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Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
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Chimps as secret agents.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2129-2158.details
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Intentional mind-wandering as intentional omission: the surrealist method.Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7727-7748.details
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Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View.Santiago Amaya - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1767-1786.details
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Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):559-576.details
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Actions, thought-experiments and the 'principle of alternate possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.details
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Deliberative Agency, Self‐Control, and the Divided Mind.Hannah Altehenger - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):542-558.details
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The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.details
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Socratic akratic action.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (3):149-159.details
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Basic causal deviance, action repertoires, and reliability.Jesús H. Aguilar - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):1-19.details
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Agency, consciousness, and executive control.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.details
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Artifact and Essence.Brandon Warmke - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):595-614.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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Intention and Intentional Action.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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The shape of agency: Control, action, skill, knowledge.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.details
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Deciding without Intending.Alexandra M. Nolte, Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2020 - Journal of Cognition 3 (1):12.details
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Trying without fail.Ben Holguín & Harvey Lederman - manuscriptdetails
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Self-control, Attention, and How to live without Special Motivational Powers.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In M. Brent & Lisa Miracchi (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. Routledge. pp. 272-300.details
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Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
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Meaningful Human Control over Smart Home Systems: A Value Sensitive Design Approach.Steven Umbrello - 2020 - Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (37):40-65.details
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Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.details
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Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2012 - In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92--111.details
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Merleau-Ponty and the transcendental problem of bodily agency.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2013 - In Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. Springer. pp. 43-61.details
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Präferenzen, Nutzen und ihre Aggregation.Christoph Lumer - 2021 - In Christian Hiebaum (ed.), Interdisziplinäres Handbuch "Gemeinwohl". Springer Fachmedien. pp. 177-193.details
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Agency and Mistakes.Santiago Amaya - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 149-150.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Wohin führt die kausale Handlungstheorie?Georg Gasser - 2008 - In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen?: Ein Akttheoretischer Zugang. Onto Verlag. pp. 181-208.details
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The Priority of Intentional Action: From Developmental to Conceptual Priority.Yair Levy - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Introduction: through contexts to actions.Anton Leist - 2007 - In .details
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Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, Th Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Series). Springer. pp. 105-119.details
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Slip-Proof Actions.Santiago Amaya - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge. pp. 21-36.details
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Intention.Sarah K. Paul - 2013 - International Encyclopedia of Ethics.details
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Action.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 78-88.details
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Representation without Thought: Confusion, Reference, and Communication.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2015 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Centerdetails
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How Many Accounts of Act Individuation Are There?Joseph Ulatowski - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Utahdetails
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Causal after all : a model of mental causation for dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Dissertation, Umeå Universitydetails
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You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
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Modeling Long-Term Intentions and Narratives in Autonomous Agents.Christian Kronsted & Zachariah A. Neemeh - forthcoming - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness.details
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Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited.Elisabeth Pacherie & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2019 - WIREs Cognitive Science 10 (2):e1481.details
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Towards a Value Sensitive Design Framework for Attaining Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Weapons Systems.Steven Umbrello - 2021 - Dissertation, Consortium Finodetails
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Actor-observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question.Bertram F. Malle, Joshua Knobe & S. Nelson - 2007 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (4):491-514.details
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Act and Intentionality.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diegodetails
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Attributions as behavior explanations: Toward a new theory.Bertram Malle - 2003details
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Qual a motivação para se defender uma teoria causal da memória?César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - In Juliano Santos do Carmo & Rogério F. Saucedo Corrêa (eds.), Linguagem e cognição. Pelotas: NEPFil. pp. 63-89.details
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Agency and control.Jesus H. Aguilar - unknowndetails
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Against the Distinction between Intentions for the Future and Intentions for the Present.Chiara Brozzo - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (58):333-346.details
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Causation, Action, and Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2009 - In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock & P. Menzies (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.details
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