- Obligation, Responsibility, and History.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (1):1-23.details
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Psychopathy, ethical perception, and moral culpability.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (2):135-150.details
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Hard- and soft-line responses to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.details
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Historicism, Non-historicism, or a Mix?Ishtiyaque Haji - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):185-204.details
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Indeterministic Choice and Ability.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):191-203.details
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Luck’s Extended Reach.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.details
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Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):239 - 261.details
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Ability, Frankfurt Examples, and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):163-190.details
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Merit, fit, and basic desert.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.details
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In defense of hard-line replies to the multiple-case manipulation argument.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):797-811.details
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What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.details
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Demystifying the Deep Self View.August Gorman - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (4):390-414.details
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Hard luck * by Neil Levy. [REVIEW]Marion Godman - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):186-188.details
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Moral responsibility and the psychopath.Walter Glannon - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):158-166.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Taking the Self out of Self-Rule.Michael Garnett - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):21-33.details
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Neurolímits.Òscar Llorens I. Garcia - 2018 - Recerca.Revista de Pensament I Anàlisi 22:15-32.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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The assimilation argument and the rollback argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.details
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A theory of the normative force of pleas.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.details
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Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
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The Zygote Argument remixed.J. M. Fischer - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):267-272.details
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The Physiognomy of Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.details
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Responsibility, Autonomy, and the Zygote Argument.John Martin Fischer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (3):223-237.details
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Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):203 - 228.details
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Initial Design, Manipulation, and Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):255-270.details
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How Should Free Will Skeptics Pursue Legal Change?Marcelo Fischborn - 2017 - Neuroethics 11 (1):47-54.details
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Predicting Philosophical Disagreement.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):978-989.details
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Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board.Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.details
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Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love.N. L. Engel-Hawbecker - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-214.details
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Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem.Nadine Elzein - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2827-2846.details
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The demand for contrastive explanations.Nadine Elzein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1325-1339.details
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Almost pregnant: On probabilism and its moral uses in the social sciences.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):572-594.details
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Betting Against Compatibilism.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (4):383-396.details
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The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Demetriou - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.details
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Rescuing the Zygote Argument.Gabriel De Marco - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1621-1628.details
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Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action.Gabriel De Marco - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1953-1972.details
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Manipulation, machine induction, and bypassing.Gabriel De Marco - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):487-507.details
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Brain Interventions, Moral Responsibility, and Control over One’s Mental Life.Gabriel De Marco - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (3):221-229.details
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Why the manipulation argument fails: determinism does not entail perfect prediction.Oisin Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):451-471.details
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Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.details
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Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.details
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Cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists as well.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):112-125.details
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Manipulation and constitutive luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2381-2394.details
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Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism.Taylor W. Cyr - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):193-214.details
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Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.Taylor W. Cyr & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):22-40.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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