- The History and Philosophy of Ecological Psychology.Lorena Lobo, Manuel Heras-Escribano & David Travieso - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Samuel Alexander's Theory of Categories.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - The Monist 98 (3):246-67.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.details
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Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.details
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The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.details
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The Evolutionary Foundation of Perceiving One's Own Emotions.Sarah L. Strout, Rosemarie I. Sokol, James D. Laird & Nicholas S. Thompson - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):493 - 502.details
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Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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Consciousness and existence as a process.Riccardo Manzotti - 2006 - Mind and Matter 4 (1):7-43.details
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Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.details
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Russell and American Realism.Matthias Neuber - 2024 - Topoi 43 (1):127-133.details
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Perry, the ‘Ego-Centric Predicament’, and the Rise of Analytic Philosophy in the United States.Matthias Neuber - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (1):185-204.details
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Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.details
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Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.details
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Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.details
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There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Consciousness outside the head.F. Tonneau - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):97-123.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.details
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“Good developmental sequence” and the paradoxes of children's skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.details
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Solipsistic sentience.Jordan C. V. Taylor - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (4):734-750.details
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The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Can indirect realism be demonstrated in the psychological laboratory?Stephen Wilcox & Stuart Katz - 1984 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (2):149-157.details
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Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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