Switch to: References

Citations of:

Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology

Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Luca Moretti (2021)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. (1 other version)Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force.Lu Teng - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):55-76.
    Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Explanationism and the awareness of logical truths.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-7.
    In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti propose a novel internalist account of epistemic justification called phenomenal explanationism, which combines phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. I argue that the current version of phenomenal explanationism faces a dilemma: either it omits the awareness requirement but implies an implausible form of logical-mathematical omniscience, or it preserves the requirement but leads to a vicious regress. I suggest how phenomenal explanationism might be revised to avoid this dilemma.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Dark Side of Clarity.Chenwei Nie - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy:1–15.
    We all have experiences in which it “seems clear” to us that something is true. This kind of clear experience can play significant roles in determining whether we believe something to be true. But what are the significant roles? So far, the literature has focused on optimal cases where a person's clear experience might provide prima facie justification for their belief. This article will develop the hypothesis that, in less optimal cases, these clear experiences can be epistemically damaging. Specifically, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • No need for explanation.Michael Huemer - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-12.
    In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti raise three objections to Phenomenal Conservatism: the problem of explaining defeaters, the problem of reflective awareness, and the bootstrapping problem. I address all three problems and then raise three objections to Phenomenal Explanationism: the problem of necessary truths, the problem of unreflective observers, and the problem of excessive flexibility. I conclude that there is no need to supplement Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    At the core of evidentialism lies a very plausible claim: rational thinkers follow their evidence. While this seems to be a very intuitive, almost trivial, claim, providing a full and complete evidentialist theory is complicated. In this entry, I begin with elucidating what kind of theory evidentialists aim to provide us with. I will show that, in order to provide a complete evidentialist theory, we have to provide a lot of details on what evidence is and how it relates to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Evidentialism, Judgment, and Suspension: Meeting Sosa's Challenges.Kevin McCain - 2023 - Episteme:1-12.
    Ernest Sosa has recently presented three challenges for evidentialism. The challenges concern what is required for epistemically justified judging and suspending of judgment. The aim of this article is to respond to these challenges on behalf of the evidentialist. Importantly, responding to Sosa's challenges requires giving substance to the idea of appreciating what one's evidence supports. This idea has been mentioned by prominent evidentialists but not given adequate development. Hence, this article marks a significant move forward in the understanding of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Reflective awareness, phenomenal conservatism, and phenomenal explanationism.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance's inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its antisceptical bite. This paper provides a novel (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Comments on appearance and explanation.Richard Fumerton - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-6.
    So as I understand it, the fundamental goal of Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti’s Appearance and Explanation is to offer a unified account of epistemic justification, one that incorporates insights of both phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. One might suppose that one gets the best of both views by employing the phenomenal conservative’s views about the role of appearance in order to get the initial data that needs explaining, while one appeals to explanationism to expand one’s justified beliefs beyond the data (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Zetetic Seemings and Their Role in Inquiry.Verena Wagner - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.
    The paper addresses the nature of seemings in light of their role in inquiry. Seemings are mental states or events with propositional content that have a specific phenomenology often referred to as “felt truth”. In epistemology, seemings are mainly discussed as possible (non-inferential) justifications for belief. Yet, epistemology has recently taken a zetetic turn, that is, a turn toward the study of inquiry. I will argue that the role of seemings in epistemology should be re-assessed from the perspective of inquiry (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Knowledge and Prizes.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (eds.), Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We examine two leading theories of rational belief, the Lockean view and the explanationist view. The first is appealing because it fits with some independently plausible claims about the ways that rational persons pursue their aims. The second is appealing because it seems to account for intuitions that cause trouble for the Lockean view. While fitting the intuitive data is desirable, we are troubled that the explanationist view seems to clash with our theoretical beliefs about what rationality must be like. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Phenomenal explanationism and non-inferential justification.Tommaso Piazza - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-11.
    In this note, I argue that McCain and Moretti’s account of non-inferential justification is subject to the subjective point of view objection, and that for this reason, it does not provide an internalistically acceptable alternative to the account of this justification supplied by Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Moreover, I contend that PC’s account is not afflicted by the same problem and that it does not generate the over-intellectualization and regress problem. Finally, contra McCain and Moretti, I argue that the non-inferential (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • How to combine evidentialism with knowledge-first epistemology.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    The main aim of this paper is to develop a view that I call “Evidential Knowledge First”. To do so, first, I consider a traditional way of developing evidentialism, which I call Traditional Evidentialism, and argue that, while it vindicates the roles we expect evidence to play, it struggles accounting for cases of non-inferential justification and non-inferential knowledge (§2-3). I then consider a view we might call “Technically Evidentialism”, which we get when we jointly take two core claims of knowledge-first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Experience, plausibility, and evidence.Ted Poston - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    Evidentialism is one of the most sensible claims of recent philosophy. Yet it is often joined with other theses about the structure of justification and the nature of experience that are dubious. In this paper, I argue that experience is not a basic source of evidence. I contend that for an experience to justify a belief, it must be independently plausible that the experience is reliable based on background information. The paper develops an account of plausibility and examines cases, including (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5).
    Humean arguments from evil are some of the most powerful arguments against Theism. They take as their data what we know about good and evil. And they argue that some rival to Theism better explains, or otherwise predicts, that data than Theism. However, this paper argues that there are many problems with various methods for defending Humean arguments. I consider Philo’s original strategy; modern strategies in terms of epistemic probability; phenomenological strategies; and strategies that appeal to scientific and metaphysical explanations. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explaining Phenomenal Explanationism: A Précis of Appearance & Explanation.McCain Kevin & Luca Moretti - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3:article number 85.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Defending Phenomenal Explanationism: Responses to Fumerton, Huemer, McAllister, Piazza, Steup, and Zhang.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3:article number 80.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Timid and Tepid Appropriation: Divine Presence, the Sensus Divinitatis, and Phenomenal Conservativism.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Res Philosophica 101 (1):109-129.
    Plantinga develops an ambitious theistic religious epistemology on which theists can have non-inferential knowledge of God. Central to his epistemology is the idea that human beings have a “sensus divinitatis” that produces such knowledge. Recently, several authors have urged an appropriation of the sensus divinitatis that is more friendly to internalist views, such as Phenomenal Conservativism. I argue that this appropriation is too timid and tepid in a variety of ways. It applies only to a small fraction of theistic beliefs; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Problems for phenomenal explanationism.Matthias Steup - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-13.
    I raise several problems for Phenomenal Explanationism, which McCain and Moretti intend to be a fusion of Evidentialism and Phenomenal Conservatism. I argue that the view is actually a non-conservative, credentialist view. Unlike conservatism, it does not allow for immediate justification. I also argue that the view has trouble accounting for justification coming from background knowledge. Finally, I argue that the view runs into the problem of equally good explanations.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism.Giada Fratantonio & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2643-2654.
    According to a version of Infallibilism, if one knows that p, then one’s evidence for p entails p. In her Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has recently developed two arguments against Infalliblism, which can both be presented in the form of a dilemma. According to the first dilemma, the infallibilist can avoid scepticism only if she endorses the claim that if one knows that p then p is part of one’s evidence for p. But this seems to come at (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Explaining Epistemic Intuitions: From Intuitionist Particularism to Intuitionist Explanationism.Kevin McCain - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2):120-139.
    In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There are two general problems for Bergmann’s response to skepticism. First, he fails to accurately portray the key principle of the skeptical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The neurotic and the dogmatist.Edvard Aviles-Meza - 2024 - Synthese 204 (4):1-15.
    According to dogmatism, our perceptual experience provides immediate justification for our beliefs about the external world. In particular, according to some versions of dogmatism, an experience with phenomenological strength (aka ‘phenomenal force’) is sufficient for immediate perceptual justification (call this ‘the phenomenal sufficiency thesis’). However, the sufficiency thesis has been challenged based on cases in which certain imaginative experiences with phenomenal force fail to justify. So, the dogmatist may claim that while phenomenal force is not sufficient, it’s still necessary for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Veridical Perceptual Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.
    What is the epistemic significance of taking a veridical perceptual experience at face value? To first approximations, the Minimal View says that it is true belief, and the Maximal View says that it is knowledge. I sympathetically explore the prospects of the Maximal View.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nonsubjectivism About How Things Seem.Matthew McGrath - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 38–53.
    We regularly appeal to claims of the form it seems that p in defense of a claim p. When we do so, we typically take it seems that p to be a reason for thinking that p but also a reason that “gets at” a relevant body of facts and its support for p. Other things being equal, we should want to vindicate our ordinary beliefs on this matter. We should want to vindicate the claim that facts about things seeming (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • From One Conservative to Another: A Critique of Epistemic Conservatism.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (2):167-186.
    Epistemic conservatism maintains that some beliefs are immediately justified simply because they are believed. The intuitive implausibility of this claim sets the burden of proof against it. Some epistemic conservatives have sought to lessen this burden by limiting its scope, but I show that they cannot remove it entirely. The only hope for epistemic conservativism is to appeal to its theoretical fruit. However, such a defense is undercut by the introduction of phenomenal conservatism, which accomplishes the same work from a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against the Phenomenal View of Evidence: Disagreement and Shared Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54–62.
    On the phenomenal view of evidence, seemings are evidence. More precisely, if it seems to S that p, S has evidence for p. Here, I raise a worry for this view of evidence; namely, that it has the counterintuitive consequence that two people who disagree would rarely, if ever, share evidence. This is because almost all differences in beliefs would involve differences in seemings. However, many literatures in epistemology, including the disagreement literature and the permissivism literature, presuppose that people who (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 217-232.
    Matthew McGrath has recently challenged all theories that allow for immediate perceptual justification. This challenge comes by way of arguing for what he calls the “Looks View” of visual justification, which entails that our visual beliefs that are allegedly immediately justified are in fact mediately justified based on our independent beliefs about the looks of things. This paper shows that McGrath’s arguments are unsound or, at the very least, that they do not cause genuine concern for the species of dogmatism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Doxastic Justification and Testimonial Beliefs.Emmanuel Smith - 2023 - Episteme (N/A):1-14.
    I argue that a general feature of human psychology provides strong reason to modify or reject anti-reductionism about the epistemology of testimony. Because of the work of what I call “the background” (which is a collection of all of an individual's synthetizations, summarizations, memories of experiences, beliefs, etc.) we cannot help but form testimonial beliefs on the basis of a testifier's say so along with additional evidence, concepts, beliefs, and so on. Given that we arrive at testimonial beliefs through the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Seeming and reflective awareness.Blake McAllister - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-12.
    In Appearance & Explanation, Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti argue that phenomenal explanationism (PE) offers a superior account to phenomenal conservatism (PC) as to why seemings justify. One of their arguments for this position is that PE is in a better position to respond to skepticism than PC, since the latter faces the problem of reflective awareness while the former does not. I deny that PE has any such advantage. To the contrary, I argue that PC offers a superior response (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Appreciating the need for autonomy, or recognizing the truth of evidentialism?Kevin McCain - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Adam Carter’s book Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing is excellent. It is clear, well-written, and interesting. On the whole, Autonomous Knowledge is rea...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Replies to Chudnoff, Lemos, and McCain.Michael Bergmann - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2):140-181.
    These replies to critical comments by Elijah Chudnoff, Noah Lemos, and Kevin McCain on my book Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition begin (after the Introduction) with Section 2, where I address a cluster of complaints from Chudnoff and McCain in connection with skepticism-supporting underdetermination principles. (These principles play a significant role in my portrayal of radical skepticism and in my Reidian response to it.) In Section 3, I reply to some objections from Lemos concerning a claim (from Radical Skepticism and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • An Examination of the Epistemology of Prejudiced Belief.William Conner - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences
    In “Racial Prejudice and Friction,” John Dewey writes: “Too often we try to discuss race prejudice morally before we have dealt with it scientifically. That is, we justify or condemn it before we understand it.” Dewey’s remark applies well to contemporary work on the epistemology of prejudiced belief, in which there are dueling tendencies either to condemn or to justify these beliefs without sufficient care. In this dissertation, I chart a middle path between these extremes. I first critique Amia Srinivasan’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemology: 50 Puzzles Paradoxes and Thought Experiments.Kevin McCain - 2021 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    "Imaginative cases, or what might be called puzzles, paradoxes, and other thought experiments, play a central role in epistemology. A significant component of understanding epistemological debates and theories is appreciating various cases and what they are thought to show. This volume collects 50 of the most important puzzles, paradoxes, and thought experiments in contemporary epistemology and describes their significance. The volume gives each case a memorable name, describes the details of the case, explains the issue to which the case is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Value, Seemings, and God: The Intersection of Virtue Epistemology, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Religious Experience.Thomas William Duttweiler - 2023 - Dissertation, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Modal Skepticism and Its Applications.Barthuly Joshua - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    This dissertation is an examination of the epistemology of modality and its application to debates in metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. I first give a novel argument for a moderate modal skepticism. The argument is a generalization and improvement upon van Inwagen (1998)'s influential argument for a close cousin to my thesis. It also brings to bear highly-relevant, recent results in mainstream epistemology that have surprisingly gone overlooked in the otherwise thoroughgoing developments in modal epistemology, a sub-discipline that has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology. By Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti. [REVIEW]Caleb Estep - 2022 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (2):354-356.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology by Kevin McCain and Luca MorettiCaleb EstepMcCAIN, Kevin and Luca Moretti. Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. iv + 195 pp. Cloth, $70.00Since its beginning, phenomenal conservatism (PC) has grown rapidly in popularity as a theory of epistemic justification. In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti develop out of PC a new theory of justification (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark