- A Cognitive Approach to the Earliest Art.Johan de Smedt & Helen de Cruz - 2011 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (4):379-389.details
|
|
Mathematical symbols as epistemic actions.Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):3-19.details
|
|
Concept individuation, possession conditions, and propositional attitudes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):140-66.details
|
|
Concepts and epistemic individuation.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.details
|
|
Modest Propositional Contents in Non-Human Animals.Laura Danón - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (5):93.details
|
|
How to perceive reasons.Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):77-88.details
|
|
To Trust or not to Trust? Children’s Social Epistemology.Fabrice Clément - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):531-549.details
|
|
Thinking with maps.Elisabeth Camp - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):145–182.details
|
|
Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.details
|
|
Analyticity and incorrigibility.Manuel Campos - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):689-708.details
|
|
Analyticity and Incorrigibility.Manuel Campos - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):689-708.details
|
|
How to Philosophically Tackle Kinds without Talking About ‘Natural Kinds’.Ingo Brigandt - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):356-379.details
|
|
Natural epistemology or evolved metaphysics? Developmental evidence for early-developed, intuitive, category-specific, incomplete, and stubborn metaphysical presumptions.Pascal Boyer - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):277 – 297.details
|
|
Natural epistemology or evolved metaphysics? Developmental evidence for early-developed, intuitive, category-specific, incomplete, and stubborn metaphysical presumptions.Pascal Boyer - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):277-297.details
|
|
The Use of Animal Models in Behavioural Neuroscience Research.B. Bovenkerk & F. Kaldewaij - unknowndetails
|
|
Précis of how children learn the meanings of words.Paul Bloom - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1095-1103.details
|
|
On going nowhere with our words: New skepticism about the philosophical method of cases.Avner Baz - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):64-83.details
|
|
Perceptual symbol systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.details
|
|
Perceptions of perceptual symbols.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):637-660.details
|
|
On the functional origins of essentialism.H. Clark Barrett - 2001 - [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 2 (1):1-30.details
|
|
On the functional orgins of essentialism.H. Clark Barrett - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (1):1-30.details
|
|
Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The epistemology of “On Sense and Reference”.Junyeol Kim - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-17.details
|
|
Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts.Gregory Salmieri - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburghdetails
|
|
The Ontogenesis of Trust.Fabrice Clément, Melissa Koenig & Paul Harris - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (4):360-379.details
|
|
The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought: A Psychological Perspective.Michael Murez, Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland - 2020 - In Rachel Goodman, James Genone & Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 107-142.details
|
|
Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.details
|
|
The complex first paradox Why do semantically thick concepts so early lexicalize as nouns?Markus Werning - 2008 - Interaction Studies 9 (1):67-83.details
|
|
Complex First? On the Evolutionary and Developmental Priority of Semantically Thick Words.Markus Werning - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):1096-1108.details
|
|
The plurality of concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.details
|
|
Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?Marius Usher - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):241-248.details
|
|
A Statistical Referential Theory of Content: Using Information Theory to Account for Misrepresentation.Marius Usher - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (3):311-334.details
|
|
A Neo-Kantian Account of Perception.Leslie Stevenson - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (3):411-431.details
|
|
Sortals for Dummies.John E. Sarnecki - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):145-164.details
|
|
The new associationism: A neural explanation of the predictive powers of the cerebral cortex. [REVIEW]Dan Ryder & Oleg Favorov - 2001 - Brain and Mind 2 (2):161-194.details
|
|
SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.Dan Ryder - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.details
|
|
Generalizations and kinds in natural science: the case of species.Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (2):230-255.details
|
|
Social categories in the making: construction or recruitment?Samuli Reijula - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12315-12330.details
|
|
Deferential concepts: A response to Woodfield.François Recanati - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):452–464.details
|
|
Learning Concepts: A Learning-Theoretic Solution to the Complex-First Paradox.Nina Laura Poth & Peter Brössel - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (1):135-151.details
|
|
Toward a theory of the empirical tracking of individuals: Cognitive flexibility and the functions of attention in integrated tracking.Nicolas J. Bullot - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):353-387.details
|
|
Response to Boyd's commentary.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):99-102.details
|
|
On swampkinds.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):103-17.details
|
|
Applying the causal theory of reference to intentional concepts.John Michael & Miles MacLeod - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):212-230.details
|
|
How Language Programs the Mind.Gary Lupyan & Benjamin Bergen - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):408-424.details
|
|
How Language Programs the Mind.Gary Lupyan & Benjamin Bergen - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (2):408-424.details
|
|
Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out?Guido Löhr - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):161-185.details
|
|
Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?Guido Löhr - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2171-2191.details
|
|
A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):1-17.details
|
|
Concepts are a functional kind. Comment on Machery's Doing Without Concepts.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):217-18.details
|
|