- Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account.Ali Hossein Khani - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):369-391.details
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Are Events Things of the Past?Julian Bacharach - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):381-412.details
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Wanting and willing.Eric Marcus - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):887-899.details
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Implicit biases in visually guided action.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):S3943–S3967.details
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Practical Knowledge as Knowledge of a Normative Judgment.Eric Marcus - 2018 - Manuscrito (4):319-347.details
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Flexible occurrent control.Denis Buehler - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2119-2137.details
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Making sense of akrasia.Matthew Burch - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):939-971.details
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A cognitive account of agentive awareness.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):545-563.details
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Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Praktischer Hylemorphismus: Ansätze zu einer Theorie praktischen Wissens im Anschluss an McDowell.Sascha Settegast - 2024 - In Jens Kertscher & Philipp Richter (eds.), Praktisches Wissen: Konzeptueller Rahmen und logische Geographie eines grundlegenden Begriffs der Praktischen Philosophie. Baden-Baden: Nomos. pp. 71-116.details
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The factivity of practical knowledge.Dawa Ometto & Niels van Miltenburg - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Knowing what you Want.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - In Lucy Campbell (ed.), Forms of Knowledge. Oxford.details
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Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2020 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. Springer. pp. 171-184.details
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The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.details
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Reasoning's relation to bodily action.David Jenkins - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):87-96.details
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Intending, acting, and doing.Luca Ferrero - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):13-39.details
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Choice and Action in Aristotle.A. W. Price - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (4):435-462.details
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Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. (1) 70-94.details
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Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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The Instrumental Structure of Actions.Markos Valaris - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):64-83.details
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From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.details
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Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof.Lucy Campbell - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):230-252.details
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How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):577-599.details
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Objections to the God Machine Thought Experiment and What they Reveal about the Intelligibility of Moral Intervention by Technological Means.Garry Young - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):831-846.details
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The Guise of the Guise of the Bad.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):5-20.details
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Practical reasoning and practical knowledge.Rowland Stout - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):564-579.details
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Causality, determination and necessitation in free human action.Vanessa Carr - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-28.details
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The Myth of Mere Movement.Chauncey Maher - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1177-1193.details
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Practical knowledge and error in action.Christian Kietzmann - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):586-606.details
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Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account.Ali Hossein Khani - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):369-391.details
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How to Respond to the Problem of Deviant Formal Causation.Stephen Davey - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):703-717.details
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