Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Mind-Wandering and the Field of Consciousness.Peter Crout - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):7-33.
    In this article I develop a phenomenological model of the dynamics of mind-wandering based on Aron Gurwitsch's (1964) field theory of consciousness. Specifically, I articulate these dynamics in terms of conscious field transformations resulting from particular interactions between the attentional focus, contextual background, and non-contextual background -- structures that Gurwitsch understood as invariantly present. According to the model, during guided thought the conscious context that escorts the focus of attention behaves like an autonomous self-defining system, as the primary determinant of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Betwixt and Between: The Enculturated Predictive Processing Approach to Cognition.Regina E. Fabry - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2483-2518.
    Many of our cognitive capacities are the result of enculturation. Enculturation is the temporally extended transformative acquisition of cognitive practices in the cognitive niche. Cognitive practices are embodied and normatively constrained ways to interact with epistemic resources in the cognitive niche in order to complete a cognitive task. The emerging predictive processing perspective offers new functional principles and conceptual tools to account for the cerebral and extra-cerebral bodily components that give rise to cognitive practices. According to this emerging perspective, many (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Exceptional Experiences of Stable and Unstable Mental States, Understood From a Dual-Aspect Point of View.Harald Atmanspacher & Wolfgang Fach - 2019 - Philosophies 4 (1):7-0.
    Within a state-space approach endowed with a generalized potential function, mental states can be systematically characterized by their stability against perturbations. This approach yields three major classes of states: asymptotically stable categorial states, marginally stable non-categorial states and unstable acategorial states. The particularly interesting case of states giving rise to exceptional experiences will be elucidated in detail. Their proper classification will be related to Metzinger’s account of self-model and world-model, and empirical support for this classification will be surveyed. Eventually, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Content Internalism and Conceptual Engineering.Joey Pollock - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11587-11605.
    Cappelen proposes a radically externalist framework for conceptual engineering. This approach embraces the following two theses. Firstly, the mechanisms that underlie conceptual engineering are inscrutable: they are too complex, unstable and non-systematic for us to grasp. Secondly, the process of conceptual engineering is largely beyond our control. One might think that these two theses are peculiar to the Austerity Framework, or to metasemantic externalism more generally. However, Cappelen argues that there is no reason to think that internalism avoids either commitment. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Am I Self-Conscious?Karl Friston - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.
    Connecting human minds to various technological devices and applications through brain-computer interfaces affords intriguingly novel ways for humans to engage and interact with the world. Not only do BCIs play an important role in restorative medicine, they are also increasingly used outside of medical or therapeutic contexts. A striking peculiarity of BCI technology is that the kind of actions it enables seems to differ from paradigmatic human actions, because, effects in the world are brought about by devices such as robotic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Mental Action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Sense of Agency and the Epistemology of Thinking.Casey Doyle - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    This paper motivates a constraint on how to explain the “sense of agency” for conscious thinking. It argues that a prominent model fails to satisfy the constraint before sketching an alternative that does. On the alternative, punctate acts of conscious thinking, such as episodes of inner speech, are recognizable as our deeds because they are recognizable as parts of complex cognitive activities, which we know non-observationally in virtue of holding intentions to perform them.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • From filters to fillers: an active inference approach to body image distortion in the selfie era.Simon C. Tremblay, Safae Essafi Tremblay & Pierre Poirier - 2021 - AI and Society (1):33-48.
    Advances in artificial intelligence, as well as its increased presence in everyday life, have brought the emergence of many new phenomena, including an intriguing appearance of what seems to be a variant of body dysmorphic disorder, coined “Snapchat dysmorphia”. Body dysmorphic disorder is a DSM-5 psychiatric disorder defined as a preoccupation with one or more perceived defects or flaws in physical appearance that are not observable or appear slight to others. Snapchat dysmorphia is fueled by automated selfie filters that reflect (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sensing the Self in Spiritual Experience.V. Hari Narayanan - 2021 - Mind and Society 20 (1):25-40.
    The paper seeks to argue that the feeling of being part of a larger whole, considered to be a major feature of spiritual experience in some traditions, amounts to a change in the way the self is pre-reflectively understood. Further, the paper argues that some recent developments in the study of cognition support the case for such a revision in self-conception, and this can be used to build up a secular understanding of spirituality. The paper proceeds by making use of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • From Indian Philosophy to Cognitive Neuroscience: Two Empirical Case Studies for Ganeri's Self: Commentary on Jonardon Ganeri’s The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, & the First-Person Stance.Jennifer Windt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1721-1733.
    In this commentary, I confront Ganeri’s theory of self with two case studies from cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary consciousness research: mind wandering and full-body illusions. Together, these case studies suggest new questions and constraints for Ganeri's theory of self. Recent research on spontaneous thought and mind wandering raises questions about the transition from unconscious monitoring to the phenomenology of ownership and the first-person stance. Full-body illusions are relevant for the attenuation problem of how we distinguish between self and others. Discussing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Experience of Being Oneself in Memory: Exploring Sense of Identity via Observer Memory.Ying-Tung Lin - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):405-422.
    Every episodic memory entails a sense of identity, which allows us to mentally travel through time. There is a special way by which the subject who is remembering comes into contact with the self that is embedded in the episodic simulation of memory: we can directly and robustly experience the protagonist in memory as ourselves. This paper explores what constitutes such experience in memory. On the face of it, the issue may seem trivial: of course, we are able to entertain (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Can the Mind Wander Intentionally?Samuel Murray & Kristina Krasich - unknown - Mind and Language:1-22.
    Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Too Much or Too Little? Disorders of Agency on a Spectrum.Valentina Petrolini - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):79-99.
    Disorders of agency could be described as cases where people encounter difficulties in assessing their own degree of responsibility or involvement with respect to a relevant action or event. These disturbances in one’s sense of agency appear to be meaningfully connected with some mental disorders and with some symptoms in particular—i.e. auditory verbal hallucinations, thought insertion, pathological guilt. A deeper understanding of these experiences may thus contribute to better identification and possibly treatment of people affected by such disorders. In this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Commentary: The Myth of Cognitive Agency: Subpersonal Thinking as a Cyclically Recurring Loss of Mental Autonomy.Jonna Vance - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Visual Perspectives in Episodic Memory and the Sense of Self.Ying-Tung Lin - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reconsidering the Mind-Wandering Reader: Predictive Processing, Probability Designs, and Enculturation.Regina E. Fabry & Karin Kukkonen - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Spontaneous Cognition and Epistemic Agency in the Cognitive Niche.Regina E. Fabry - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Dynamical Relations in the Self-Pattern.Shaun Gallagher & Anya Daly - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Abstract: The notion of a self-pattern, as developed in the pattern theory of self, which holds that the self is best explained in terms of the kind of reality that pertains to a dynamical pattern, acknowledges the importance of neural dynamics, but also expands the account of self to extra-neural (embodied and enactive) dynamics. The pattern theory of self, however, has been criticized for failing to explicate the dynamical relations among elements of the self-pattern; as such, it seems to be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Breaking the Self.Wanja Wiese - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.
    Are there logically possible types of conscious experience that are nomologically impossible, given independently justified assumptions about the neural underpinnings of consciousness in human beings? In one sense, this is trivial: just consider the fact that the types of perceptual experiences we can have are limited by our sensory organs. But there may be non-trivial types of conscious experience that are impossible. For instance, if there is a basic type of self-consciousness, corresponding to a phenomenal property that is nomologically necessary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mind-Wandering is Unguided Attention: Accounting for the “Purposeful” Wanderer.Zachary Irving - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):547-571.
    Although mind-wandering occupies up to half of our waking thoughts, it is seldom discussed in philosophy. My paper brings these neglected thoughts into focus. I propose that mind-wandering is unguided attention. Guidance in my sense concerns how attention is monitored and regulated as it unfolds over time. Roughly speaking, someone’s attention is guided if she would feel pulled back, were she distracted from her current focus. Because our wandering thoughts drift unchecked from topic to topic, they are unguided. One motivation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • I'm Thinking Your Thoughts While I Sleep: Sense of Agency and Ownership Over Dream Thought.Melanie Rosen - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (3):326-339.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Problem of Mental Action.Thomas Metzinger - 2017 - Philosophy and Predicitive Processing.
    In mental action there is no motor output to be controlled and no sensory input vector that could be manipulated by bodily movement. It is therefore unclear whether this specific target phenomenon can be accommodated under the predictive processing framework at all, or if the concept of “active inference” can be adapted to this highly relevant explanatory domain. This contribution puts the phenomenon of mental action into explicit focus by introducing a set of novel conceptual instruments and developing a first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Can Science Explain Consciousness? Toward a Solution to the 'Hard Problem'.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can Science Explain Consciousness?Bruiger Dan - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct. Recommendations for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-Technology.Michael Madary & Thomas Metzinger - 2016 - Frontiers in Robotics and AI 3:1-23.
    The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • What Can Body Ownership Illusions Tell Us About Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood?Jakub Limanowski - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Hedonic Hotspots, Hedonic Potholes: Vedanā Revisited.Akincano M. Weber - 2018 - Contemporary Buddhism 19 (1):7-30.
    For the last 100 years vedanā – a key Buddhist term referring to a process instrumental in the arising of desire, grasping and identification – has been mostly translated as ‘feeling’ or as ‘sensation’. But is it really either? Informed by a review of the concept’s use in the Pali Suttas, the paper attempts to re-trace the term’s meaning in early Buddhist Psychology. The established renditions of ‘sensation’ or ‘feeling’ for vedanā are deemed misleading; it is suggested that they be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Mind‐Wandering: A Philosophical Guide.Zachary C. Irving & Aaron Glasser - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations