En este artículo relaciono la reflexión de Balibar en torno a la proposición de la igualibertad con su lectura de la filosofía de Spinoza. Balibar examina esta última desde la necesidad de teorizar una respuesta a la pregunta por el hombre en la nueva coyuntura política de los años ochenta y noventa del siglo XX. Y expone la antropología política spinoziana a través de la presentación y el análisis de tres correlaciones: entre las identidades individuales y la colectiva, entre las (...) potencias individuales y la colectiva y entre las singularidades y la naturaleza infinita. Así puede dar cuenta de las tres modalidades (antigua, moderna y posmoderna) de la igualibertad, pensando el conatus como esfuerzo de liberación siempre ya activo. (shrink)

This article focuses on three of the affects discussed in Spinoza’s Ethics: pride, esteem, and scorn. At first, it focuses mainly on the delusional aspect Spinoza attributes to these passions as a matter of definition, emphasizing the monological and self-referential dimension in which they seem to imprison the subject. It then analyzes the reference to a notion of justice contained in their definitions, and how this triggers a struggle for recognition. In a third moment, it highlights the political efficacy of (...) these affects in producing not only conflict but also social bonds. Finally, it concludes by considering how Spinoza’s treatment of these affects fits within the framework of the more general problem of the relationship between passion and reason. (shrink)

It is common to assimilate Marx’s and Spinoza’s conceptions of democracy. In this chapter, I assess the relation between Marx’s early idea of “true democracy” and Spinozist democracy, both the historical influence and the theoretical affinity. Drawing on Marx’s student notebooks on Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, I show there was a historical influence. However, at the theoretical level, I argue that a sharp distinction must be drawn. Philosophically, Spinoza’s commitment to understanding politics through real concrete powers does not support with Marx’s (...) anti-institutional conception of true democracy. And as a matter of social theory, the gap between civil society and the state which so troubles Marx is a development of modernity that has not entered Spinoza's premodern field of view. Marx’s true democracy was also influenced by his study of Rousseau, and theoretically, it is just as close if not closer to Rousseau as to Spinoza. (shrink)

This chapter investigates Spinoza's conception of reason, focusing on (i) the difference between reason and the imagination, and (ii) the difference between reason and intuitive knowledge. The central interpretive debate this chapter considers is about the scope of rational cognition. Some commentators have argued that it is only possible to have rational cognition of properties that are universally shared, whereas intuitive knowledge may grasp the essences of particular individuals. Another prominent interpretation is that reason differs from intuition only in virtue (...) of its form or manner of apprehension, and not in virtue of the content or ideas it apprehends. However, authors on both sides of the debate have held that reason is incapable of grasping singular things. After summarizing the debate, this chapter presents an argument that Spinozan reason is not blind to particulars: it is (at least sometimes) capable of grasping the causal structure that characterizes an individual. (shrink)

In his Political Treatise, Spinoza repeatedly compares states to human beings. In this interpretation of the comparisons, I present a progressively more restrictive account of Spinoza’s views about the nature of human beings in the Ethics and show at each step how those views inform the account of states in the Political Treatise. Because, like human beings, states are individuals, they strive to persevere in existence. Because, like human beings, states are composed of parts that are individuals, states' parts also (...) strive to persevere in being. Finally, because in states, as in human beings, a change to the power of striving of a part can be at the same time a change to the whole that differs in kind, strong states can be bad for their citizens and states that serve their citizens well may nevertheless be weak. Spinoza’s principal project in the Political Treatise is to design states that are stable and good for their citizens. This account of the comparisons shows why that project is so difficult: one cannot design a good state simply by designing a stable state. (shrink)

Encyclopedia entry for the Springer Encyclopedia of EM Phil and the Sciences, ed. D. Jalobeanu and C. T. Wolfe.

ABSTRACT Genevieve Lloyd argues that when we follow Spinoza in understanding reason as a part of nature, we gain new insights into the human condition. Specifically, we gain a new political insight: we should respond to cultural difference with a pluralist ethos. This is because there is no pure universal reason; human minds find their reason shaped differently by their various embodied social contexts. Furthermore, we can use the resources of the imagination to bring this ethos about. In my response, (...) I offer a friendly challenge to Lloyd’s characterisation of the lessons of Spinoza’s philosophy. I argue that Lloyd’s Spinoza remains excessively unpolitical, even in the moment that he is brought to bear on contemporary politics. An unpluralistic attitude may well be rationally inferior, but is it really explained by insufficient or inappropriate imagination? To the contrary, a properly Spinozist account of reason must include an account of the concrete determinants of reason’s imperfect realisation in the world. In Spinoza’s own oeuvre, this is carried out through an ever-increasing—and ever more sociological—interest in the political structures within which individual reason flourishes or withers. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne of the recurrent motifs in political thought is the idea of the social contract, according to which a society, a government, or moral principles depend for their existence on agreements...

Spinoza rarely refers to art. However, there are extensive resources for a Spinozist aesthetics in his discussion of health in the Ethics and of social affects in his political works. There have been recently been a few essays linking Spinoza and art, but this essay additionally fuses Spinoza’s politics to an affective aesthetics. Spinoza’s statements that art makes us healthier (Ethics 4p54Sch; Emendation section 17) form the foundation of an aesthetics. In Spinoza’s definition, “health” is caused by external objects that (...) maintain our power to act in a variety of ways. Humans need such objects because our complex bodies constantly lose or consume many parts necessary to our overall functioning. Notably, Spinoza defines humans’ bodies through this complexity (2p13Sch), so health as maintenance of complexity is a distinctly human endeavor. Further, while art is not the only healthy activity, I argue that art is a particularly potent cure, which explains Spinoza’s otherwise opaque comment that music can cure melancholy (by which he meant a near-total inability to act, akin to death). Rather than only causing frivolous pleasures, art may be as essential to human flourishing as are other human beings in general; other people are “most useful” because of the variety of actions they make possible (4p35Cor & Sch1). Art’s production of a dizzying variety of affects is likewise most useful for health. -/- Having established how art in general affects the individual, I then explain the role of artists in shaping social groups. Artists use vivid and highly charged affective techniques, as do political sovereigns and religious prophets (TTP chapters 1-2 & 15-16). However, sovereigns and prophets are concerned exclusively with “morality,” defined by Spinoza as the use of affects (primarily based on fear and hope) to produce “obedience” in the generic multitude or people at large. An artist, however, rarely causes affects in the whole nation, affecting instead only a smaller niche or “sub-genre” of people. The affects produced in this group are also not identical to those used by sovereigns, since artists do not primarily deploy sad affects of hope and fear but instead use a wide variety of joyful affects. Further, in Spinoza’s analysis of ceremonies (TTP chapter 5), we see how small groups exposed to repeated ceremonies or social practices eventually develop new strengths which they lacked before. Repeated exposure to shared aesthetic “ceremonies” (e.g., live music performances) of the same sub-genre will over time create the capacity of new powers in the sub-genre of people, which distinguishes them from the masses. Spinoza says sovereigns forge a “second nature” for the generic people through affects; we can then affirm that smaller groups exposed to a distinct sub-genre of art can acquire a new “third nature” which will contain unique powers extending beyond healthy maintenance of their existing bodies. That is, art in general is necessary to flourish and remain whole (maintaining health), but it can also occasionally expand what one is to unforeseen heights (through specific artistic sub-genres). (shrink)

Collection of papers presented at the First Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy.

In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According (...) to a long-held reading, the control that the will has over doxastic states in Descartes’s theory is direct; the doxastic states are affected by the mere act of will. This reading is called direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV), or direct voluntarism (DV) for short, and it states that we are capable of assenting, rejecting and suspending a judgment based only on our will to do so. Thus, these actions would be utterly and merely volitional. DV can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism (+DV) and direct negative voluntarism (-DV). Direct positive voluntarism deals with the act of forming judgments, maintaining that one can accept or deny a proposition wilfully and either merely believe or not believe something voluntarily. Direct negative voluntarism deals with the suspension of judgment, maintaining that it can likewise be accomplished by a simple act of will. However, I support an alternate account of Descartes’s voluntarism, which is called indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV), or indirect voluntarism (IV) for short. By this account, the will is capable of affecting a doxastic state indirectly by making one concentrate on essential tasks for forming that state, such as gathering up and paying attention to strong reasons and evidence. IV is also possible to divide into indirect positive voluntarism (+IV) and indirect negative voluntarism (-IV). Per indirect positive voluntarism the will needs to pay attention to reasons for accepting or denying some proposition. Likewise, by indirect negative voluntarism, in order to suspend judgment the will needs to direct this attention to the reasons for doubt. By attending to these reasons, the will also comes face-to-face with its own freedom. This feeling of freedom can be described as affectivity of the reasons for belief (assent) and doubt (suspension). (shrink)

This article is concerned with the Spinozian topic of understanding human actions and its interpretation by Nietzsche in The Gay Science 333. Nietzsche doesn’t read directly Spinoza’s work but rather the volume of Kuno Fischer’s History of Modern Philosophy dedicated to the XVIIth century philosopher; this can be confirmed by the way in which the text is quoted. Even if Nietzsche reduces greatly the power of understanding to one of its aspect translating intelligere as erkennen, it is necessary to emphasize (...) that the aphorism presents a novelty that can enrich the study of the relationship between these two philosophers. Nietzsche identifies conscious thought with the “last scenes of reconciliation” between different drives of a previous unconscious process. Even if the point of departure of this survey is the centrality of affects in both thinkers, it will also identify a precise limit which distances Spinoza’s understanding of the affects from the centrality of drives in Nietzsche’s philosophical project. (shrink)

The objective of this doctoral dissertation is to interpret the explanation of akrasia that the Dutch philosopher Benedictus Spinoza (1632-1677) gives in his work The Ethics. One is said to act acratically when one intentionally performs an action that one judges to be worse than another action which one believes one might perform instead. In order to interpret Spinoza’s explanation of akrasia, a large part of this dissertation investigates Spinoza’s theory of emotion. The first chapter is introductory and outlines Spinoza’s (...) categorisation of mental states and his conception of the relation between the mind and the body. The second chapter deals with Spinoza’s epistemology and the relation between cognitive mental states and states of the brain. The third chapter argues that Spinoza holds that emotions are non-cognitive mental states that are caused by cognitive mental states. The fourth chapter interprets Spinoza’s discussion of the emotions of Joy and Sadness insofar as they are mental states. The fifth chapter suggests that when Spinoza says that the power of our body is increased or decreased when we are joyful or sad, he means that when we are joyful or sad then, at the same time, our heart and perhaps the organs of our digestive system are affected in such a way that our bodily health is increased or decreased. The sixth chapter points to three problems that concern Spinoza’s definitions of the psychophysical states of pleasure, pain, cheerfulness and melancholy, and offers slightly altered definitions of these states. The seventh chapter interprets the various aspects of Spinoza’s conception of the emotion of Desire, both insofar as it is a state of the mind and insofar it is a state of the body, as well as the relation between the emotion of Desire and man’s striving for self-preservation. The eighth chapter discusses what Spinoza writes on the strength of emotions and the way in which we make value judgments in order to finally interpret why it is, according to Spinoza, that ‘we so often see the better for ourselves but follow the worse’. (shrink)

Spinoza developed a highly interesting metaphysical theory of nature and individuality. In this paper, I endeavor to bring forward some ideas on how Spinozistic views on extended substance, physical world, and individuality can be approached using the concept of power as the basis of interpretation. Jonathan Bennett's ‘field metaphysical’ interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine of one extended substance has generated much discussion, and forms the other starting point of my paper. I believe that the field metaphysical interpretation enables one to deal (...) with the central questions concerning physical individuation — individuality and the persistence of individual being — in a rather novel way. My main question is this: what follows if physical individuals are seen as parts of a unified field of extended power? (shrink)

The argumentative structure of this article can be summarized as follows: 1) Spinoza was repeatedly accused of eleaticism; 2) there is a rupture with the eleaticism when one admits the ‘multivocity’ of the logical operators “is” and “is not”; as can be seen, for example, 2.1) in the discussion introducing the Great Genera in Plato’s Sophist, and 2.2) in a certain use made by Aristotle of the category’s doctrine in order to soften the Parmenidean version of the Principle of Non-Contradiction. (...) 3) Spinoza admits the ‘multivocity’ of “is” and “is not”. Hence, Spinoza should not be placed among the Eleatics but inside the brotherhood of the suspects of the so-called parricide against Parmenides. This reasoning, which almost sounds as a truism, will, however, suggest two interesting further considerations: one on how an important tradition of interpretation of Spinoza has misplaced the problem of the relationship of Spinoza’s ontology with the logical principles; and another on the type of logic that is implied by the theory of modes of perception or kinds of knowledge. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone indagar el estatuto del miedo y sus declinaciones políticas en los pensamientos de Thomas Hobbes y Baruch Spinoza para interpretar su impacto en la democracia como un problema teórico político. Cuando se comparan a Hobbes y Spinoza, las interpretaciones predominantes, incluso aquellas que identifican algunas coincidencias respecto de los sentidos y efectos políticos de miedo, tienden a poner en primer plano las diferencias entre ambos. Sin embargo, la problematización de esta emoción es un punto de (...) partida para aproximarse a las teorías políticas de Hobbes y de Spinoza desde una óptica distinta. Con ese propósito, en una primera instancia, se repondrá, de manera sintética, la doctrina de los afectos de cada uno de los autores mencionados. Luego, se procederá a realizar una comparación entre dichas doctrinas, destacando un afecto en particular, el miedo. Finalmente, y es en esta sección donde se planteará el argumento central del artículo, se explotarán los corolarios de las conceptualizaciones del miedo de Hobbes y de Spinoza en relación con la política contemporánea. (shrink)

The central argument of Youpa's book is that Spinoza's moral philosophy offers a distinctive variety of moral realism, grounded in a standard of human nature. In this review essay, I provide an overview of Youpa's remarkably lucid interpretation of Spinoza. However, I also critique Youpa's conception of the 'free man' as an objective standard of perfection which (a) applies equally to all humans, and (b) which has objective moral force in the sense that it ought to be approached. I sketch (...) an alternative reading of Spinoza which denies a shared human essence, and which denies that an individual ought to become more perfect than they in fact are. I argue that Youpa's reading rests on the conflation of Spinoza's concepts of active power and adequate causation. I then suggest that Youpa's resultant excessive focus on a rational human essence as 'what we fundamentally are' leads him to downplay a more developmental and imaginative dimension to Spinoza's moral philosophy. (shrink)

En este texto se busca elaborar una idea de formación en el pensamiento de Baruch de Spinoza, como alternativa a las ideas educativas que, de manera esencialista, mediante el proceso educativo pretenden hacer corresponder al educando a ciertos modelos preestablecidos. Para ello se construye una idea de auto-realización en Spinoza en la que resultan deseables diferentes caminos de auto-realización para diferentes individuos. Se propone que esta auto-realización consiste en ser capaz de obrar y ser afectado de muchas maneras, y se (...) propone que el conocimiento en Spinoza implica una cierta pasividad activa que se nutre de la diferencia y de lo otro. (shrink)

In his final, incomplete Tractatus Politicus (1677), Spinoza’s account of human power and freedom shifts towards a new, teleological interest in the ‘highest good’ of the state in realising the freedom of its subjects. This development reflects, in part, the growing influence of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Dutch republicanism, and the Dutch post-Rampjaar context after 1672, with significant implications for his view of political power and freedom. It also reflects an expansion of his account of natural right to include independence of mind, (...) a model of autonomy that in turn shapes the infamous sui juris exclusions of his unfinished account of democracy. This article focuses specifically on the Tractatus Politicus, a hitherto under-addressed work in Spinoza’s corpus and one too often considered indistinct from his earlier Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). It argues for a reconsideration of its importance to early modern political thought, particularly regarding the role of the state in realising the freedom and harmony of its subjects through reasonable laws. (shrink)

In the context of Spinoza's psychological and political theory, money appears as a profound social problem. I agree with Frédéric Lordon and André Orléan that Spinoza's psychological theory can explain how multiple agents can converge on a single monetary good as a means of payment. I disagree, however, with their further claim that this convergence brings an end to rivalrous conflict among those agents. Instead, I argue, it intensifies and concentrates this rivalry, threatening the very bonds that hold society together. (...) Yet money is, on Spinoza's account, necessary for commerce, and commerce is necessary for humans to live together. The social problem that thus arises is that of ensuring that money can play its vital role in supporting commerce without giving way to destructive rivalries that can destroy society. My interpretation of Spinoza on these points is influenced by the theory of René Girard, with which Spinoza's account has some striking parallels. (shrink)

While both intuitive knowledge and reason are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. Intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza describes as the ‘greatest virtue of mind’, is superior to reason. The nature of this superiority has been the subject of some controversy due to Spinoza's notoriously parsimonious treatment of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in the Ethics. In this paper, I argue that intuitive knowledge differs from reason not only in terms of its method of cognition—but (...) also in terms of its content. More specifically, I maintain that there is something that is known by intuition, namely the unique essences of things, that is not known by reason. My argument is supported by an examination of Spinoza's account of essences in the Ethics, which reveals that he is committed to both unique and shared essences. Based on this dual commitment, I argue that whereas for Spinoza both reason and intuition can be said to reach adequate knowledge of the shared essence of a thing, the unique essence of a singular thing, which is nothing but its actual essence, can only be known through intuitive knowledge. (shrink)

Nossa meta é caracterizar alguns aspectos da metodologia científica utilizada por Aristóteles em algumas passagens dos dois primeiros livros do Sobre o Céu e averiguar quais são os principais recursos a que Aristóteles recorre para descobrir os princípios de sua astronomia e para coletar os dados iniciais astronômicos relevantes. Procuraremos mostrar que, para Aristóteles, embora escassos e imprecisos, os dados observacionais ainda têm preferência em relação aos endoxa astronômicos, o que não impede, porém, o emprego de alguns testes dialéticos para (...) o estabelecimento do conhecimento preliminar relevante para a astronomia. (shrink)

How do we fashion a new political imaginary from fragmentary, diffuse and often antagonistic subjects, who may be united in principle against the exigencies of capitalism but diverge in practice, in terms of the sites, strategies and specific natures of their own oppression? To address this question I trace the dissonance between the approaches of Antonio Negri and Gilles Deleuze back to their divergent mobilizations of Spinoza’s affect and the role it plays in the ungrounding and reconstitution of the social (...) body. This dissonance reveals a divergence in their projects, the way these political projects emerge as counter-actualizations, the means by which they are expressed, and the necessity of a particular kind of historical subject to their realization. Most significantly, it speaks to how we might engage difference and alterity within our own political projects, our collective creations. I conclude with a focus on the productive possibilities provided by Deleuze’s writings on the scream, as a vehicle to uncover new terrains of struggle and new possibilities for collectivity. (shrink)

If it is true that Spinoza belongs to the history of Jewish Philosophy, his concept of God also cannot cease to being “Jewish”. Our aim here is to call into question if Spinoza’s concept of God, as exposed in Ethics’ definitions, has something of Jewish, particularly when faced with conceptions yielded by some of the main philosophers from Jewish and Arabic traditions: Saadya, Avicenna, Ibn Gabirol, Halevi, Maimonides and Crescas. Our answer, at the end, is negative.

Spinoza’s Ethics makes reference to three kinds of knowledge that humans are capable of winning: imagination, reason and intuitive knowledge of God. Of these, imagination is necessarily inadequate while the latter two are necessarily adequate. In other words, we remain passive in the first type of knowledge, but come into our power of acting in the latter two. The passage from the first to the second and third types of knowledge, however, remains, in Spinoza’s text, rather obscure. This paper seeks (...) to come to terms with how exactly the passage from passion to action is made in the Ethics while locating this particular problematic as a site at which various interpretations of Spinoza diverge with considerable stakes. I thus focus on Gilles Deleuze’s proposed answer to this problem as well as Pierre Macherey’s critique of Deleuze’s reading. I argue that the disagreement between Macherey and Deleuze is not merely interpretive, but rather indicates some of the stakes involved in assessing Spinoza’s theory of the passions and the imagination. An ‘optimistic’ appraisal of these features might lead one to Deleuze’s affirmationist project, while Macherey’s pessimism concerning the two might take a Spinozist politics in quite the opposite direction. I appreciate and assess multiple aspects of Macherey’s critique while nonetheless arguing that they do not prove damning for Deleuze’s affirmationist picture. I conclude with an analysis of vacillation of mind in Deleuze’s Spinoza, and place Deleuze’s thoughts on this note in conversation with his earlier reading of Nietzsche. (shrink)

This paper adopts Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s expressionism and pure semiotics to argue that Spinoza’s Ethics offers an alternative notion of freedom of speech that is based on the potentia of the individual. Its aim is to show how freedom of thought is connected to the problem of individuation that connects our mode of being with our power to speak and think. Rather than treating freedom of speech as an enlightened idea that is in opposition to, for example, religious authority, (...) or the suppression of human rights, this paper argues that freedom of speech should be understood by what Spinoza calls ‘an adequate idea’: an idea that explains the cause of its own production. What is to be considered is: who wants this freedom, in what situation, why, what is at stake? No freedom in itself is ever given. This paper argues for speech as an assembled body that is always in connection with other bodies. It is argued that to understand the power and value of the freedom of speech, we should study the praxis of the utterance as an assembled body, its causal dimensions, and its affective immanent relations with other bodies, and other modes of speaking. (shrink)

The article aims to reconstruct the seventeenth-century debate of the scientific nature of mathematics and the possibility of conceiving an idea of a positive infinite to address the philosophical implications of mathematics in Spinoza’s work, emphasizing the geometric ordering in his Ethics. We will approach the mathematical thinking of that philosopher from three perspectives: the pedagogical, the epistemological and the ontological. In the pedagogical sense, his synthetic geometry aims to inhabit the evidence as rhetorical and pedagogical expression of a perfect (...) and self-evident concatenation that leads the progress of the reader through philosophical propositions. In the epistemological sense, we have the aim of inhabiting the thing defined by a genetic definition that provides the very acting essence of a thing. That epistemological sense provides us the difference between a definition of a thing by its predicates or through its inner essence. And finally, in the ontological sense of inhabiting the infinite itself, because geometry can bring us the proper way to conceive the positive idea of the absolutely infinite in which we necessarily are and take part. (shrink)

There is currently a growing interest in the philosophy and political thought of Baruch de Spinoza following many years of comparative neglect, particularly within political philosophy. The focus of this paper is Spinoza's major work, the Ethics, and its relation to his political writings. It explores Spinoza's distinctive formulations of imagination and affect and considers some of the ways in which these impact upon his political thought, specifically via his reflections upon democracy and knowledge. The discussion draws particular attention to (...) the aporetic status of imagination and its tendency towards ambivalence. It argues that this dynamic account of imagination introduces provisionality and contingency into Spinoza's reflections upon politics that may, in turn, enrich discussions seeking to introduce an awareness of the affective resonances of communication and identification to democratic theory. (shrink)

This article presents a decades-long conflict in the upper echelons of postwar French academic philosophy between the self-identifying “Cartesian” Ferdinand Alquié, professor at the Sorbonne, and the “Spinozist” Martial Gueroult of the Collège de France. Tracking the development of this rivalry serves to illuminate the historical drama that occurred in France as phenomenology was integrated into the Cartesian tradition and resisted by a commitment to rationalism grounded in a specifically French understanding of Spinozism. Over the course of Alquié and Gueroult's (...) polemic, however, we nevertheless witness a shared concern to preserve philosophy from the reductive tendencies of historicism and its possible assimilation to theology. What is more, the ultimate impasse of this conflict continues to inform the most innovative projects in French thought in the wake of structuralism and the “theological turn” of French phenomenology. (shrink)

En una carta del 20 de julio de 1664 Spinoza le relata a su amigo Peter Balling un sueño con “cierto brasileño, negro y sarnoso”. Tal vez sea esa la única mención en la obra spinozista que refiere al Nuevo Mundo, donde Holanda poseía colonias. A partir de ese sueño, el presente trabajo inquiere sobre la coexistencia de las filosofías modernas de la libertad con la esclavitud real de miles de seres humanos en América, y en particular sobre el silencio (...) de Spinoza en relación con la trata de esclavos africanos en tierras americanas. (shrink)

The spinozian critical fortune records that, starting withproposition 27 of Ethics Part iii, something completely original appearsin the examination of affective life: the imitation of affections. Spinoza’snovelty, in comparison with his contemporaries, is to describe theproduction of affections no longer from an external object, but from theconduct of “something”, or “someone”, on an object - considering thatthis production is rooted in the fact that we imagine that this “someone”or that “something” is similar to us. The proposition links a longdeductive sequence (...) that runs through the rest of Part iii, supports thecrucial Part iv propositions on politics and law and reaches the PoliticalTreaty [i, v]. Our intention is to evaluate the meanings of this propositionin Spinoza’s political thought, based on a review of this problemin critical fortune - taking into account some passages in the works ofPrimo Levi. In particular the “Chemistry Test”, chapter ofthis book If This Is a Man? [Se questo è un uomo?]. (shrink)

Para determinar la relación entre saber y poder en el Tratado político de Spinoza, debe observarse que a medida que la potestas del imperio se comparte, es decir, a medida que las instancias de discusión racional aumentan , la instancia de un saber independiente de la posesión del poder va desapareciendo. Mientras que la instancia del saber racional es indispensable reconocerla en la monarquía, como opuesta a la potestas de uno solo , parece que se diluye y comparte a medida (...) que la potestas vuelve a la multitud, pasando por el gobierno aristocrático. La inconclusión del TP no puede mostrarnos la lógica de esta disolución de la autoridad de la razón en el régimen democrático, la potestas absoluta. (shrink)

We suggest in this paper that the practice of philosophy with children can be fruitfully understood as an example of a transindividual system. The adoption of the term ‘transindividuality’ serves two main purposes: it allows us to focus on individuation as a process and at the same time to problematise some of the classical antinomies of Western philosophy that continue to inform our understanding of the relation between individuality and community. We argue that the practice of philosophical inquiry with children, (...) when interpreted in terms of Spinoza’s conceptions of relational individuality and affective reason, offers a compelling example of how shared thinking operates as an individuating process in that knowledge and affect, interiority and exteriority, individuality and collectivity can be experienced in action and thought as complementary aspects of the same process. (shrink)

No escólio da proposição IV18, ao falar rapidamente das soluções contra a impotência e inconstância humanas, Espinosa afirma a utilidade mútua entre dois homens no favorecimento de suas potências de agir como uma das soluções à servidão. Esse favorecimento é permitido pelas muitas coisas que os homens possuem em comum entre si, que, por sua vez, podem possibilitar tanto as relações de aumento de potência, na medida em que os homens conduzem-se pela razão, quanto as de diminuição, nas quais os (...) homens estão submetidos às paixões, podendo ser contrários e danosos uns aos outros. No entanto, apesar da ambivalência dessas relações proporcionadas pelo comum, a utilidade da vida em sociedade ainda é afirmada como uma forma de favorecimento mútuo entre os homens na medida em que se conduzem pela razão e por meio da instituição da _Civitas_, que institui um meio termo entre a dimensão passional e a dimensão racional dos homens. (shrink)

Se analizan los más tradicionales aspectos vinculados a la teoría política spinozista, la teoría del contrato y la crítica de la religión, en estrecha relación con la Ética y con el tratamiento de las relaciones entre afectos e imaginación, que se considera como el núcleo de su pensamiento político. Se interpreta así la idea de conatus desde una doble dimensión, política y ontológica, cuya articulación con las otras categorías recogidas en la Ética, especialmente con relación a los afectos, ofrece una (...) alternativa al pensamiento de la omnipotencia, dominante en la mayor parte de las filosofías de la modernidad. (shrink)

Este estudo tem como principal objetivo uma análise do conceito de determinação em Espinosa. Historicamente, o pensamento de Espinosa foi assimilado a uma filosofia acosmista, isto é, uma filosofia que nega a realidade das coisas finitas em um mundo onde apenas Deus ou a substância seria real. Tal interpretação se consolida a partir das considerações hegelianas em suas Lições sobre a História da Filosofia e na Ciência da Lógica, em que Hegel lê todo o sistema de Espinosa a partir do (...) princípio "omnis determinatio est negatio". Nosso estudo se desenvolve então, primeiramente, apresentando as consequências contemporâneas desta leitura hegeliana; em seguida analisamos a interpretação hegeliana e algumas contribuições de Deleuze a respeito do conceito de determinação em Espinosa; e, por fim, analisamos no texto espinosano a função que o conceito de determinação desempenha e como ela se distancia do consagrado marco de leitura hegeliano de que “omnis determinatio est negatio”. (shrink)

Deleuze has suggested that Spinoza and Foucault share common concerns, particularly the notion of immanence and their mutual hostility to theories of subjective intentionality and contract-based theories of state power. This article explores these shared concerns. On the one hand Foucault's view of governmentality and its re-theorization of power, sovereignty and resistance provide insights into how humans are constituted as individualized subjects and how populations are formed as subject to specific regimes or mentalities of government. On the other, Spinoza was (...) concerned with how humans organized themselves into communities capable of self-government. In particular, his idea of immanent causality was crucial because central to his ideas of freedom and power. We argue that Spinoza's approach to power and causality prefigures ideas developed by Foucault in his theory of governmentality, especially with respect to his biopolitical rethinking of power and resistance. (shrink)

This paper argues that Spinoza's main political writings are concerned, in part, with knowledge of essences as detailed in the Ethics. It is further argued that knowledge of the essences of states, and essential properties that belong to states, may be an example of the elusive scientia intuitiva or third kind of knowledge. The paper concludes by considering Spinoza's goals in his political writings and the importance of metaphysics and the theory of knowledge more broadly for early modern political philosophers.

I propose a theory of popular power, according to which a political order manifests popular power to the extent it robustly maintains an egalitarian basic structure. There are two parts to the theory. First, the power of a political order lies in the basic structure's robust self-maintenance. Second, the popularity of the political order’s power lies in the equality of relations between the society's members. I will argue that this theory avoids the perverse consequences of some existing radical democratic theories (...) of popular power which focus on mass expression, either in plebiscites or in social movements, as popular power's canonical instances. In particular, my theory does not valourise momentary expression over durable effect, and it offers a ready framework for conceptualising the sometimes-oligarchic substructure of the supposedly canonical instances of popular power. I will show that this theory has strong precedents within a certain republican tradition of political philosophy. (shrink)

En esta conferencia se sostiene que el intento de retrotraer la política en Spinoza a sucesos describibles físicamente, que se puede leer en el texto homónimo de A. Matheron, es falso. La presentación tratará la ontología de Spinoza: se quiere mostrar que ella no se puede interpretar físicamente. La interpretación se dirige igualmente contra la hipótesis de J. Bennett en su libro A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, para quien la filosofía de Spinoza es interpretada bajo la prioridad del atributo extensión (...) y, con ello, según un modelo físico. (shrink)

En este trabajo centrado en la Ética se resaltará la dimensión de alteridad de la esencia del ser humano y, por lo tanto, en el caso de Spinoza, de la noción de deseo. A partir de esta alteridad constitutiva, el modo dicotómico de pensar lo social y lo individual es reconsiderado mediante un deseo que, sin dejar de ser singular, es y persevera en relación con los demás. Con el fin de no reducir la noción de deseo a una de (...) sus expresiones, se distinguirá entre las diversas formas del deseo, en particular el anhelo, y el deseo-cupiditas. Asimismo se perfilará la noción de un deseo de razón en contraste con las figuras de la impotencia. Las vías abiertas conducen a la valoración de un pensador que nos legó una noción de deseo que implica simultáneamente afirmación y codependencia, insertándolo en debates éticos, políticos y psicológicos actuales. (shrink)

Is Leibnizian dynamics the New Physics sought in his youth to provide a solution to the problem of body unity/composition? This question can only be answered tentatively. The thesis that I will develop in this second part is that chemical-combinatoria project is not complete without some ideas of dynamics. The idea of form, which since the early Leibniz’s philosophy is projected to give a foundation to the corpuscular theory, only reaches this objective with the theory of conspiring movements that Leibniz (...) develops as the last phase of his dynamics. Within this general objective, this second part develops three secondary issues of importance: Leibniz’s emergent and realistic position, his theory of compounds and the interpretation of the Combinatoria or Characteristica project as a science of forms. (shrink)

Assunto pouco estudado na obra de Espinosa, o trabalho ocupa centralidade em seu pensamento acerca do direito comum. Através do exame das ocorrências do trabalho nos dois tratados políticos, bem como da observância da correta tradução de _ opera mutua _, procura-se jogar nova luz sobre a história em Espinosa, em particular sobre a gênese do direito comum e sobre as ideias de justiça e injustiça nesse autor.

Partindo das figuras do sábio e do ignorante tal como aparecem na obra de Espinosa, busca-se situá-las, na estratégia de exposição de Espinosa, como modelos ou imagens cujo conceito remete à prática. Com isso, procura-se mostrar o lugar central ocupado pelos conceitos de regra de vida e emenda da vida na concepção espinosana de liberdade.