LandryElaine, * ed. Categories for the Working Philosopher. Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-19-874899-1 ; 978-0-19-106582-8. Pp. xiv + 471.

This paper introduces Basic Intuitionistic Set Theory BIST, and investigates it as a first-order set theory extending the internal logic of elementary toposes. Given an elementary topos, together with the extra structure of a directed structural system of inclusions on the topos, a forcing-style interpretation of the language of first-order set theory in the topos is given, which conservatively extends the internal logic of the topos. This forcing interpretation applies to an arbitrary elementary topos, since any such is equivalent to (...) one carrying a dssi. We prove that the set theory BIST+Coll is sound and complete relative to forcing interpretations in toposes with natural numbers object. Furthermore, in the case that the structural system of inclusions is superdirected, the full Separation schema is modelled. We show that all cocomplete and realizability toposes can be endowed with such superdirected systems of inclusions.A large part of the paper is devoted to an alternative notion of category-theoretic model for BIST, which, following the general approach of Joyal and Moerdijkʼs Algebraic Set Theory, axiomatizes the structure possessed by categories of classes compatible with BIST. We prove soundness and completeness results for BIST relative to the class-category semantics. Furthermore, BIST+Coll is complete relative to the restricted collection of categories of classes given by categories of ideals over elementary toposes with nno and dssi. It is via this result that the completeness of the original forcing interpretation is obtained, since the internal logic of categories of ideals coincides with the forcing interpretation. (shrink)

The paper relativizes the method of ordinal analysis developed for Kripke–Platek set theory to theories which have the power set axiom. We show that it is possible to use this technique to extract information about Power Kripke–Platek set theory, KP.As an application it is shown that whenever KP+AC proves a ΠP2 statement then it holds true in the segment Vτ of the von Neumann hierarchy, where τ stands for the Bachmann–Howard ordinal.

The usual construction of models of NFU (New Foundations with urelements, introduced by Jensen) is due to Maurice Boffa. A Boffa model is obtained from a model of (a fragment of) Zermelo–Fraenkel with Choice (ZFC) with an automorphism which moves a rank: the domain of the Boffa model is a rank that is moved. “Most” elements of the domain of the Boffa model are urelements in terms of the interpreted NFU. The main result of this paper is that the restriction (...) of the membership relation of the original model of set theory with automorphism to the domain of the Boffa model is first-order definable in the language of NFU. In particular, all information about the extensions in the original model of the urelements of the model of NFU is definable in terms of NFU. A corollary (answering a question of Thomas Forster) is that the urelements in a Boffa model are not homogeneous. (shrink)

Paul Cohen’s method of forcing, together with Saul Kripke’s related semantics for modal and intuitionistic logic, has had profound effects on a number of branches of mathematical logic, from set theory and model theory to constructive and categorical logic. Here, I argue that forcing also has a place in traditional Hilbert-style proof theory, where the goal is to formalize portions of ordinary mathematics in restricted axiomatic theories, and study those theories in constructive or syntactic terms. I will discuss the aspects (...) of forcing that are useful in this respect, and some sample applications. The latter include ways of obtaining conservation results for classical and intuitionistic theories, interpreting classical theories in constructive ones, and constructivizing model-theoretic arguments. (shrink)

This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice. This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively pursued (...) today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics? (shrink)

We show how to interpret the language of first-order set theory in an elementary topos endowed with, as extra structure, a directed structural system of inclusions (dssi). As our main result, we obtain a complete axiomatization of the intuitionistic set theory validated by all such interpretations. Since every elementary topos is equivalent to one carrying a dssi, we thus obtain a first-order set theory whose associated categories of sets are exactly the elementary toposes. In addition, we show that the full (...) axiom of Separation is validated whenever the dssi is superdirected. This gives a uniform explanation for the known facts that cocomplete and realizability toposes provide models for Intuitionistic Zermelo—Fraenkel set theory (IZF). (shrink)

Tarski [5] showed that for any set X, its set w(X) of well-orderable subsets has cardinality strictly greater than that of X, even in the absence of the axiom of choice. We construct a Fraenkel-Mostowski model in which there is an infinite strictly descending sequence under the relation |w (X)| = |Y|. This contrasts with the corresponding situation for power sets, where use of Hartogs' ℵ-function easily establishes that there can be no infinite descending sequence under the relation |P(X)| = (...) |Y|. (shrink)

Tarski [5] showed that for any setX, its setω(X) of well-orderable subsets has cardinality strictly greater than that ofX, even in the absence of the axiom of choice. We construct a Fraenkel-Mostowski model in which there is an infinite strictly descending sequence under the relation ∣ω(X)∣ = ∣Y∣. This contrasts with the corresponding situation for power sets, where use of Hartogs' ℵ-function easily establishes that there can be no infinite descending sequence under the relation.

I examine various claims to the effect that Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis and other problems of higher set theory are ill-posed questions. The analysis takes into account the viability of the underlying philosophical views and recent mathematical developments.

ZFC has sentences that quantify over all sets or all ordinals, without restriction. Some have argued that sentences of this kind lack a determinate meaning. We propose a set theory called TOPS, using Natural Deduction, that avoids this problem by speaking only about particular sets.

This paper, a contribution to “micro set theory”, is the study promised by the first author in [M4], as improved and extended by work of the second. We use the rudimentarily recursive functions and the slightly larger collection of gentle functions to initiate the study of provident sets, which are transitive models of $\mathsf{PROVI}$, a subsystem of $\mathsf{KP}$ whose minimal model is Jensen’s $J_{\omega}$. $\mathsf{PROVI}$ supports familiar definitions, such as rank, transitive closure and ordinal addition—though not ordinal multiplication—and Shoenfield’s unramified (...) forcing. Providence is preserved under directed unions. An arbitrary set has a provident closure, and the extension of a provident $M$ by a set-generic $\mathcal{G}$ is the provident closure of $M\cup\{\mathcal{G}\}$. The improvidence of many models of $\mathsf{Z}$ is shown. The final section uses similar but simpler recursions to show, in the weak system $\mathsf{MW}$, that the truth predicate for $\dot{\varDelta}_{0}$ formulæ is $\Delta_{1}$. (shrink)

A theoretical development is carried to establish fundamental results about rank-initial embeddings and automorphisms of countable non-standard models of set theory, with a keen eye for their sets of fixed points. These results are then combined into a “geometric technique” used to prove several results about countable non-standard models of set theory. In particular, back-and-forth constructions are carried out to establish various generalizations and refinements of Friedman’s theorem on the existence of rank-initial embeddings between countable non-standard models of the fragment (...) \ + \-Separation of \; and Gaifman’s technique of iterated ultrapowers is employed to show that any countable model of \ can be elementarily rank-end-extended to models with well-behaved automorphisms whose sets of fixed points equal the original model. These theoretical developments are then utilized to prove various results relating self-embeddings, automorphisms, their sets of fixed points, strong rank-cuts, and set theories of different strengths. Two examples: The notion of “strong rank-cut” is characterized in terms of the theory \, and in terms of fixed-point sets of self-embeddings. (shrink)

Given a model \ of set theory, and a nontrivial automorphism j of \, let \\) be the submodel of \ whose universe consists of elements m of \ such that \=x\) for every x in the transitive closure of m ). Here we study the class \ of structures of the form \\), where the ambient model \ satisfies a frugal yet robust fragment of \ known as \, and \=m\) whenever m is a finite ordinal in the sense (...) of \ Our main achievement is the calculation of the theory of \ as precisely \-\. The following theorems encapsulate our principal results:Theorem A. Every structure in \ satisfies \-\.Theorem B. Each of the following three conditions is sufficient for a countable structure \ to be in \: \ is a transitive model of \-\. \ is a recursively saturated model of \-\. \ is a model of \.Theorem C. Suppose \ is a countable recursively saturated model of \ and I is a proper initial segment of \ that is closed under exponentiation and contains \. There is a group embedding \ from \\) into \\) such that I is the longest initial segment of \ that is pointwise fixed by \ for every nontrivial \.\)In Theorem C, \\) is the group of automorphisms of the structure X, and \ is the ordered set of rationals. (shrink)

We show how to interpret the language of first-order set theory in an elementary topos endowed with, as extra structure, a directed structural system of inclusions . As our main result, we obtain a complete axiomatization of the intuitionistic set theory validated by all such interpretations. Since every elementary topos is equivalent to one carrying a dssi, we thus obtain a first-order set theory whose associated categories of sets are exactly the elementary toposes. In addition, we show that the full (...) axiom of Separation is validated whenever the dssi is superdirected. This gives a uniform explanation for the known facts that cocomplete and realizability toposes provide models for Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. (shrink)

We derive the schemes of from certain weak forms of the same.

Hellman [2003] raises interesting challenges to categorical structuralism. He starts citing Awodey [1996] which, as Hellman sees, is not intended as a foundation for mathematics. It offers a structuralist framework which could denned in any of many different foundations. But Hellman says Awodey's work is 'naturally viewed in the context of Mac Lane's repeated claim that category theory provides an autonomous foundation for mathematics as an alternative to set theory' (p. 129). Most of Hellman's paper 'scrutinizes the formulation of category (...) theory' specifically in 'its alleged role as providing a foundation' (p. 130). I will also focus on the foundational question. Page numbers in parentheses are page references to Hellman [2003]. (shrink)

We consider all combinatorially possible systems corresponding to subsets of finite set theory (i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without the axiom of infinity) and for each of them either provide a well-founded locally finite graph that is a model of that theory or show that this is impossible. To that end, we develop the technique of axiom closure of graphs.

The large-structure tools of cohomology including toposes and derived categories stay close to arithmetic in practice, yet published foundations for them go beyond ZFC in logical strength. We reduce the gap by founding all the theorems of Grothendieck’s SGA, plus derived categories, at the level of Finite-Order Arithmetic, far below ZFC. This is the weakest possible foundation for the large-structure tools because one elementary topos of sets with infinity is already this strong.

This article serves to present a large mathematical perspective and historical basis for the Axiom of Replacement as well as to affirm its importance as a central axiom of modern set theory.

Let be the basic set theory that consists of the axioms of extensionality, emptyset, pair, union, powerset, infinity, transitive containment, Δ0‐separation and set foundation. This paper studies the relative strength of set theories obtained by adding fragments of the set‐theoretic collection scheme to. We focus on two common parameterisations of the collection: ‐collection, which is the usual collection scheme restricted to ‐formulae, and strong ‐collection, which is equivalent to ‐collection plus ‐separation. The main result of this paper shows that for (...) all, proves that there exists a transitive model of Zermelo Set Theory plus ‐collection, the theory is ‐conservative over the theory. It is also shown that (2) holds for when the Axiom of Choice is included in the base theory. The final section indicates how the proofs of (1) and (2) can be modified to obtain analogues of these results for theories obtained by adding fragments of collection to a base theory (Kripke‐Platek Set Theory with Infinity plus ) that does not include the powerset axiom. (shrink)

In this paper is used to denote Jensen's modification of Quine's ‘new foundations’ set theory () fortified with a type‐level pairing function but without the axiom of choice. The axiom is the variant of the axiom of counting which asserts that no finite set is smaller than its own set of singletons. This paper shows that proves the consistency of the simple theory of types with infinity (). This result implies that proves that consistency of, and that proves the consistency (...) of. (shrink)

On the occasion of his 70th birthday, the work of Adrian Mathias in set theory is surveyed in its full range and extent.

By a classical theorem of Harvey Friedman, every countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of a sufficiently strong fragment of ZF has a proper rank-initial self-embedding j, i.e., j is a self-embedding of $\mathcal {M}$ such that $j[\mathcal {M}]\subsetneq \mathcal {M}$, and the ordinal rank of each member of $j[\mathcal {M}]$ is less than the ordinal rank of each element of $\mathcal {M}\setminus j[\mathcal {M}]$. Here, we investigate the larger family of proper initial-embeddings j of models $\mathcal {M}$ of fragments of (...) set theory, where the image of j is a transitive submodel of $\mathcal {M}$. Our results include the following three theorems. In what follows, $\mathrm {ZF}^-$ is $\mathrm {ZF}$ without the power set axiom; $\mathrm {WO}$ is the axiom stating that every set can be well-ordered; $\mathrm {WF}$ is the well-founded part of $\mathcal {M}$ ; and $\Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $ is the full scheme of dependent choice of length $\alpha $.Theorem A.There is an $\omega $ -standard countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {ZF}^-+\mathrm {WO}$ that carries no initial self-embedding $j:\mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$ other than the identity embedding.Theorem B.Every countable $\omega $ -nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\ \mathrm {ZF}$ is isomorphic to a transitive submodel of the hereditarily countable sets of its own constructible universe $L^{\mathcal {M}}$.Theorem C.The following three conditions are equivalent for a countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {ZF}^{-}+\mathrm {WO}+\forall \alpha \ \Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $. There is a cardinal in $\mathcal {M}$ that is a strict upper bound for the cardinality of each member of $\mathrm {WF}$. $\mathrm {WF}$ satisfies the powerset axiom.For all $n \in \omega $ and for all $b \in M$, there exists a proper initial self-embedding $j: \mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$ such that $b \in \mathrm {rng}$ and $j[\mathcal {M}] \prec _n \mathcal {M}$. (shrink)

We identify complete fragments of the simple theory of types with infinity and Quine’s new foundations set theory. We show that TSTI decides every sentence ϕ in the language of type theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s1⋯∃ylslθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables, s1>⋯>sl, and θ is quantifier-free, ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s⋯∃ylsθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables and θ is quantifier-free. This shows that NF decides every stratified sentence ϕ in the language (...) of set theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns distinct values to all of the variables y1,…,yl, ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns the same value to all of the variables y1,…,yl. (shrink)