The last in a series of examinations, this paper articulates Husserl's mature position on the nature of a phenomenologically informed human science. Falling between the naïve positivity of a naturalistic approach to psychology and the transcendental view of consciousness at the base of phenomenological philosophy, we argue that a human scientific psychology—while not itself transcendental in nature needs to re-arise upon the transcendental ground as an empirical—but no longer transcendentally naïve—discipline through Husserl's notion of the "return to positivity." This notion (...) of the return allows us to avoid "transcendental psychologism," differentiating psychological from transcendental subjectivity but from a transcendental, rather than naïve perspective. In this way, the return to positivity reclaims psychology as a worldly, but no longer naïve, discipline. To facilitate an understanding of the different perspectives in question, and the process of leaving the naturalistic perspective in order to return to it once armed with a transcendental understanding and its associated tools, we continue to develop the illustrative example of anorexia provided in the first part of this series. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of this framework for transcendental reforms both of clinical practice and of psychological research. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a neglected part of Dilthey’s œuvre that consists of papers on 16th–17th century philosophical issues. These papers are closer to interpretive articles than to original works, and so they are neither considered Dilthey’s original contributions to his own philosophy nor studied as part of the secondary literature. One of the most characteristic features of Dilthey’s philosophic style is the historical-systematic method mostly repudiated as concealing the real statement of the author “between the lines,” i.e. behind historical (...) analyses. Therefore these papers are not reckoned among Dilthey’s great works of enduring significance. This paper aims to make the reader more sensitive to the world and claims of these papers by way of an intermediary approach to them that acknowledges their intermediary position between a historical description and a systematic analysis. This is to be accomplished by having a look at the “pantheism” of Georg Misch, Dilthey’s largely forgotten pupil and son-in-law. (shrink)

Hermeneutik tarihsel süreç içerisinde hukuk, teoloji, tarih, sanat ve felsefe gibi çeşitli alanlarda farklı şekillerde tanımlanmış ve kullanılmış bir kavramdır. Bu doğrultuda, hermeneutiğin tam olarak belirlenebilmesi amacıyla, hermeneutik kelimesinin kökenine ve bu disiplinin tarihine mümkün olduğunca öz bir şekilde bakma gereksinimi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü hermeneutik disiplinini tek bir perspektiften değerlendirmek, onun temel gerçekliğini anlamamıza engel olacak çarpıtmaların gün yüzüne çıkmasına sebep olabilir. Genel anlamda bir ifadenin, anlamın, metnin ya da sanat eserinin belirli bir çerçeve içerisinde yorumlanması olarak değerlendirilen hermeneutik, felsefe (...) açısından varlığın oluş tarzı, sosyoloji açısından metodolojik problemlere yönelik bir çözüm, dini açıdan ise anlaşılması güç metinlerin anlamını gün yüzüne çıkaran yorum kuralları bütünü olarak tanımlanabilir (Audi, 1999: 377). Webster’in Uluslararası İngilizce sözlüğünde hermeneutik kavramı genel ifadesiyle yorumlama ve açıklamanın metodolojik ilkelerinin soruşturulması olarak tanımlanmakta iken, daha özel anlamda ise İncil’in çevirisinin yapılabilmesi için belirlenen genel prensiplerin incelenmesi olarak belirtilmiştir (Gove, 1971: 1059). Bu çalışmada, Auguste Comte’un öncülük ettiği pozitivist anlayışın öne sürdüğü ve desteklediği doğa bilimci yöntemin ve pozitivist tarih anlayışının, insanı ve yaşantısını doğru bir kavrayışla değerlendirme noktasında etkili olamadığı vurgulanacaktır. Pozitivist düşünce doğa bilimlerinin elde etmiş olduğu başarı ve kazanımlardan yola çıkarak dönemin bilim anlayışı konusunda belirleyici olmakla birlikte, ön plana çıkardığı bilimsellik modelinin ya da kriterinin bir sonucu olarak tinsel bilimlerin ya da beşerî bilimlerin doğasına uygun olmayan yöntemleri benimsemesi hususunda belirleyici bir unsur olmuştur. Böylece, doğa bilimleri söz sahibi olmadığı bir alan içerisinde parlatılarak, bilimsellik statüsü kazanabilme kaygısıyla tinsel bilimleri yöntemsel bir kriz içerisine sürüklemiştir. Bu çerçevede, hermeneutiğin zaman içerisindeki dönüşümünün zirve noktasında yer alan düşünürlerden biri olan Wilhelm Dilthey’in tinsel bilimleri yöntemsel açıdan karşı karşıya kaldıkları kriz durumundan çıkarmak amacıyla ileri sürdüğü hermeneutik yönteme ilişkin savlarını, hermeneutiğin tarihsel süreç içerisindeki kazanımlarından yola çıkarak tartışmak gerekmektedir. (shrink)

Following Gadamer, Dilthey’s philosophy of the social world is beset by an implicit subjectivism which puts into question the very possibility of shared understanding. This subjectivism is taken to lie behind Dilthey’s emphasis on empathy (or “re-experiencing”), which becomes a condition of our understanding of others and knowledge of the socio-historical world generally. I argue that Dilthey does not give primacy to subjectivity, particularly in his later works. Dilthey’s own notion of sociality, accounted for in terms of the common realm (...) of “objective spirit,” is akin to Gadamer’s own anti-subjectivist account of the human sciences and understanding. Through objective spirit, Dilthey shows that understanding cannot be conceived in terms of an aggregation of individual mental acts but is instead an irreducibly social accomplishment. (shrink)

The topic of this study is a notion of empathy that is common in philosophy and in the behavioral sciences. It is here referred to as ‘the notion of empathy as emotional sharing’, and it is characterized in terms of three ideas. If a person, S, has empathy with respect to an emotion of another person, O, then (i) S experiences an emotion that is similar to an emotion that O is currently having, (ii) S’s emotion is caused, in a (...) particular way, by the state of O or by S’s entertaining an idea of the state or situation of O, and (iii) S experiences this emotion in a way that does not entail that S is in the corresponding emotional state. The aim of the study is to clarify this notion of empathy by clarifying these three ideas and by tracing the history of their development in philosophy. -/- The study consists of two parts. Part one contains a short and selective account of the history in Western philosophy of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing. In chapter 2 Spinoza’s theory of imitation of affects and Hume’s theory of sympathy are presented. It is argued that these theories only exemplify the second idea characteristic of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing. Chapter 3 contains presentations of Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy, and Schopenhauer’s theory of compassion. These theories are shown to exemplify the second and the third idea. In chapter 4 there are presentations of Edith Stein’s description of Einfühlung, and Max Scheler’s account of empathy and fellow-feeling. It is shown that these accounts contain explicit specifications of the third idea, and it is argued that they also exemplify the second idea. -/- In part two, the three ideas are further clarified and the notion of empathy as emotional sharing is defined. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the main contemporary philosophical analyses of empathy. Three different views are distinguished: one that construes empathetic emotions as emotional states, one that construes them as imagined emotions, and one that construes them as off-line emotions. The first two views are criticized and rejected. The third is accepted and further developed in chapter 6, which contains a general analysis of the emotions. A distinction is made between two ways of experiencing an emotion, and it is argued that it is possible to have the affective experience characteristic of a particular kind of emotional state without being in that kind of state. In chapter 7, a definition of ‘empathy’ is proposed. This definition contains specifications of the three ideas characteristic of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing, and it shows both how the empathizer’s emotion resembles the emotion of the empathee, and how this emotion is caused and experienced. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Dans cet article, je propose une interprétation de la philosophie de Wilhelm Dilthey qui repose sur trois idées directrices. La première idée identifie l'objet de sa philosophie : la vie. La deuxième idée établit sa méthode, soit l'autoréflexion. La troisième idée clarifie ce qui est révélé par l'autoréflexion, à savoir l'universalité et la variabilité de la vie. Dans un premier temps, je défends que la lecture épistémologique de la philosophie de Dilthey doit être abandonnée. Dans un deuxième temps, je (...) présente mon interprétation de la philosophie de Dilthey. ABSTRACT In this paper, I suggest an interpretation of Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy that rests on three guiding ideas. The first idea identifies the object of his philosophy: life. The second one establishes its method, namely self-reflection. The third one clarifies what is revealed by self-reflection, that is the universality and the variability of life. First, I show that the epistemological reading of Dilthey's philosophy must be abandoned. Second, I detail my interpretation of Dilthey's philosophy. (shrink)

The ArgumentDavid Bloor often wrote that Karl Mannheim had “stopped short” in his sociology of knowledge, lacking the nerve to consider the natural sciences sociologically. While this assessment runs counter to Mannheim's own work, which responded in quite specific ways both to an encroaching “modernity” and a looming fascism, Bloor's depiction becomes clearer when considered in the light of his principal introduction to Mannheim's work — a series of essays by Robert Merton. Bloor's reading and appropriation of Mannheim emerged from (...) his background in experimental psychology and his attempts to supercede Merton's own structural-functionalist program for the sociology of knowledge. By retracing this extended trail of readings and re-readings, we may begin to understand the roots of Bloor's curious interpretation of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, and inquire in a reflexive way about the present and future directions of science studies. (shrink)

This study examines the sources of human divergence as arise from Wilhelm Dilthey’s writings. While Dilthey assigns a central role to the human subject, he never synthesizes his major ideas on subjectivity into a unified theory of subjective uniqueness. I will show that such a theory can be derived from his writings through the combination of three ideas that appear in them. These ideas are: (1) the thesis that human understanding is possible because of psychological content that is shared by (...) both the creator and the interpreter; (2) the belief that this shared content is the only content that exists within human beings, meaning that there is no unique psychological content; and (3) the perception of this inner universal content as an accumulation of life-possibilities. When joined together, these ideas create an inspiring theory of human divergence, according to which the uniqueness of an individual is determined through partial realization of universal possibilities. (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, nous examinons le projet d'une critique de la raison historique mené par Wilhelm Dilthey et l'accusation d'historicisme portée contre lui par Heinrich Rickert. En comparant leurs tentatives respectives d'offrir un fondement philosophique aux sciences humaines, nous montrons que Dilthey et Rickert, en dépit de leurs divergences, convergent vers une réinterprétation productive de l'historicisme et conduisent à une reconfiguration de la relation entre philosophie et histoire. Cet article analyse trois implications théoriques et pratiques de l'historicisme : la mise (...) en valeur du particulier, le caractère historiquement situé du sujet connaissant et la primauté de la conscience historique. (shrink)