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  1. Your word against mine: the power of uptake.Lucy McDonald - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3505-3526.
    Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have some power over whether it is performed. Call this (...)
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  • The natural right of property.Eric Mack - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):53-78.
    The two main theses of are: (i) that persons possess an original, non-acquired right not to be precluded from making extra-personal material their own (or from exercising discretionary control over what they have made their own); and (ii) that this right can and does take the form of a right that others abide by the rules of a (justifiable) practice of property which facilitates persons making extra-personal material their own (and exercising discretionary control over what they have made their own). (...)
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  • (1 other version)Fronteras, liberalismo e inmigración.Daniel Loewe - 2016 - Pensamiento 72 (272):633-654.
    El artículo sostiene que la teoría liberal está tensionada por una pretensión de universalidad normativa y su implementación institucional en el contexto de los Estados nacionales. Esta tensión se expresa claramente en el caso de la inmigración con la demanda estatal de control discrecional de las fronteras. El artículo desarrolla cuatro argumentos a favor de la relevancia normativa de las fronteras, y sostiene que no son conclusivos. Correspondientemente, desde una perspectiva liberal se dispondría de menos argumentos para justificar el cierre (...)
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  • By Convention Alone: Assignable Rights, Dischargeable Debts, and the Distinctiveness of the Commercial Sphere.Jed Lewinsohn - 2023 - Ethics 133 (2):231-270.
    This article argues that the dominant “nonconventionalist” theories of promising cannot account for the moral impact of two basic commercial practices: the transfer of contractual rights and the discharge of contractual debt in bankruptcy. In particular, nonconventionalism’s insensitivity to certain features of social context precludes it from registering the moral significance of these social phenomena. As prelude, I demonstrate that Seana Shiffrin’s influential position concerning the divergence between promise and contract commits her to impugning these features of the modern economy. (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Promises and all of the people who rely on them.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 54 (1):114-129.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • (2 other versions)Promises and all of the people who rely on them.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 54 (1):114-129.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • (1 other version)Promises and Practices Revisited.Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):119-154.
    Promising is clearly a social practice or convention. By uttering the formula, “I hereby promise to do X,” we can raise in others the expectation that we will in fact do X. But this succeeds only because there is a social practice that consists (inter alia) in a disposition on the part of promisers to do what they promise, and an expectation on the part of promisees that promisers will so behave. It is equally clear that, barring special circumstances of (...)
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  • Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation.Brendan Kenessey - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):204-232.
    This paper argues that promises are proposals in joint practical deliberation, the activity of deciding together what to do. More precisely: to promise to ϕ is to propose (in a particular way) to decide together with your addressee(s) that you will ϕ. I defend this deliberative theory by showing that the activity of joint practical deliberation naturally gives rise to a speech act with exactly the same properties as promises. A certain kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding (...)
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  • Expression and transaction in illocutionary acts.David Hills - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):758-766.
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  • (1 other version)Promising-Part 1.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of ‘bare wrongings’), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and promissory obligation, which attempt to solve the problems: The expectation account (...)
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  • (1 other version)Promising - Part 2.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):842-851.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising which attempt to solve these problems fall short of explaining the promissory (...)
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  • Promises, obligation, and reliance.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):150-170.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 150-170, January 2022.
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  • Reading Austin Rhetorically.Andrew Munro - 2013 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 46 (1):22-43.
    Given John L. Austin’s Oxonian pedigree, we should expect his discussion of how “to say something is to do something” (1962, 12) to be taken up analytically. However, Austin also offers resources that have been exploited outside of traditional analytic philosophy—think of certain analytic feminist work, for example, or literary critical uses of performativity. For the most part, such work extends and inflects Austin’s notion of illocution and its related concepts of force and performativity for disciplinary-specific ends. This tendency in (...)
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  • Responding to Trust.Matthew Harding - 2011 - Ratio Juris 24 (1):75-87.
    The essay considers what respect demands and what trust demands when one person trusts another. What respect requires in responding to trust is substantial but limited, ranging from the sharply proscriptive to the mildly prescriptive. What trust requires is, in a sense, unlimited, its content depending on the extent to which the person who trusts, and more importantly the person who is trusted, seek to build a relationship characterised by trust and trustworthiness.
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  • Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.
    In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Commitment, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-113.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
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  • Norms that Confer Competence.Torben Spaak - 2003 - Ratio Juris 16 (1):89-104.
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  • (1 other version) Promising, intimate relationships, and conventionalism.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):481-524.
    The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create commitments. What is really at issue between conventionalists and nonconventionalists is whether the basic moral relation of promissory commitment derives from the moral principles that govern our use of social conventions. Other nonconventionalist accounts make problematic concessions to the conventionalist's core (...)
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  • The Power to Promise Oneself.Kyle Fruh - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):61-85.
    Considerable attention has been devoted to the peculiar obligating force of interpersonal promises. But paradigmatic promising is not an orphan in the family of our moral concepts, and the focus on interpersonal promises has overshadowed sibling phenomena that any account of promises should also cover. I examine the case of single-party promises and argue, against the prevailing view, that we have good reason to take the phenomenon of making promises to oneself seriously. This supports what I call ‘the breadth criterion’: (...)
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  • Promising's Neglected Siblings: Oaths, Vows, and Promissory Obligation.Kyle Fruh - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):858-880.
    Promises of a customary, interpersonal kind have received no small amount of philosophical attention. Of particular interest has been their capac- ity to generate moral obligations. This capacity is arguably what distinguishes promises from other, similar phenomena, like communicating a firm intention. But this capacity is common to still other nearby phenomena, such as oaths and vows. These latter phenomena belong to the same family of concepts as promises, but they are structurally and functionally distinct. Taken in their turn, they (...)
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  • John Rawls Refutou o Intuicionismo?Andréa Luisa Bucchile Faggion - 2024 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 69 (1):e45448.
    Em Uma Teoria da Justiça, John Rawls explicou o intuicionismo como a doutrina que professa o pluralismo irredutível de princípios morais, princípios estes cujos conflitos não poderiam ser resolvidos de maneira principiológica. Segundo Rawls, não se pode oferecer um argumento abstrato que prove que o pluralismo moral é falso. Mas seria possível mostrarmos aquilo que o intuicionista nega existir: o princípio moral mais fundamental, que sistematiza nossas obrigações morais. Este princípio, de acordo com Rawls, seria o princípio da equidade. Neste (...)
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  • (1 other version)Forcing freedom - Arthur Ripstein. Force and freedom: Kant's legal and political philosophy. Cambridge, ma: Harvard university press, 2009. Pp. 399, XIII. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (1):89-99.
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  • Promising as Doxastic Entrustment.Jorah Dannenberg - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):425-447.
    I present a novel way to think about promising: Promising as Doxastic Entrustment. The main idea is that promising is inviting another to entrust her belief to you, and that taking a promiser’s word is freely choosing to accept this invitation. I explicate this through considering the special kind of reason for belief issued by a promiser: a reason whose rational status depends both on the will of the promiser to provide it, and on the will of the promisee to (...)
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  • A contractualist account of promising.Michael J. Cholbi - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):475-91.
    T.M. Scanlon (1998) proposes that promise breaking is wrong because it shows manipulative disregard for the expectations for future behavior created by promising. I argue that this account of promissory obligation is mistaken in it own right, as well as being at odds with Scanlon's contractualism. I begin by placing Scanlon's account of promising within a tradition that treats the creation of expectations in promise recipients as central to promissory obligation. However, a counterexample to Scanlon's account, his case of the (...)
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  • Do We Have Normative Powers?Ruth Chang - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):275-300.
    ‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...)
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  • (1 other version)Commitments, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
    This chapter argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model—as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you make a (...)
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  • Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection.Daniele Bruno - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3211-3231.
    Normative powers like promising allow agents to effect changes to their reasons, permissions and rights by the means of communicative actions whose function is to effect just those changes. An attractive view of the normativity of such powers combines a non-reductive account of their bindingness with a value-based grounding story of why we have them. This value-based view of normative powers however invites a charge of wishful thinking: Is it not bad reasoning to think that we have a given power (...)
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  • Coordination Cannot Establish Political Authority.Matthias Brinkmann - 2018 - Ratio Juris 31 (1):49-69.
    One of the most common arguments in favour of the state's authority is that without the coordinating hand of political institutions, we could not achieve important moral benefits. I argue that if we understand authority correctly, then coordination cannot even in principle establish that coordinators have political authority.
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  • Perceiving commitments: When we both know that you are counting on me.Francesca Bonalumi, John Michael & Christophe Heintz - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (4):502-524.
    Can commitments be generated without promises, commissive speech acts or gestures that are conventionally interpreted as such? While we remain neutral with respect to the normative answer to this question, we propose a psychological answer. Specifically, we hypothesize that people at least believe that commitments are in place if one agent (the sender) has led a second agent (the recipient) to rely on her to do something, and if this is mutually known by the two agents. Crucially, this situation can (...)
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  • Cueing Implicit Commitment.Francesca Bonalumi, Margherita Isella & John Michael - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):669-688.
    Despite the importance of commitment for distinctively human forms of sociality, it remains unclear how people prioritize and evaluate their own and others’ commitments - especially implicit commitments. Across two sets of online studies, we found evidence in support of the hypothesis that people’s judgments and attitudes about implicit commitments are governed by an implicit sense of commitment, which is modulated by cues to others’ expectations, and by cues to the costs others have invested on the basis of those expectations.
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  • Agreements, undertakings, and practical reason.Oliver Black - 2004 - Legal Theory 10 (2):77-95.
    This paper argues for two models of agreement which develop the idea that there is an agreement where one party gives a conditional undertaking and the other responds with an unconditional undertaking. The models accommodate plausible justifications for making and complying with agreements.
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  • Law, Shared Activities, and Obligation.Stefano Bertea - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 27 (2):357-381.
    This paper offers a critical assessment of the way the influential “conception of law as a shared activity” explains the normative component of law in general and legal obligation in particular. I argue that the conception provides a bipartite account of legal obligation: we have full-blooded legal obligation, carrying genuine practical force, and legal obligation in a perspectival sense, the purpose of which is not to engage with us in practical reasoning, but simply to state what we ought to do (...)
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  • Property and the rule of law.Lisa M. Austin - 2014 - Legal Theory 20 (2):79-105.
    This paper offers a new framework for thinking about the relationship between the common law of property and the rule of law. The standard way of framing this relationship is within the terms of the form/substance debate within the literature on the rule of law: Does the rule of law include only formal and procedural aspects or does it also encompass and support substantive rights such as private property rights and civil liberties? By focusing on the nature of common-law reasoning, (...)
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  • The Two Faces of Binding Precedents: A Hohfeldian Look.María Beatriz Arriagada - 2024 - Ratio Juris 37 (1):25-47.
    Taking into account one of the meanings of the expression binding precedent and stipulating a definition for that meaning, this article aims to contribute to the concept's structural characterization. By this I mean the effort to identify the legal norms on which the existence and functioning of binding precedents depend and to show that these norms constitute a group of Hohfeldian legal relations between the courts whose precedents must be followed, the courts that must follow them, and the individuals whose (...)
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  • On the Topic of the Divergence between Legal and Moral Obligations in Common Law.Tareq Al-Tawil - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25 (1):5-37.
    If common law is to run parallel to the morality of promissory obligation, it must require the breaching seller to keep his promise, not simply to pay off the buyer. However, in the event of promise-breaking, common law orders the defendant to compensate the claimant for the loss that flows from the breach of the duty to perform. The following questions then arise: why does English law not order the defendant to do the very thing that the substantive duty requires (...)
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  • Relational Primitivism.Ariel Zylberman - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):401-422.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • Deference as a normative power.Andrea C. Westlund - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):455-474.
    Much of the literature on practical authority concerns the authority of the state over its subjects—authority to which we are, as G. E. M. Anscombe says, subject “willy nilly”. Yet many of our “willy” (or voluntary) relationships also seem to involve the exercise of practical authority, and this species of authority is in some ways even more puzzling than authority willy nilly. In this paper I argue that voluntary authority relies on a form of voluntary obligation that is akin (in (...)
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  • Promises beyond assurance.Nicholas Southwood & Daniel Friedrich - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):261 - 280.
    Breaking a promise is generally taken to involve committing a certain kind of moral wrong, but what (if anything) explains this wrong? According to one influential theory that has been championed most recently by T.M. Scanlon, the wrong involved in breaking a promise is a matter of violating an obligation that one incurs to a promisee in virtue of giving her assurance that one will perform or refrain from performing certain acts. In this paper, we argue that the “Assurance View”, (...)
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  • Communicative eye contact signals a commitment to cooperate for young children.Barbora Siposova, Michael Tomasello & Malinda Carpenter - 2018 - Cognition 179 (C):192-201.
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  • (1 other version)Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):481-524.
    The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create commitments. What is really at issue between conventionalists and nonconventionalists is whether the basic moral relation of promissory commitment derives from the moral principles that govern our use of social conventions.Other nonconventionalist accounts make problematic concessions to the conventionalist's core instincts, (...)
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  • Promise as practice reason.Hanoch Sheinman - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):287-318.
    To promise someone to do something is to commit oneself to that person to do that thing, but what does that commitment consist of? Some think a promissory commitment is an obligation to do what’s promised, and that while promising practices facilitate the creation of promissory obligations, they are not essential to them. I favor the broadly Humean view in which, when it comes to promises (and so promissory obligations), practices are of the essence. I propose the Practice Reason Account (...)
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  • The Normative Power of Consent and Limits on Research Risks.Aaron Eli Segal & David S. Wendler - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    Research regulations around the world do not impose any limits on the risks to which consenting adults may be exposed. Nonetheless, most review committees regard some risks as too high, even for consenting adults. To justify this practice, commentators have appealed to a range of considerations which are external to informed consent and the risks themselves. Most prominently, some argue that exposing consenting adults to very high risks has the potential to undermine public trust in research. This justification assumes that (...)
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  • Commitment and the Second-Person Standpoint.Janis Schaab - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (4):511-532.
    On Chang's voluntarist account of commitments, when we commit to φ, we employ the 'normative powers' of our will to give ourselves a reason to φ that we would otherwise not have had. I argue that Chang's account, by itself, does not have sufficient conceptual resources to reconcile the normative significance of commitments with their alleged fundamentally volitional character. I suggest an alternative, second-personal account of commitment, which avoids this problem. On this account, the volitional act involved in committing is (...)
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  • (Mis)Understanding Correlativity in Contractual Relations.Irina Sakharova - 2024 - Ratio Juris 37 (1):48-66.
    This article challenges the orthodox explanation of the normative connection between contracting parties: The promisee is regarded as having a superior position vis‐à‐vis the promisor, a position manifesting itself in the promisee's authority or control over the promisor's performance, and supported, in particular, by the promisee's supposed power, or at least some sort of ability falling short of a normative power, to “waive” the promisor's duty of performance. The article demonstrates that this explanation is rooted in a one‐sided, and ultimately (...)
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  • Norm and Object: A Normative Hylomorphic Theory of Social Objects.Asya Passinsky - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (25):1-21.
    This paper is an investigation into the metaphysics of social objects such as political borders, states, and organizations. I articulate a metaphysical puzzle concerning such objects and then propose a novel account of social objects that provides a solution to the puzzle. The basic idea behind the puzzle is that under appropriate circumstances, seemingly concrete social objects can apparently be created by acts of agreement, decree, declaration, or the like. Yet there is reason to believe that no concrete object can (...)
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  • (1 other version)Between Promise and Contract: The Limits of Application of Philosophical Discourse on Promises to Theory of Contract Law.Szymon Osmola - 2018 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 9 (1):111-128.
    The concept of promise may be very interesting for legal theorists, especially contract law theorists. The article aims to briefly discuss the issue of promises in contemporary analytic philosophy and show some of its possible applications in legal theory. Three basic approaches will be distinguished: the contract as a promise paradigm and two ways of its critique: formal and material. The contract as a promise paradigm will be rejected as incapable of coping with, among others, the so-called autonomy paradox. Arguments (...)
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  • (1 other version)Promises and Practices Revisited.R. Jay Wallace Niko Kolodny - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):119-154.
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  • I—Richard Moran: Testimony, Illocution and the Second Person.Richard Moran - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):115-135.
    The notion of ‘bipolar’ or ‘second‐personal’ normativity is often illustrated by such situations as that of one person addressing a complaint to another, or asserting some right, or claiming some authority. This paper argues that the presence of speech acts of various kinds in the development of the idea of the ‘second‐personal’ is not accidental. Through development of a notion of ‘illocutionary authority’ I seek to show a role for the ‘second‐personal’ in ordinary testimony, despite Darwall's argument that the notion (...)
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  • On the Moral Impact Theory of Law.Ezequiel H. Monti - 2022 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 42 (1):298-324.
    Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way. Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue (...)
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  • Hans Kelsen and the Bindingness of Supra-National Legal Norms.Richard D. Latta - unknown
    The pure theory of law is a positivist legal theory put forward by Hans Kelsen. Recently there have been two attempts to understand democracy as a source for the normativity that the pure theory assigns to law. Lars Vinx seeks to understand the pure theory as a theory of political legitimacy, in which the normativity that the pure theory assigns to the laws of a state depends on the state’s adoption of certain legitimacy enhancing features, including being democratic. Uta Bindreiter (...)
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