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  1. Humor and Sympathy in Medical Practice.Carter Hardy - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (2):179-190.
    Medical professionals seem to interpret their uses of humor very differently from those outside the medical profession. Nurses and physicians argue that humor is necessary for them to do their jobs well. Many patients are horrified that they could one day be the butt of their physician’s jokes. The purpose of this paper is to encourage the respectful use of humor in clinical prac-tice, so as to support its importance in medical practice, while simultaneously protecting against its potential abuse. I (...)
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  • Affectivity and Narrativity in Depression: A Phenomenological Study.Anna Bortolan - 2017 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 20 (1):77-88.
    In this study I explore from a phenomenological perspective the relationship between affectivity and narrative self-understanding in depression. Phenomenological accounts often conceive of the disorder as involving disturbances of the narrative self and suggest that these disturbances are related to the alterations of emotions and moods typical of the illness. In this paper I expand these accounts by advancing two sets of claims. In the first place, I suggest that, due to the loss of feeling characteristic of the illness, the (...)
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  • Affectivity and the Distinction Between Minimal and Narrative Self.Anna Bortolan - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):67-84.
    In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise (...)
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  • A Phenomenological Critique of Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality.Joshua Soffer - manuscript
    Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective propositional frameworks. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which determinations of meaning and significance are (...)
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  • Beyond Husserl and Schütz. Hermann Schmitz and Neophenomenological Sociology.Robert Gugutzer - 2020 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 50 (2):184-202.
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  • Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (6):602-626.
    It is generally maintained that emotions consist of intentional states and /or bodily feelings. This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of guilt in severe depression, in order to illustrate how such conceptions fail to adequately accommodate a way in which some emotional experiences are said to be deeper than others. Many emotions are intentional states. However, I propose that the deepest emotions are not intentional but pre-intentional, meaning that they determine which kinds of intentional state are possible. I go on (...)
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  • Concerns and the Seriousness of Emotion.John M. Monteleone - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):181-207.
    Some philosophers have claimed that emotions are states of mind where an object is taken seriously. Seriousness, as this paper understands it, involves both a phenomenological change in attention and non-indifference towards an object. The paper investigates how contemporary theories of emotion can explain the seriousness of emotion. After rejecting explanations based on feeling, desire, and concern, the paper argues that the seriousness of an emotion can be explained as the manifestation of a concern in an outwardly directed feeling. Given (...)
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  • The Diving Bell and the Butterfly as an Emotional Event.Tarja Laine - 2010 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):295-305.
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  • Epistemic Emotions: The Case of Wonder.Laura Candiotto - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54).
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  • How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
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  • The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion.Candace S. Alcorta - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):233-236.
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  • Are Background Feelings Intentional Feelings?Emilia Barile - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):560-574.
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  • Moments of recognition: deontic power and bodily felt demands.Henning Nörenberg - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (1):191-206.
    While the current discussion on embodied cognition provides valuable accounts of an agent’s bodily sensitivity to instrumental possibilities, in this paper I investigate felt demands as the bodily-affective dimension of the agent’s recognition of deontic powers such as obligations. I argue that there is a close kinship between felt demands and affordances in the stricter sense. I will suggest that what is unique about felt demands on an experiential level is that they involve an evaluative perspective arising from acute or (...)
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  • Yoga From the Mat Up: How Words Alight on Bodies.Doris McIlwain & John Sutton - 2013 - Educational Philosophy and Theory (6):1-19.
    Yoga is a unique form of expert movement that promotes an increasingly subtle interpenetration of thought and movement. The mindful nature of its practice, even at expert levels, challenges the idea that thought and mind are inevitably disruptive to absorbed coping. Building on parallel phenomenological and ethnographic studies of skilful performance and embodied apprenticeship, we argue for the importance in yoga of mental access to embodied movement during skill execution by way of a case study of instruction and practice in (...)
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  • How the Intentionality of Emotion Can Be Traced to the Intensionality of Emotion: Intensionality in Emotive Predicates.Prakash Mondal - 2013 - Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (1):35-54.
    In this paper a connection between intentionality, intensionality, language and emotion will be drawn up through a demonstration of an intimate relationship between the intentionality of emotion and intensionality in language. What will be shown is that the intentionality of emotion can ultimately be traced to the intensionality of emotional contexts. For this purpose, emotive predicates will be categorized in terms of their intensional behavior and regularities. They will then be brought forward for an explication of why and how far (...)
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  • Affective Intentionality and Self-Consciousness.Jan Slaby & Achim Stephan - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):506-513.
    We elaborate and defend the claim that human affective states are, among other things, self-disclosing. We will show why affective intentionality has to be considered in order to understand human self-consciousness. One specific class of affective states, so-called existential feelings, although often neglected in philosophical treatments of emotions, will prove central. These feelings importantly pre-structure affective and other intentional relations to the world. Our main thesis is that existential feelings are an important manifestation of self-consciousness and figure prominently in human (...)
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  • Affective Self-Construal and the Sense of Ability.Jan Slaby - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):151-156.
    How should we construe the unity, in affective experience, of felt bodily changes on the one hand and intentionality on the other, without forcing affective phenomena into a one-sided theoretical framework such as cognitivism? To answer this question, I will consider the specific kind of self-awareness implicit in affectivity. In particular, I will explore the idea that a bodily sense of ability is crucial for affective self-awareness. Describing the affective ways of “grasping oneself” manifest in a person’s felt sense of (...)
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  • Emotion and Value : A Phenomenological Approach.Vanello Daniel - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Warwick. Department of Philosophy
    In this thesis I argue that the affective component of emotional experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I call this the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part I critically assess three contemporary accounts which, I argue, are motivated either implicitly or explicitly by the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. I argue that all three accounts fail due to the (...)
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  • Boosting Cooperation. The Beneficial Function of Positive Emotions in Dialogical Inquiry.Laura Candiotto - 2018 - Humana Mente 11 (33).
    The aim of the paper is to discuss and evaluate the role of positive emotions for cooperation in dialogical inquiry. I analyse dialogical interactions as vehicles for inquiry, and the role of positive emotions in knowledge gain is illustrated in terms of a case study taken from Socratic Dialogue, a contemporary method used in education for fostering group knowledge. I proceed as follows. After having illustrated the case study, I analyse it through the conceptual tools of distributed cognition and character-based (...)
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  • A Conceptual Analysis of the Oceanic Feeling : With a Special Note on Painterly Aesthetics.Jussi A. Saarinen - unknown
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  • Emotion as Position-Taking.Jean Mueller - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):525-540.
    It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...)
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  • A Phenomenological Approach to Clinical Empathy: Rethinking Empathy Within its Intersubjective and Affective Contexts.Hardy Carter - 2017 - Dissertation, University of South Florida
    This dissertation contributes to the philosophy of empathy and biomedical ethics by drawing on phenomenological approaches to empathy, intersubjectivity, and affectivity in order to contest the primacy of the intersubjective aspect of empathy at the cost of its affective aspect. Both aspects need to be explained in order for empathy to be accurately understood in philosophical works, as well as practically useful for patient care in biomedical ethics. In the first chapter, I examine the current state of clinical empathy in (...)
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  • “Feelings as the Motor of Perception”? The Essential Role of Interest for Intentionality.Maren0 Wehrle - 2015 - Husserl Studies 31 (1):45-64.
    Husserl seldom refers to feelings, and when he does, he mainly focuses on their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of value apprehension. This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings in Husserl from a different angle. For this purpose it makes a detour through Husserl’s early account of attention. In a text from 1898 on attention the aspect of interest, which is said to have a basis in feeling, plays an essential role. Although Husserl argues here (...)
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  • Being and Feeling Addicted to Exercise: Reflections From a Neophenomenological Perspective.Robert Gugutzer - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (1):30-48.
    ABSTRACTSince its emergence during the 1970s, scientific research on exercise addiction has been interested primarily in the mental and physical causes and consequences of the behaviour of exercise addicts. This focus can be ascribed to the dominance of psychology and medicine among this field of research. This paper wishes to contribute to these thematic priorities and basic approaches by taking a phenomenological perspective as a basis, thus making the embodied and the personal dimension of exercise addiction the centre of attention. (...)
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  • Yoga From the Mat Up: How Words Alight on Bodies.Doris McIlwain & John Sutton - 2014 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 46 (6):655-673.
    Yoga is a unique form of expert movement that promotes an increasingly subtle interpenetration of thought and movement. The mindful nature of its practice, even at expert levels, challenges the idea that thought and mind are inevitably disruptive to absorbed coping. Building on parallel phenomenological and ethnographic studies of skilful performance and embodied apprenticeship, we argue for the importance in yoga of mental access to embodied movement during skill execution by way of a case study of instruction and practice in (...)
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  • Embodied Inter-Affection in and Beyond Organizational Life-Worlds.Wendelin Küpers - 2014 - Critical Horizons 15 (2):150-178.
    This paper presents a phenomenology of affect and discusses its relevance for organizational life-worlds. With Merleau-Ponty, affects are interpreted as bodily and embodied inter-relational phenomena, which have specific pathic, ecstatic and emotional qualities. Relationally, they will be situated as “inter-affection” that are part of the inter-corporeality of the “Flesh” of wild being. Affect and inter-affectivity are then related to organizational life-worlds, through a critical exploration of different phenomena and effects generated by positive, negative and ambiguous dimensions. Finally, the potentials of (...)
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  • Getting Stuck: Temporal Desituatedness in Depression.Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):701-718.
    The DSM characterizes major depressive disorder partly in temporal terms: the depressive mood must last for at least two weeks, and also must impact the subject "most of the day, nearly every day." However, from the standpoint of phenomenological psychopathology, the long-lasting quality of the condition hardly captures the distinctiveness of depression. While the DSM refers to objective time as measured by clocks and calendars, what is especially striking about depression is the distortions to lived time that it involves. But (...)
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  • On Being Motivated.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
    Merleau-Ponty’s notion of being motivated or solicited to act has recently been the focus of extensive investigation, yet work on this topic has tended to take the general notion of being motivated for granted. In this paper, I shall outline an account of what it is to be motivated. In particular, I shall focus on the relation between the affective character of states of being motivated and their intentional content, i.e. how things appear to the agent. Drawing on Husserl’s discussion (...)
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  • How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily?Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
    The long-standing debate between cognitive and feeling theories of emotion stems, in part, from the assumption that cognition and thought are abstract, intellectual, disembodied processes, and that bodily feelings are non-intentional and have no representational content. Working with this assumption has led many emotions theorists to neglect the way in which emotions are simultaneously bodily and cognitive-evaluative. Even hybrid theories, such as those set forth by Prinz and Barlassina and Newen, fail to account fully for how the cognitive and bodily (...)
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  • The Deep Bodily Roots of Emotion.Albert A. Johnstone - 2012 - Husserl Studies 28 (3):179-200.
    This article explores emotions and their relationship to ‘somatic responses’, i.e., one’s automatic responses to sensations of pain, cold, warmth, sudden intensity. To this end, it undertakes a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of the first-hand experience of eight basic emotions, briefly exploring their essential aspects: their holistic nature, their identifying dynamic transformation of the lived body, their two-layered intentionality, their involuntary initiation and voluntary espousal. The fact that the involuntary tensional shifts initiating emotions are irreplicatable voluntarily, is taken to show that (...)
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  • Affectivity and Moral Experience: An Extended Phenomenological Account.Anna Bortolan - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):471-490.
    The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between affectivity and moral experience from a phenomenological perspective. I will start by showing how in a phenomenologically oriented account emotions can be conceived as intentional evaluative feelings which play a role in both moral epistemology and the motivation of moral behaviour. I will then move to discuss a particular kind of affect, "existential feelings" (Ratcliffe in Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(8–10), 43–60, 2005, 2008), which has not been considered so (...)
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  • Emotional Intentionality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:251-269.
    This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship (...)
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  • Um sobretudo de argila: afetividade e normatividade na fenomenologia do corpo.Róbson Ramos dos Reis - 2019 - Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10 (1):124.
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  • Optimal Grip on Affordances in Architectural Design Practices: An Ethnography.Erik Rietveld & Anne Ardina Brouwers - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):545-564.
    In this article we move beyond the problematic distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ cognition by accounting for so-called ‘higher’ cognitive capacities in terms of skillful activities in practices, and in terms of the affordances exploited in those practices. Through ethnographic research we aim to further develop the new notion of skilled intentionality by turning to the phenomenon of the tendency towards an optimal grip on a situation in real-life situations in the field of architecture. Tending towards an optimal grip is (...)
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  • Being a Body and Having a Body. The Twofold Temporality of Embodied Intentionality.Maren Wehrle - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The body is both the subject and object of intentionality: qua Leib, it experiences worldly things and qua Körper, it is experienced as a thing in the world. This phenomenological differentiation forms the basis for Helmuth Plessner’s anthropological theory of the mediated or eccentric nature of human embodiment, that is, simultaneously we both are a body and have a body. Here, I want to focus on the extent to which this double aspect of embodiment relates to our experience of temporality. (...)
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  • Transformative Learning, Enactivism, and Affectivity.Michelle Maiese - 2017 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 36 (2):197-216.
    Education theorists have emphasized that transformative learning is not simply a matter of students gaining access to new knowledge and information, but instead centers upon personal transformation: it alters students’ perspectives, interpretations, and responses. How should learning that brings about this sort of self-transformation be understood from the perspectives of philosophy of mind and cognitive science? Jack Mezirow has described transformative learning primarily in terms of critical reflection, meta-cognitive reasoning, and the questioning of assumptions and beliefs. And within mainstream philosophy (...)
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  • An Enactivist Approach to Treating Depression: Cultivating Online Intelligence Through Dance and Music.Michelle Maiese - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    This paper utilizes the enactivist notion of ‘sense-making’ to discuss the nature of depression and examine some implications for treatment. As I understand it, sensemaking is fully embodied, fundamentally affective, and thoroughly embedded in a social environment. I begin by presenting an enactivist conceptualization of affective intentionality and describing how this general mode of intentional directedness to the world is disrupted in cases of major depressive disorder. Next, I utilize this enactivist framework to unpack the notion of ‘temporal desituatedness,’ and (...)
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  • Delusions Redux.Jennifer Radden - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):125-139.
    My response to the preceding essays begins with some preliminaries about my terminology, approach, and conception of rationality as a regulative ideal. I then comment on the Murphy's discussion about normal religious belief and religious delusions, and on causal assumptions challenged by Langdon's folies à deux. Responding to Gerrans's imagination-based account of delusion and Hohwy's discussion of illusions, I next try to envision what both doxastic and imagination-based approaches might have overlooked by asking whether there can be delusional feelings. Final (...)
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