- The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details
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Ignorance and awareness.Paul Silva & Robert Weston Siscoe - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):225-243.details
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A dilemma for reasons additivity.Geoff Keeling - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):20-42.details
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Attitude and Social Rules, or Why It's Okay to Slurp Your Soup.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (28).details
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How Could Prayer Make a Difference? Discussion of Scott A. Davison, Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation.Caleb Murray Cohoe - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2):171-185.details
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How to modify the strength of a reason.Andrew Kernohan - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1205-1220.details
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The dual scale model of weighing reasons.Chris Tucker - 2021 - Noûs 56 (2):366-392.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - 2021 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16. Oxford University Press.details
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Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model.João Sàágua & Michael D. Baumtrog - 2018 - In António Marques & João Sàágua (eds.), Essays on Values and Practical Rationality: Ethical and Aesthetical Dimensions. Peter Lang. pp. 193-250.details
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Prime Time (for the Basing Relation).Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge.details
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
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Introduction: Virtue's Reasons.Noell Birondo & S. Stewart Braun - 2017 - In Noell Birondo & S. Stewart Braun (eds.), Virtue’s Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-7.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Barry Maguire - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):779-805.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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The Varieties of Normativity.Derek Clayton Baker - 2016 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 567-581.details
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The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Knowing how to put knowledge first in the theory of justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.details
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Requirements, Oughts, Intentions.John Horty - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):220-229.details
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How to be a deontic buck-passer.Euan K. H. Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3193-3211.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit.Errol Lord - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):436-464.details
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Normative metaphysics for accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):363-384.details
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A hyperintensional logical framework for deontic reasons.Federico L. G. Faroldi & Tudor Protopopescu - 2019 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (4):411-433.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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(1 other version)Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will.Alex Kaiserman - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):687-709.details
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Defending The Importance of Being Rational: Replies to Bedke and Guindon, Hazlett, and Way.Errol Lord - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):168-183.details
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