Abstract Impossible fictions have lessons to teach us about linguistic representation, about mental content and concepts, and about uses of conceivability in epistemology. An adequate theory of impossible fictions may require theories of meaning that can distinguish between different impossibilities; a theory of conceptual truth that allows us to make useful sense of a variety of conceptual falsehoods; and a theory of our understanding of necessity and possibility that permits impossibilities to be conceived. After discussing these questions, strategies for resisting (...) the picture of impossible fictions presented here and in Part I are discussed. Perhaps apparently impossible fictions describe possibilities after all; or perhaps impossible fictions are all trivial; or perhaps some apparently intelligible impossible fictions are unintelligible after all. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a close reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on inconsistency, mostly as they appear in the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. I focus especially on an objection to Wittgenstein's view given by Alan Turing, who attended the lectures, the so-called ‘falling bridges’-objection. Wittgenstein's position is that if contradictions arise in some practice of language, they are not necessarily fatal to that practice nor necessitate a revision of that practice. If we then assume that we have adopted (...) a paraconsistent logic, Wittgenstein's answer to Turing is that if we run into trouble building our bridge, it is either because we have made a calculation mistake or our calculus does not actually describe the phenomenon it is intended to model. The possibility of either kind of error is not particular to contradictions nor inconsistency, and thus contradictions do not have any special status as a thing to be avoided. (shrink)

Ultralogic as Universal? is a seminal text in non-classcial logic. Richard Routley presents a hugely ambitious program: to use an 'ultramodal' logic as a universal key, which opens, if rightly operated, all locks. It provides a canon for reasoning in every situation, including illogical, inconsistent and paradoxical ones, realized or not, possible or not. A universal logic, Routley argues, enables us to go where no other logic—especially not classical logic—can. Routley provides an expansive and singular vision of how a universal (...) logic might one day solve major problems in set theory, arithmetic, linguistics, physics, and more. It circulated in typescript in the late 1970s before appearing as the Appendix to Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. With engaging, forceful prose, unsparing criticism of entrenched institutions, and many tantalizing proof sketches, Ultralogic? has had a major influence on the development of paraconsistent and relevant logic. This new edition makes this work available for a modern audience, newly typeset and corrected, along with extensive notes, and new commentary essays. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits ([Maddy, 2017]). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of 'multiversism', and then I proceed to analyse Maddy's concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics , in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of the multiverse seems to (...) be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to Maddy's concerns based on a careful analysis of 'multiverse practice'. (shrink)

This paper examines truth diagrams for some non-classical, modal and dynamic logics. Truth diagrams are diagrammatic and visual ways to represent logical truth akin to truth tables, developed by Peter C.-H. Cheng. Currently, it is only given for classical propositional logic. In this paper, we establish truth diagrams for Priest's Logic of Paradox, Belnap–Dunn's Four-Valued Logic, MacColl's Connexive Logic, Bochvar–Halldén's Logic of Non-Sense, Carnielli–Coniglio's logic of formal inconsistency as well as classical modal logic and its dynamic extension to shed light (...) on the semantic behaviour of some non-classical and modal logics. (shrink)

The pluralist sheds the more traditional ideas of truth and ontology. This is dangerous, because it threatens instability of the theory. To lend stability to his philosophy, the pluralist trades truth and ontology for rigour and other ‘fixtures’. Fixtures are the steady goal posts. They are the parts of a theory that stay fixed across a pair of theories, and allow us to make translations and comparisons. They can ultimately be moved, but we tend to keep them fixed temporarily. Apart (...) from considering rigour of proof as a fixture, I discuss fixed models, invariant notions and fixed information about objects across theories. There are other fixtures, but it is enough to start with these. (shrink)

A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the sensory receptors. According to the active-externalist theory of perception, amodal perception depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper focuses on amodal visual perception and presents a counter-example to the idea that active-externalism can account for amodal perception. The counterexample involves the experience of (...) so-called ‘impossible objects’, objects experienced in perceptual character as having geometrical properties that no physically real object can have. (shrink)

This paper defends a reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics in the Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics as a radical conventionalist one, whereby our agreement about the particular case is constitutive of our mathematical practice and ‘the logical necessity of any statement is a direct expression of a convention’ (Dummett 1959, p. 329). -/- On this view, mathematical truths are conceptual truths and our practices determine directly for each mathematical proposition individually whether it is true or false. Mathematical truths (...) are thus not consequences of a prior adoption of a convention or rules as orthodox conventionalism has it. -/- The goal of the paper is not merely exegetical, however, and argues that radical conventionalism can withstand some of the most difficult objections that have been brought forward against it, including those of Dummett himself, and thus that radical conventionalism has been prematurely excluded from consideration by philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

Mathematical pluralism notes that there are many different kinds of pure mathematical structures—notably those based on different logics—and that, qua pieces of pure mathematics, they are all equally good. Logical pluralism is the view that there are different logics, which are, in an appropriate sense, equally good. Some, such as Shapiro, have argued that mathematical pluralism entails logical pluralism. In this brief note I argue that this does not follow. There is a crucial distinction to be drawn between the preservation (...) of truth and the preservation of truth-in-a-structure; and once this distinction is drawn, this suffices to block the argument. The paper starts by clarifying the relevant notions of mathematical and logical pluralism. It then explains why the argument from the first to the second does not follow. A final section considers a few objections. (shrink)

This paper is a step toward showing what is achievable using non-classical metatheory—particularly, a substructural paraconsistent framework. What standard results, or analogues thereof, from the classical metatheory of first order logic can be obtained? We reconstruct some of the originals proofs for Completeness, Löwenheim-Skolem and Compactness theorems in the context of a substructural logic with the naive comprehension schema. The main result is that paraconsistent metatheory can ‘re-capture’ versions of standard theorems, given suitable restrictions and background assumptions; but the shift (...) to non-classical logic may recast the meanings of these apparently ‘absolute’ theorems. (shrink)

This paper offers an inconsistent model of motion perception. It was prompted by work on inconsistent motion due to Hegel and, following him, Priest. But the paper skirts Hegel's full scale idealism, by proposing that the inconsistency is with the cognitive contents of motion perception. The paper draws on work in the psychology of perception, and in the theory of inconsistency. I begin by noting the prima facie argument that temporal change threatens inconsistency, and canvassing ways in which this might (...) be avoided. The orthodox reply to the prima facie argument is that one and the same thing can have different incompatible properties at different times. This is plausible when applied to motion in the physical world. However, applied to cognition, it can be seen that the phenomenon of phi or beta, combined with the mechanism of a Reichardt detector, lends support to one key step in the prima facie argument, namely re-identification over time. The inconsistency of the model is then seen to follow from application of the Fade Principle. Advantages of the model are stressed: including a simple explanation of the debilitating condition of akinetopsia, that is, motion blindness; and a suggestion as to how to account for the “moving now.”. (shrink)

Introduction to the Routley/Sylvan Issue.

In this paper, I compare how it is that inconsistencies are handled in mathematics to how they are handled in chemistry. In mathematics, they are very precisely formulated and identified, unlike in chemistry. So the chemists can learn from the precision and the very well-worked out strategies developed by logicians and deployed by mathematicians to cope with inconsistency. Some lessons can also be learned by the mathematicians from the chemists. Mathematicians tend to be intolerant towards inconsistencies. There are some philosophers (...) of chemistry who attribute to chemists, collectively, a more tolerant attitude towards inconsistency, and so, mathematicians can learn from the chemists’ attitude to inform their choice of strategies. (shrink)