Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Caring animals and care ethics.Birte Wrage - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37.
    Are there nonhuman animals who behave morally? In this paper I answer this question in the affirmative by applying the framework of care ethics to the animal morality debate. According to care ethics, empathic care is the wellspring of morality in humans. While there have been several suggestive analyses of nonhuman animals as empathic, much of the literature within the animal morality debate has marginalized analyses from the perspective of care ethics. In this paper I examine care ethics to extract (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Ethics of Touch and the Importance of Nonhuman Relationships in Animal Agriculture.Steve Cooke - 2021 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 34 (2):1-20.
    Animal agriculture predominantly involves farming social animals. At the same time, the nature of agriculture requires severely disrupting, eliminating, and controlling the relationships that matter to those animals, resulting in harm and unhappiness for them. These disruptions harm animals, both physically and psychologically. Stressed animals are also bad for farmers because stressed animals are less safe to handle, produce less, get sick more, and produce poorer quality meat. As a result, considerable efforts have gone into developing stress-reduction methods. Many of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Animal cognition.Kristin Andrews - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Entry for the Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Animal moral psychologies.Susana Monsó & Kristin Andrews - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Caring animals and the ways we wrong them.Birte Wrage & Judith Benz-Schwarzburg - 2023 - Biology and Philosophy 38 (4):1-23.
    Many nonhuman animals have the emotional capacities to form caring relationships that matter to them, and for their immediate welfare. Drawing from care ethics, we argue that these relationships also matter as objectively valuable states of affairs. They are part of what is good in this world. However, the value of care is precarious in human-animal interactions. Be it in farming, research, wildlife ‘management’, zoos, or pet-keeping, the prevention, disruption, manipulation, and instrumentalization of care in animals by humans is ubiquitous. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Darwin and the golden rule: how to distinguish differences of degree from differences of kind using mechanisms.Paul Thagard - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (6):1–18.
    Darwin claimed that human and animal minds differ in degree but not in kind, and that ethical principles such as the Golden Rule are just an extension of thinking found in animals. Both claims are false. The best way to distinguish differences in degree from differences in kind is by identifying mechanisms that have emergent properties. Recursive thinking is an emergent capability found in humans but not in other animals. The Golden Rule and some other ethical principles such as Kant’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Badness of Death for Sociable Cattle.Daniel Story - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-20.
    I argue that death can be (and sometimes is) bad for cattle because it destroys relationships that are valuable for cattle for their own sake. The argument relies on an analogy between valuable human relationships and relationships cattle form with conspecifics. I suggest that the reasons we have for thinking that certain rich and meaningful human relationships are valuable for their own sake should also lead us to think that certain cattle relationships are valuable for their own sake. And just (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Socrates in the fMRI Scanner: The Neurofoundations of Morality and the Challenge to Ethics.Jon Rueda - 2021 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (4):606-612.
    The neuroscience of ethics is allegedly having a double impact. First, it is transforming the view of human morality through the discovery of the neurobiological underpinnings that influence moral behavior. Secondly, some neuroscientific findings are radically challenging traditional views on normative ethics. Both claims have some truth but are also overstated. In this article, the author shows that they can be understood together, although with different caveats, under the label of ‘neurofoundationalism’. Whereas the neuroscientific picture of human morality is undoubtedly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Why Care About Sustainable AI? Some Thoughts From The Debate on Meaning in Life.Markus Rüther - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (1):1-19.
    The focus of AI ethics has recently shifted towards the question of whether and how the use of AI technologies can promote sustainability. This new research question involves discerning the sustainability of AI itself and evaluating AI as a tool to achieve sustainable objectives. This article aims to examine the justifications that one might employ to advocate for promoting sustainable AI. Specifically, it concentrates on a dimension of often disregarded reasons — reasons of “meaning” or “meaningfulness” — as discussed more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nonhuman Value: A Survey of the Intrinsic Valuation of Natural and Artificial Nonhuman Entities.Andrea Owe, Seth D. Baum & Mark Coeckelbergh - 2022 - Science and Engineering Ethics 28 (5):1-29.
    To be intrinsically valuable means to be valuable for its own sake. Moral philosophy is often ethically anthropocentric, meaning that it locates intrinsic value within humans. This paper rejects ethical anthropocentrism and asks, in what ways might nonhumans be intrinsically valuable? The paper answers this question with a wide-ranging survey of theories of nonhuman intrinsic value. The survey includes both moral subjects and moral objects, and both natural and artificial nonhumans. Literatures from environmental ethics, philosophy of technology, philosophy of art, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Meaning in Life in AI Ethics—Some Trends and Perspectives.Sven Nyholm & Markus Rüther - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (2):1-24.
    In this paper, we discuss the relation between recent philosophical discussions about meaning in life (from authors like Susan Wolf, Thaddeus Metz, and others) and the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI). Our goal is twofold, namely, to argue that considering the axiological category of meaningfulness can enrich AI ethics, on the one hand, and to portray and evaluate the small, but growing literature that already exists on the relation between meaning in life and AI ethics, on the other hand. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Casting Justice Before Swine: Late Mediaeval Pig Trials as Instances of Human Exceptionalism.Sven Gins - 2023 - Sophia 62 (4):631-663.
    In recent years, several cases about the legal personhood of nonhuman animals garnered global attention, e.g. the recognition of ‘basic rights’ for the Argentinian great apes Sandra and Cecilia. Legal scholars have embraced the animal turn, blurring the once sovereign boundaries between persons and objects, recognising nonhuman beings as legal subjects. The zoonotic origins of the Covid-19 pandemic stress the urgency of establishing ‘global animal law’ and deconstructing anthropocentrism. To this end, it is vital to also consider the extensive premodern (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Sentience and the Primordial ‘We’: Contributions to Animal Ethics from Phenomenology and Buddhist Philosophy.Anya Daly - 2023 - Environmental Values 32 (2):215-236.
    This paper explores the ontological bases for ethical behaviour between human animals and non-human animals drawing on phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy. Alongside Singer and utilitarianism, I argue that ethical behaviour regarding animals is most effectively justified and motivated by considerations of sentience. Nonetheless, utilitarianism misses crucial aspects of sentience. Buddhist ethics is from the beginning focused on all sentient beings, not solely humans. This inclusivity, and refined interrogations of suffering, means it can furnish more nuanced understandings of sentience. For phenomenology, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How dogs perceive humans and how humans should treat their pet dogs: Linking cognition with ethics.Judith Benz-Schwarzburg, Susana Monsó & Ludwig Huber - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Humans interact with animals in numerous ways and on numerous levels. We are indeed living in an “animal”s world,’ in the sense that our lives are very much intertwined with the lives of animals. This also means that animals, like those dogs we commonly refer to as our pets, are living in a “human’s world” in the sense that it is us, not them, who, to a large degree, define and manage the interactions we have with them. In this sense, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Practice‐Focused Case for Animal Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (2):226-243.
    Considerations of nonhuman animal moral agency typically base their reasoning and (very often negative) verdict on a capacity‐focused approach to moral agency. According to this approach, an entity is a moral agent if it has certain intrapersonal features or capacities, typically in terms of conscious reflection and deliberation. According to a practice‐focused notion of moral agency, however, an entity is a moral agent in virtue of being a participant of a moral responsibility practice (MRP). I argue that a practice‐focused approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Re-framing the debate over animal morality.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2020 - EurSafe Newsletter 22 (1):3-6.
    Is morality uniquely human or does morality exist in at least some non-human animals? Are animals full-fledged moral creatures or do they merely exhibit proto-morality—evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article? Such questions, prompted by remarkable advances in empirical research into the social and emotional lives of non-human animals, have aroused much recent interest amongst scientists, philosophers, and in the popular media, not least for their apparent bearing on questions of human uniqueness, evolution, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • For their own good? The unseen harms of disenhancing farmed animals.Susana Monsó & Sara Hintze - forthcoming - In Cheryl Abbate & Christopher Bobier (eds.), New Omnivorism and Strict Veganism: Critical Perspectives. Routledge.
    In recent years, some ethicists have defended that we should genetically engineer farmed animals to diminish or eliminate their capacity to experience negative affective states, a process known as disenhancement that would, according to these authors, result in a situation that is better than the status quo. While we agree with this overall assessment, we believe that it is a mistake to defend disenhancement as a good solution to farmed animals’ plight. This is because disenhancement entails some generally unseen harms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    Can nonhuman animals and artificial intelligence (AI) entities be attributed moral agency? The general assumption in the philosophical literature is that moral agency applies exclusively to humans since they alone possess free will or capacities required for deliberate reflection. Consequently, only humans have been taken to be eligible for ascriptions of moral responsibility in terms of, for instance, blame or praise, moral criticism, or attributions of vice and virtue. Animals and machines may cause harm, but they cannot be appropriately ascribed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The alchemy of suffering in the laboratory of the world: Vedāntic Hindu engagements with the affliction of animals.Akshay Gupta & Ankur Barua - 2023 - Religious Studies 59 (S1):82-95.
    Traditionally, the problem of evil, in its various formulations, has been one of the strongest objections against perfect being theism. In the voluminous literature on this problem, the motif of evil has usually been discussed with respect to human flourishing. In recent decades more focused attention has been paid to animal suffering and the philosophical problems that such suffering poses for perfect being theists. However, this growing body of literature, in Anglo-American philosophical milieus, is largely aimed at sketching a specifically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark