Is prostitution immoral? In this book, Rob Lovering argues that it is not. Offering a careful and thorough critique of the many―twenty, to be exact―arguments for prostitution's immorality, Lovering leaves no claim unchallenged. Drawing on the relevant literature along with his own creative thinking, Lovering offers a clear and reasoned moral defense of the world's oldest profession. Lovering demonstrates convincingly, on both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist grounds, that there is nothing immoral about prostitution between consenting adults. The legal implications of this (...) view are also brought to bear on the current discourse surrounding this controversial topic. (shrink)

In this short critical analysis, the author examines the recent argument by Moen in his article ‘Is Prostitution Harmful?' In highlighting why prostitution does not cause harm to either member involved in the act, Moen argues that prostitution is not an ethical concern. However, while Moen is able to clearly challenge contemporary objections to prostitution, the author of this review will suggest that Moen's argument is itself incomplete as it does not address essential key ontological issues. This critical analysis will (...) briefly suggest why this omission weakens Moen's argument. Finally, it will conclude with examining why prostitution differs substantially from other professions through the type of harm that it causes to the moral agents involved. (shrink)

The debate concerning prostitution is centered around two main views: the liberal view and the radical feminist view. The typical liberal view is associated with decriminalization and normalization of prostitution; radical feminism stands in favor of prohibition or abolition. Here, I argue that neither of the views is right. My argument does not depend on the plausible (or actual) side effects of prohibition, abolition, or normalization; rather, I am concerned with the ideals involved. I will concede to liberals their claim (...) that prostitution is not harmful in itself. Yet, I will argue that prostitution cannot be thought of as “just another job”. Even if prostitution is not harmful in itself, it can do much harm. I will argue that a policy of vigilance is the most adequate one to adopt with regard of prostitution, given the risk of harm associated with prostitution. A policy of vigilance tries to discriminate between those who take a certain course of action willingly and those who do not. It puts no restraints on those who exercise their genuine will, but protects those who are openly or subtly coerced. (shrink)

Criminalisation of prostitution, and minority rights for disabled persons, are important contemporary political issues. The article examines their intersection by analysing the conditions and arguments for making a legal exception for disabled persons to a general prohibition against purchasing sexual services. It explores the badness of prostitution, focusing on and discussing the argument that prostitution harms prostitutes, considers forms of regulation and the arguments for and against with emphasis on a liberty-based objection to prohibition, and finally presents and analyses three (...) arguments for a legal exception, based on sexual rights, beneficence, and luck egalitarianism, respectively. It concludes that although the general case for and against criminalisation is complicated there is a good case for a legal exception. (shrink)

I agree with Scott A Anderson1 and Rosalind J McDougall2 that many prostitutes suffer significant harms, and that these harms must be taken seriously. Having a background in public outreach for sex workers, I share this concern wholeheartedly.In the article to which Anderson and McDougall respond,3 I ask why prostitutes are harmed: are prostitutes harmed because prostitution itself is harmful or because of contingent ways in which prostitutes are socially and legally treated? This is an important question, since if the (...) latter is the case, then the widespread moral and legal campaign against prostitution, rather than being a legitimate response to something harmful, is itself the source of much suffering and distress. In my article, I argue at length that it is indeed our social and legal treatment of prostitutes that is the dominant source of harm.Neither Anderson nor McDougall seems to take issue with my rebuttal of the nine most central arguments in favour of the view that prostitution itself is harmful. They do, however, raise a number of more general issues, and I shall now address these.A worry raised by Anderson is that in defending the view that prostitution itself is not harmful, I am ‘abstracting away from key facts about the context in which prostitution takes place’, and as such, I ‘fail to recognize how contextual, historical and social’ prostitution really is. I think this is a good objection — so good, in fact, that I raise and discuss it in the article. I formulate the objection as follows: "[The objection] states that my argument is utopian: that prostitution is a complex practice deeply entrenched in a long line of other social and psychological issues, such as gender inequality, poverty, power hierarchies and exploitation, and that … ". (shrink)

In ‘Is prostitution harmful?’ I argue that if casual sex is acceptable, then so is prostitution.1 Anna Westin, in ‘The harms of prostitution: critiquing Moen's argument of no-harm’, raises four objections to my view.2 Let me reply to these in turn.Westin's first objection is that it is ‘fundamentally problematic [to] categorise sexual ethics into merely two types’, the type that accepts casual sex and the type that does not. The reason why, she explains, is that this ‘incompletely frames the contemporary (...) discourse in sexual ethics’. She points to the views of Linda McDowell, Roger Scruton, Raja Halwani and the Roman Catholic Church to illustrate the breadth of contemporary ethical theorising about sex.Westin is right that I do not provide an account of contemporary sexual ethics. Neither …. (shrink)

Moen targets a view about the intrinsic harmfulness of prostitution that he sees as widespread in healthcare, academia and public policy.1 He argues that the exchange of sex for money is not intrinsically harmful by systematically rejecting various possible proposed harms. He further suggests that it is the social context of discriminating laws and stigma that accounts for the harms experienced by prostitutes, rather than any intrinsic feature of exchanging sex for money.One striking aspect of his argument is the particular (...) way in which he characterises the common view about the harmfulness of prostitution. Consider the following two possible versions of the claim that prostitution is harmful: "The intrinsic claim: The exchange of sex for money is intrinsically harmful to the seller." "The contingent claim: Prostitutes are currently likely to experience significant harm."The intrinsic claim is …. (shrink)

I takt med sekulariseringen av Norge har den kristne bioetikken mistet innflytelse. For klassisk kristen etikk har det vært mange nederlag de siste tiårene. Men det har skjedd noe mer enn at klassiske kristne posisjoner har mistet tilslutning. De kristnes argumenter har også mistet appell og gjennomslagskraft i det offentlige rom, i en grad som ikke alene kan forklares med at antallet kristne synker. Artikkelen identifiserer fem hovedgrunner til at kristne argumenter i bioetikken ikke får gjennomslag i offentligheten: politisk liberalisme, (...) avvisningen av religiøs argumentasjon, avvisningen av unntaksløse moralske forbud, moralsk subjektivisme og relativisme, og avvisning av handlingers symbolverdi. Grunnene drøftes med eksempler fra offentlig debatt.Nøkkelord: bioetikk, kristen etikk, naturrett, politisk liberalismeEnglish summary: Christian bioethics on the defensiveIn Norway, Christian bioethics has lost influence in step with secularization. For classical Christian ethics there have been numerous defeats in recent decades. However, something more than a simple decline in support for classical Christian positions has taken place. Christian arguments have also lost appeal and impact in the public square, to a degree that cannot be explained merely by the falling rate of adherence to Christianity. The article identifies five major reasons why Christian arguments in the sphere of bioethics fail to have an impact in the public square: political liberalism, the rejection of religious argumentation, the rejection of moral absolutes, moral subjectivism and relativism, and the rejection of the symbolic value of actions. The reasons are discussed with examples from the public debate. (shrink)

There are few participants in academic or policy debates over prostitution who would disagree that steps should be taken to improve conditions for those working in prostitution; so Moen1 is in good and plentiful company with respect to his recommendations.I will focus here on the analysis leading up to his conclusions, and with whether it helps us understand why prostitution is so commonly harmful and what it would take to mitigate those harms.i On these matters I am dubious. The question (...) of whether or not prostitution is harmful would seem, manifestly, to be an empirical question, rather than a philosophical issue. I take it that Moen's aim is to clarify the evaluative task, and then to evaluate the arguments that can be made to show prostitution is harmful—tasks which philosophers can responsibly engage in. But I would suggest that Moen's approach to this particular subject oversimplifies it by abstracting away from key facts about the context in which prostitution takes place, and thus that it does not offer as strong a case for normalising prostitution as he hopes.The basic thesis of Moen's essay is that if casual sex is harmless , then the sale of casual sexual services for money is also harmless, or at …. (shrink)

In September 2015 a well-publicised Campaign Against Sex Robots (CASR) was launched. Modelled on the longer-standing Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the CASR opposes the development of sex robots on the grounds that the technology is being developed with a particular model of female-male relations (the prostitute-john model) in mind, and that this will prove harmful in various ways. In this chapter, we consider carefully the merits of campaigning against such a technology. We make three main arguments. First, we argue (...) that the particular claims advanced by the CASR are unpersuasive, partly due to a lack of clarity about the campaign’s aims and partly due to substantive defects in the main ethical objections put forward by campaign’s founder(s). Second, broadening our inquiry beyond the arguments proferred by the campaign itself, we argue that it would be very difficult to endorse a general campaign against sex robots unless one embraced a highly conservative attitude towards the ethics of sex, which is likely to be unpalatable to those who are active in the campaign. In making this argument we draw upon lessons from the campaign against killer robots. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that although a generalised campaign against sex robots is unwarranted, there are legitimate concerns that one can raise about the development of sex robots. (shrink)