relations as well as prove their existence or otherwise. We also show how our equilibria can be seen as a generalisation of the idea of taking maximal consistent subsets of agents. (shrink)

With each proposition P we associate a set of proposition (a hyperproposition) which determines the order in which one may retreat from accepting P, if one cannot fully hold on to P. We first describe the structure of hyperpropositions. Then we describe two operations on propositions, subtraction and merge, which can be modelled in terms of hyperpropositions. Subtraction is an operation that takes away part of the content of a proposition. Merge is an operation that determines the maximal consistent content (...) of two propositions considered jointly. The merge operation gives rise to an inference relation which is, in a certain sense, optimally paraconsistent. (shrink)

The AGM (Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that are not closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that one first adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an (...) intuitively plausible way of revising one's beliefs. Since it typically involves the temporary acceptance of an inconsistent set of beliefs, it can only be used in belief representations that distinguish between different inconsistent sets of belief. (shrink)

We investigate the research programme of dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) and analyze its underlying methodology. The Ramsey test for conditionals is used to characterize the logical and philosophical differences between two paradigmatic systems, AGM and KGM, which we develop and compare axiomatically and semantically. The importance of Gärdenfors’s impossibility result on the Ramsey test is highlighted by a comparison with Arrow’s impossibility result on social choice. We end with an outlook on the prospects and the future of DDL.

The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...) the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology. (shrink)

Traditionally, belief change is modelled as the construction of a belief set that satisfies a success condition. The success condition is usually that a specified sentence should be believed or not believed. Furthermore, most models of belief change employ a select-and-intersect strategy. This means that a selection is made among primary objects that satisfy the success condition, and the intersection of the selected objects is taken as outcome of the operation. However, the select-and-intersect method is difficult to justify, in particular (...) since the primary objects are not themselves plausible outcome candidates. Some of the most controversial features of belief change theory, such as recovery and the impossibility of Ramsey test conditionals, are closely connected with the select-and-intersect method. It is proposed that a selection mechanism should instead operate directly on the potential outcomes, and select only one of them. In this way many of the problems that are associated with the select-and-intersect method can be avoided. This model is simpler than previous models in the important Ockhamist sense of doing away with intermediate, cognitively inaccessible objects. However, the role of simplicity as a choice criterion in the direct selection among potential outcomes is left as an open issue. (shrink)

Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 3(4), 535–553. Segerberg, K. (1995). Conditional action. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas, & A. Herzig (Eds.), Conditionals: From philosophy to computer science, Studies ...

We describe the relation between coherence and foundations approaches to belief change in terms of a correspondence between epistemic entrenchment relations(Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1988; Rott, 1992) and dependence consequence relations from Bochman (1999, 2000a).The general conclusion of the study is that dependence consequence relations are sufficiently expressive to subsume the notion of an epistemic entrenchment and its generalizations.

We distinguish the set of explicit beliefs of a reasoner, his "belief base", from the beliefs that are merely implicit. Syntax-based belief change governed by the structure of the belief base and the ranking ("prioritization") of its elements is reconstructed with the help of an epistemic entrenchment relation in the style of Gärdenfors and Makinson. Though priorities are essentially different from entrenchments, distinguished relations of epistemic entrenchment may be obtained from prioritized belief bases by a number of different constructions. An (...) approximate reconstruction of syntax-based belief change is possible, which can be strengthened to a strict identity in some important special cases. A competitive interpretation and a minimal change interpretation of the basic idea of entrenchment are discussed. It is argued that entrenchment essentially involves multiple belief changes, i.e., changes by sets of sentences. (shrink)

Two of the major problems in AGM-style belief revision, namely the difficulties in accounting for iterated change and for Ramsey test conditionals, have satisfactory solutions in descriptor revision. In descriptor revision, the input is a metalinguistic sentence specifying the success condition of the operation. The choice mechanism selects one of the potential outcomes in which the success condition is satisfied. Iteration of this operation is unproblematic. Ramsey test conditionals can be introduced without giving rise to the paradoxical results that they (...) generate in other systems. In addition to standard Ramsey test conditionals, a more general variant of epistemic conditionals is defined, representing statements of the form ”if the belief state is changed to satisfy condition A then it will satisfy condition B”. An axiomatic characterization of such descriptor conditionals is presented. It is related in intricate ways to the KLM postulates for cumulative reasoning. (shrink)

Epistemic entrenchment, as presented by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) and Gärdenfors (1988), is a formalisation of the intuition that, when forced to choose between two beliefs, an agent will giveup the less entrenched one. While their formalisation satisfactorilycaptures the intuitive notion of the entrenchment of beliefs in a number ofaspects, the requirement that all wffs be comparable has drawn criticismfrom various quarters. We define a set of refined versions of theirentrenchment orderings that are not subject to the same criticism, andinvestigate (...) the relationship between the refined entrenched orderings,the entrenchment orderings of Gärdenfors and Makinson, and AGM theorycontraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985). To conclude, we compare refinedentrenchment with two related approaches to epistemic entrenchment. (shrink)

Belief revision theories aim to model the dynamics of epistemic states. Besides beliefs, epistemic states comprise most importantly justificational structures. Typically, belief revision theories, however, model the dynamics of beliefs while neglecting justificational structures over and above logical relations. Despite some awareness that this approach is problematic, how devastating the consequences of this neglect are has not yet been fully grasped. In this paper, I argue that taking justificational structures into account could solve four well-known problems of belief revision.

In his paper ‘Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Reply to My Critics’, N. Tennant (1997b) reacts to the critical reception of an earlier article of his. The present note rectifies some of the most serious misrepresentations in Tennant's reply.

The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the (...) incorporation of new information). Makinson has generalised this work by introducing the notion of a withdrawal operation. Underlying the account proffered by AGM is the idea of rational belief change. A belief change operation should be guided by certain principles or integrity constraints in order to characterise change by a rational agent. One of the most noted principles within the context of AGM is the Principle of Informational Economy. However, adoption of this principle in its purest form has been rejected by AGM leading to a more relaxed interpretation. In this paper, we argue that this weakening of the Principle of Informational Economy suggests that it is only one of a number of principles which should be taken into account. Furthermore, this weakening points toward a Principle of Indifference. This motivates the introduction of a belief removal operation that we call severe withdrawal. We provide rationality postulates for severe withdrawal and explore its relationship with AGM contraction. Moreover, we furnish possible worlds and epistemic entrenchment semantics for severe withdrawals. (shrink)