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Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision

In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer. pp. 93--126 (1991)

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  1. Belief Change for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.
    We discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) for introspective agents: agents who have the ability to form higher-order beliefs. Such agents can reflect upon and change their minds about their own beliefs. The project of constructing such a logic, full DDL or DDL unlimited, is ridden with difficulties due to the fact that the agent's own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality he is trying to explore. When an introspective agent learns more about (...)
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  • Back to Basics: Belief Revision Through Direct Selection.Sven Hansson - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (5):887-915.
    Traditionally, belief change is modelled as the construction of a belief set that satisfies a success condition. The success condition is usually that a specified sentence should be believed or not believed. Furthermore, most models of belief change employ a select-and-intersect strategy. This means that a selection is made among primary objects that satisfy the success condition, and the intersection of the selected objects is taken as outcome of the operation. However, the select-and-intersect method is difficult to justify, in particular (...)
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  • The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory.Emmanuel Genot - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):271-289.
    I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of interrogative games, (...)
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  • On the Role of the Research Agenda in Epistemic Change.Erik J. Olsson & David Westlund - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):165 - 183.
    The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...)
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  • DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):353-385.
    The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the proper sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural language — ordinary mathematical English — to characterize the mathematical structures that are under study. Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal logical (...)
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  • Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference.Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193.
    We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the rejection of (...)
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  • The Ramsey Test Revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro & A. Herzig (eds.), Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 131-182.
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  • Four Ways in Which Theories of Belief Revision Could Benefit from Theories of Epistemic Justification.Gordian Haas - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):295-316.
    Belief revision theories aim to model the dynamics of epistemic states. Besides beliefs, epistemic states comprise most importantly justificational structures. Typically, belief revision theories, however, model the dynamics of beliefs while neglecting justificational structures over and above logical relations. Despite some awareness that this approach is problematic, how devastating the consequences of this neglect are has not yet been fully grasped. In this paper, I argue that taking justificational structures into account could solve four well-known problems of belief revision.
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  • Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accommodating Iterated Beliefs And Ramsey Conditionals Within DDL.Sten Lindström & Wiodek Rabinowicz - 1997 - In Lars Lindahl, Paul Needham & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), For Good Measure. Uppsala, Sverige:
    In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are of the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter. Then we distinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on the doxastic states of a rational agent but also rationality (...)
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  • How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant.Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):361-380.
    A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we (...)
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  • Modellings for Belief Change: Prioritization and Entrenchment.Hans Rott - 1992 - Theoria 58 (1):21-57.
    We distinguish the set of explicit beliefs of a reasoner, his "belief base", from the beliefs that are merely implicit. Syntax-based belief change governed by the structure of the belief base and the ranking ("prioritization") of its elements is reconstructed with the help of an epistemic entrenchment relation in the style of Gärdenfors and Makinson. Though priorities are essentially different from entrenchments, distinguished relations of epistemic entrenchment may be obtained from prioritized belief bases by a number of different constructions. An (...)
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  • Iterated Descriptor Revision and the Logic of Ramsey Test Conditionals.Sven Hansson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (4):429-450.
    Two of the major problems in AGM-style belief revision, namely the difficulties in accounting for iterated change and for Ramsey test conditionals, have satisfactory solutions in descriptor revision. In descriptor revision, the input is a metalinguistic sentence specifying the success condition of the operation. The choice mechanism selects one of the potential outcomes in which the success condition is satisfied. Iteration of this operation is unproblematic. Ramsey test conditionals can be introduced without giving rise to the paradoxical results that they (...)
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  • On Non-Prioritized Multiple Belief Revision.Li Zhang - 2018 - Dissertation, KTH Royal Institute of Technology
    This thesis investigates a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, the operation of making up one's mind, and its generalization, the operation of choice revision. Making up one's mind about a sentence is a belief change that takes the agent to a belief state in which either the sentence or its negation is believed. In choice revision, the input information is represented by a set of sentences, and the agent should make a choice on which sentences to be accepted. Apart from (...)
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  • Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment.Hans Rott - 1992 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78.
    A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant (...)
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  • AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (AGM), "On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions" was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twentyfive years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in (...)
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  • AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty-five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original (...)
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  • Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery).Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
    The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the (...)
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  • When Hyperpropositions Meet .André Fuhrmann - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):559 - 574.
    With each proposition P we associate a set of proposition (a hyperproposition) which determines the order in which one may retreat from accepting P, if one cannot fully hold on to P. We first describe the structure of hyperpropositions. Then we describe two operations on propositions, subtraction and merge, which can be modelled in terms of hyperpropositions. Subtraction is an operation that takes away part of the content of a proposition. Merge is an operation that determines the maximal consistent content (...)
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  • Reversing the Levi Identity.Sven Ove Hansson - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
    The AGM (Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that are not closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that one first adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an (...)
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  • Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):195-237.
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test : If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision as a relation (...)
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  • Semi-Contraction: Axioms and Construction.Eduardo Fermé & Ricardo Rodriguez - 1998 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39 (3):332-345.
    Semi-contraction is a withdrawal operation defined by Fermé in "On the logic of theory change: Contraction without recovery." In this paper we propose: (1) an axiomatic characterization of semi-contraction; (2) an alternative construction for semi-contraction based on semi-saturatable sets, inspired by Levi's saturatable sets; (3) a special kind of semi-contraction that satisfies the Lindström and Rabinowicz interpolation thesis.
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  • Logic of Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • On the Logic of Small Changes in Hypertheories.John Cantwell - 1997 - Theoria 63 (1-2):54-89.
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  • To Preference Via Entrenchment.Konstantinos Georgatos - 1999 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1--3):141--155.
    We introduce a simple generalization of Gardenfors and Makinson’s epistemic entrenchment called partial entrenchment. We show that preferential inference can be generated as the sceptical counterpart of an inference mechanism defined directly on partial entrenchment.
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  • Equilibria in Social Belief Removal.Richard Booth & Thomas Meyer - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):97 - 123.
    In studies of multi-agent interaction, especially in game theory, the notion of equilibrium often plays a prominent role. A typical scenario for the belief merging problem is one in which several agents pool their beliefs together to form a consistent "group" picture of the world. The aim of this paper is to define and study new notions of equilibria in belief merging. To do so, we assume the agents arrive at consistency via the use of a social belief removal function, (...)
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  • What's New Isn't Always Best.Sven Ove Hansson - 1997 - Theoria 63 (1-2):1-13.
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