- Elicitation rules and incompatible goals.Julie R. Irwin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):20-21.details
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Architecture and algorithms: Power sharing for mental models.Robert Inder - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):354-354.details
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Experimentalist pressure against traditional methodology.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):743 - 765.details
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The Natural Origins of Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):521-536.details
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The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60:43-68.details
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The open end: Social naturalism, feminist values and the integrity of epistemology.Catherine Hundleby - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (3):251 – 265.details
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Computational science and scientific method.Paul Humphreys - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (4):499-512.details
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Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.details
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Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.details
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First insights on “neuropedagogy of reasoning”.Olivier Houdé - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):81 – 89.details
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Cross-cultural epistemic practices.Soraj Hongladarom - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (1):83 – 92.details
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The logical content of theories of deduction.Wilfrid Hodges - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):353-354.details
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A dual process model for cultural differences in thought.Hiroshi Yama, Miwa Nishioka, Tomoko Horishita, Yayoi Kawasaki & Junichi Taniguchi - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (2):143-172.details
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Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Philosophy.Andrew Higgins & Alexis Dyschkant - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (3):372-398.details
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Truth or consequences.John Heil - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):19-20.details
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A critique of information processing theories of consciousness.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (1):89-107.details
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Pragmatic commitments to naturalized epistemology.Cong Hangqing & Cheng Xiaodong - 2006 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (3):477-490.details
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Preposterism and Its Consequences.Susan Haack - 1996 - Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (2):296.details
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Fallibilism, Objectivity, and the New Cynicism.Susan Haack - 2004 - Episteme 1 (1):35-48.details
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Naturalism, normativity, and explanation: Some scientistic biases of contemporary naturalism.Guy Axtell - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.details
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The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and Empirical.Francesco Guala - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):954-980.details
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The normativity of Lewis Conventions.Francesco Guala - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3107-3122.details
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Consequences of consequentialism.Rick Grush - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):18-19.details
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Wisdom.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):1-16.details
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The Value of Understanding.Stephen Grimm - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (2):103-117.details
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Mental models: Rationality, representation and process.D. W. Green - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):352-353.details
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Rule systems are not dead: Existential quantifiers are harder.Richard E. Grandy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):351-352.details
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
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Functional role semantics and reflective equilibrium.Simone Gozzano - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (38):62-76.details
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Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).details
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Moral errors.Clark Glymour - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):17-18.details
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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
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A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences.Herbert Gintis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):1-16.details
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Rationality, Virtue and Higher‐Order Coherence.Jens Gillessen - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (3):411-436.details
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Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.details
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No representations without rules: The prospects for a compromise between paradigms in cognitive science.James W. Garson - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):25-37.details
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A number of questions about a question of number.Alan Garnham - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):350-351.details
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Why study deduction?Kathleen M. Galotti & Lloyd K. Komatsu - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):350-350.details
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Beliefs as signals: A new function for belief.Eric Funkhouser - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):809-831.details
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Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture.Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237.details
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Is consequentialism better regarded as a form of reasoning or as a pattern of behavior?Steve Fuller - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-17.details
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Confirmation and Meaning Holism Revisited.Timothy Fuller - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1379-1397.details
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Teleological epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):673-691.details
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Consequentialism and utility theory.Deborah Frisch - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-16.details
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Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition.Benjamin James Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.details
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Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.details
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Mental models and informal logic.Alec Fisher - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):349-349.details
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What Does Belief Have to Do with Truth?Iskra Fileva - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (4):557-570.details
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Deductive reasoning: What are taken to be the premises and how are they interpreted?Samuel Fillenbaum - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):348-349.details
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The argument for mental models is unsound.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):347-348.details
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