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Causal closure principles and emergentism

Philosophy 75 (294):571-586 (2000)

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  1. The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- Tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
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  • Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel.Paul Giladi - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):248-270.
    My aim in this paper is to defend the claim that the absolute idealism of Hegel is a liberal naturalist position against Sebastian Gardner’s claim that it is not genuinely naturalistic, and also to defend the position of ‘liberal naturalism’ from Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for it to occupy. By ‘liberal naturalism’, I mean a doctrine which is a non-reductive form of philosophical naturalism. Like Fred Beiser, I take the thesis of liberal naturalism to find (...)
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  • Taking Emergentism Seriously.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):31-46.
    The Exclusion Argument has afflicted non-reductionists for decades. In this article, I attempt to show that emergentism—the view that mental entities can downwardly cause physical entities in a non-overdetermining way—is the most plausible approach to solving the exclusion problem. The emergentist approach is largely absent in contemporary philosophy of mind, because emergentism rejects the Causal Closure of Physics, a doctrine embraced by almost all physicalists. This article, however, challenges the consensus on causal closure and defends a physicalist version of emergentism. (...)
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  • The Super-Overdetermination Problem.John Donaldson - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to (...)
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  • Causal After All : A Model of Mental Causation for Dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Dissertation, Umeå University
    In this dissertation, I develop and defend a model of causation that allows for dualist mental causation in worlds where the physical domain is physically complete. In Part I, I present the dualist ontology that will be assumed throughout the thesis and identify two challenges for models of mental causation within such an ontology: the exclusion worry and the common cause worry. I also argue that a proper response to these challenges requires a thoroughly lightweight account of causation, i.e. an (...)
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  • Causal closure of the physical, mental causation, and physics.Dejan Dimitrijević - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-22.
    The argument from causal closure of the physical is usually considered the most powerful argument in favor of the ontological doctrine of physicalism. Many authors, most notably Papineau, assume that CCP implies that physicalism is supported by physics. I demonstrate, however, that physical science has no bias in the ontological debate between proponents of physicalism and dualism. I show that the arguments offered for CCP are effective only against the accounts of mental causation based on the action of the mental (...)
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  • Wunder verletzen die Naturgesetze nicht.Daniel Von Wachter - 2017 - In Benedikt Göcke & Ruben Schneider (eds.), Gottes Handeln in der Welt. pp. 361-382.
    Einige versuchen, Wunder mit den Naturgesetzen vereinbar zu machen, indem sie „Wunder“ als etwas anderes als göttliche Eingriffe definieren. Dieser Aufsatz behauptet hin- gegen, daß Wunder die Naturgesetze nicht verletzen, obwohl sie göttliche Eingriffe sind. Wunder sind auch keine „Ausnah- men“ der Naturgesetze, noch treffen die Naturgesetze nicht auf sie zu. Naturgesetze haben nie Ausnahmen, sie werden nie verletzt oder ausgesetzt, sie sind wahrscheinlich notwen- dig und unveränderlich, und sie treffen auch auf göttliche Ein- griffe zu. Wir sollten nicht unsere (...)
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  • Dispositional Explanations in Dualism.Janko Nesic - 2013 - Filozofija I Društvo 24 (4):218-241.
    In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can be causal explanations, (...)
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  • Miracles Are Not Violations of the Laws of Nature Because the Laws Do Not Entail Regularity.Daniel Von Watcher - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):37.
    Some have tried to make miracles compatible with the laws of nature by re-defining them as something other than interventions. By contrast, this article argues that although miracles are divine interventions, they are not violations of the laws of nature. Miracles are also not exceptions to the laws, nor do the laws not apply to them. The laws never have exceptions; they never are violated or suspended, are probably necessary and unchangeable, and apply also to divine interventions. We need to (...)
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  • Metaphysical Necessity Dualism.Ben White - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1779-1798.
    A popular response to the Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that mental events depend on their physical bases in such a way that the causation of a physical effect by a mental event and its physical base needn’t generate any problematic form of causal overdetermination, even if mental events are numerically distinct from and irreducible to their physical bases. This paper presents and defends a form of dualism that implements this response by using a dispositional essentialist view of properties to (...)
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  • Mental Causation.Sophie C. Gibb - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):327-338.
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  • Life and the Homeostatic Organization View of Biological Phenomena.Robert Arp - 2008 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 4 (1-2):260-285.
    p style="text-indent: 0cm; line-height: normal" class="MsoBodyTextIndent3"span style="font-size: 11pt"In this paper, I argue that starting with the organelles that constitute a cellmdash;and continuing up the hierarchy of components in processes and subsystems of an organismmdash;there exist clear instances of emergent biological phenomena that can be considered ldquo;livingrdquo; entities.spannbsp; /spanThese components and their attending processes are living emergent phenomena because of the way in which the components are organized to maintain homeostasis of the organism at the various levels in the hierarchy.spannbsp; /spanI (...)
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  • Emergence in Mind (Mind Association Occasional Series) . Edited by Cynthia and Macdonald. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 288 Pages ISBN 13: 978-0-19-958362-1. [REVIEW]Elly Vintiadis - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (4):603-610.
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  • Žingsniai Link Antifizikalizmo.Mariusz Grygianiec - 2016 - Problemos 89:7.
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  • Interventionism and the Exclusion Problem.Yasmin Bassi - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    Jaegwon Kim (1998a, 2005) claims that his exclusion problem follows a priori for the non-reductive physicalist given her commitment to five apparently inconsistent theses: mental causation, non-identity, supervenience, causal closure and non-overdetermination. For Kim, the combination of these theses entails that mental properties are a priori excluded as causes, forcing the non-reductive physicalist to accept either epiphenomenalism, or some form of reduction. In this thesis, I argue that Kim’s exclusion problem depends on a particular conception of causation, namely sufficient production, (...)
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  • Pain is Mechanism.Simon van Rysewyk - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Tasmania
    What is the relationship between pain and the body? I claim that pain is best explained as a type of personal experience and the bodily response during pain is best explained in terms of a type of mechanical neurophysiologic operation. I apply the radical philosophy of identity theory from philosophy of mind to the relationship between the personal experience of pain and specific neurophysiologic mechanism and argue that the relationship between them is best explained as one of type identity. Specifically, (...)
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  • Closing in on Causal Closure.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.
    I examine the meaning and merits of a premise in the Exclusion Argument, the causal closure principle that all physical effects have physical causes. I do so by addressing two questions. First, if we grant the other premises, exactly what kind of closure principle is required to make the Exclusion Argument valid? Second, what are the merits of the requisite closure principle? Concerning the first, I argue that the Exclusion Argument requires a strong, “stringently pure” version of closure. The latter (...)
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  • Mentaalinen kausaatio.Panu Raatikainen - 2007 - In Syy. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
    Ajatus mentaalisesta kausaatiosta – siitä että mentaaliset ominaisuudet, tilat tai tapahtumat aiheuttavat fysikaalisia vaikutuksia, esimerkiksi ruumiinliikkeitä ja käyttäytymistä – on keskeinen osa niin arkiajattelua kuin tieteellistä psykologiaakin. Itsessään se tuntuu lähes latteudelta. Tarkemmassa filosofisessa tarkastelussa se kuitenkin synnyttää huomattavia filosofisia ongelmia (ks. esim. Block 1990; Heal & Mele 1993; Crane 1995).
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  • Nonreductive Physicalism and the Problem of Strong Closure.Sophie Gibb - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):29-42.
    Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments for physicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This principle is standardly defended by appealing to the fact that it enjoys empirical support from numerous confirming cases (and no disconfirming cases) in physics. However, in recent literature on mental causation, attempts have been made to provide a stronger argument for it. (...)
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  • Counterfactuals and Token Identity: Reply to Lowe.José Luis Bermúdez - 2006 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3).
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  • Neo-Thomistic Hylomorphism Applied to Mental Causation and Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Matthew Keith Owen - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    The aim of this work is to defend substance dualism by defeating two of its paramount potential defeaters. I will argue that a substance dualist position, neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, provides a solution to the causal pairing problem and a good explanation of neural correlates of consciousness. After an introductory first chapter, I'll explicate dualism's dominant potential defeaters in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 will clarify what neural correlates of consciousness are and the objection to dualism based on neural correlates. The (...)
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  • Kant’s Emergence and Sellarsian Cognitive Science.Richard McDonough - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):44-53.
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  • VIII—Defending Dualism.Sophie Gibb - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):131-146.
    In the contemporary mental causation debate, two dualist models of psychophysical causal relevance have been proposed which entail that although mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain, this is not in virtue of them causing any physical event. It is widely assumed that the principle of the causal completeness of the physical domain provides a general argument against interactive dualism. But, whether the completeness principle presents a problem for these alternative forms of interactive dualism is questionable. In this (...)
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  • Causation and Mental Causation: Standpoints and Intersections.Raffaella Campaner & Carlo Gabbani - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (29).
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  • Ontology, Mind and Free Will. A Workshop in Memory of E.J. Lowe.Matteo Grasso & Mattia Sorgon - 2014 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 5 (2):128-136.
    The single day conference “Ontology, Mind and Free Will. A Workshop in Memory of E.J. Lowe (1950-2014)” took place at the Department of Humanities of the University of Macerata on March, 3 rd 2014. It included as speakers Sophie Gibb (Durham University), Mario De Caro (Roma Tre University) and Michele Paolini Paoletti (University of Macerata). This event was thought by the organizers in order to honor the British philosopher Ethan Jonathan Lowe, who suddenly passed away last January with infinite regret (...)
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  • Mental Causation for Mind-Body Dualists.Antonella Corradini - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (29).
    Interactive dualism is notorious for supporting genuine and autonomous mental causation that is allegedly impossible for its confliction with basic principles of physics. The purpose of this essay is to show the invalidity of this commonplace view, by arguing to the contrary in three different steps. First, I will deal with the objection about the non-scientific character of interactive dualism, as it is conceived of in present-day philosophy of mind. Second, I will illustrate and critically examine three contemporary models of (...)
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  • Physical Determinability.Sophie C. Gibb - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (29).
    I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifically, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. The distinction that I make between causes and enabling (...)
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  • No Microphysical Causation? No Problem: Selective Causal Skepticism and the Structure of Completeness-Based Arguments for Physicalism.Matthew Haug - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1187-1208.
    A number of philosophers have argued that causation is not an objective feature of the microphysical world but rather is a perspectival phenomenon that holds only between “coarse-grained” entities such as those that figure in the special sciences. This view seems to pose a problem for arguments for physicalism that rely on the alleged causal completeness of physics. In this paper, I address this problem by arguing that the completeness of physics has two components, only one of which is causal. (...)
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  • Pushing Brains: Can Cognitive Neuroscience Provide Experimental Evidence for Brain-Mind Causation?Martin Kurthen - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (2):5-22.
    What makes the issue of causal relations between mental and cerebral events so special? And is there experimental evidence from neuroscience for this sort of causation? To answer these questions, the issue of brain-mind causation is considered against the background of the mind-brain problem and the theory of causation in general. Then, one empirical study from cognitive neuroscience is discussed as an example of how the correlations of mental and cerebral events and processes are investigated in current research. From the (...)
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  • Could Mental Causation Be Invisible?David Robb - forthcoming - In Alexander Carruth, S. C. Gibb & John Heil (eds.), The Metaphysics of E.J. Lowe. Oxford University Press.
    E.J. Lowe has recently proposed a model of mental causation on which mental events are emergent, thus exerting a novel, downward causal influence on physical events. Yet on Lowe's model, mental causation is at the same time empirically undetectable, and in this sense is "invisible". Lowe's model is ingenious, but I don't think emergentists should welcome it, for it seems to me that a primary virtue of emergentism is its bold empirical prediction about the long-term results of human physiology. Here (...)
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  • Causation Across Levels, Constitution, and Constraint.Max Kistler - 2010 - In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences · Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 141--151.
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  • The Zombie Attack, Perry’s Parry, and a Riposte: A Slight Softening of the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness.J. Ritchie - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):55-65.
    The “hard problem” of consciousness is a challenge for explanations of the nature of our phenomenal experiences. Chalmers has claimed that physicalist solutions to the challenge are ill-suited due, in part, to the zombie argument against physicalism. Perry has suggested that the zombie argument begs the question against the physicalist, and presents no relevant threat to the view. Although seldom discussed in the literature, I show there is defensive merit to Perry’s “parry” of the zombie attack. The success of the (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Completeness and the Uses (and Abuses) of Exclusion Principles.Matthew C. Haug - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):379-401.
    I argue that the completeness of physics is composed of two distinct claims. The first is the commonly made claim that, roughly, every physical event is completely causally determined by physical events. The second has rarely, if ever, been explicitly stated in the literature and is the claim that microphysics provides a complete inventory of the fundamental categories that constitute both the causal features and intrinsic nature of all the events that causally affect the physical universe. After showing that these (...)
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  • The Epistemic/Ontic Divide.Barbara Montero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404 - 418.
    A number of philosophers think that, while we cannot explain how the mind is physical, we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, looses its force. For if one takes physical/nonphysical causation and ontological physicalism (...)
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  • Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation.E. J. Lowe - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of (...)
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  • Zooming in on Downward Causation.William S. Robinson - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):117-136.
    . An attempt is made to identify a concept of ‘downward causation’ that will fit the claims of some recent writers and apply to interesting cases in biology and cognitive theory, but not to trivial cases. After noting some difficulties in achieving this task, it is proposed that in interesting cases commonly used to illustrate ‘downward causation’, (a) regularities hold between multiply realizable properties and (b) the explanation of the parallel regularity at the level of the realizing properties is non-trivial. (...)
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  • Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):479-505.
    Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes: Sid climbs the hill because he wants to. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes: Sid climbs the hill because a complex neural process in his brain triggered his climbing. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of (...)
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  • Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics.David Yates - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.
    The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is tare in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of properties are better (...)
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  • Natural Language and the Propositional Attitude Complex.Karen Shanton - 2006 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3).
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  • Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum.Sophie Gibb - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):363-384.
    The conservation laws do not establish the central premise within the argument from causal overdetermination – the causal completeness of the physical domain. Contrary to David Papineau, this is true even if there is no non-physical energy. The combination of the conservation laws with the claim that there is no non-physical energy would establish the causal completeness principle only if, at the very least, two further causal claims were accepted. First, the claim that the only way that something non-physical could (...)
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  • Mechanisms and Downward Causation.Max Kistler - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):595-609.
    Experimental investigation of mechanisms seems to make use of causal relations that cut across levels of composition. In bottom-up experiments, one intervenes on parts of a mechanism to observe the whole; in top-down experiments, one intervenes on the whole mechanism to observe certain parts of it. It is controversial whether such experiments really make use of interlevel causation, and indeed whether the idea of causation across levels is even conceptually coherent. Craver and Bechtel have suggested that interlevel causal claims can (...)
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  • A Causal Argument for Dualism.Bradford Saad - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2475-2506.
    Dualism holds that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity response to causal arguments for physicalism. Third, it transforms the dialectical role of epiphenomenalism. Fourth, it refutes the view that causal considerations prima facie support physicalism but not dualism. After developing the causal argument for dualism and drawing (...)
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  • The Causal Closure Principle.Sophie Gibb - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):626-647.
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