- Information and error.Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):74-75.details
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Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.details
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Sensations, error, and eliminative materialism.Mark Leon - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):83-95.details
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Characterising the senses.Mark Leon - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):243-70.details
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Dretske on knowledge.Keith Lehrer & Stewart Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):73-74.details
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Semantic information: Inference rules + memory.Michael Lebowitz - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):147-148.details
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Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States.Jane Suilin Lavelle - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.details
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Knowledge and the absolute.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):72-73.details
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Knowledge without Truth.Joseph Thomas Tolliver - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):29-51.details
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Functional architecture and free will.Henry E. Kyburg - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):143-146.details
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Do normative facts need to explain?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272.details
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On the generality of PARRY, Colby's paranoia model.Manfred Kochen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):540-541.details
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Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.details
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Heavy Duty Platonism.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1255-1270.details
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The elusive visual processing mode: Implications of the architecture/algorithm distinction.Roberta L. Klatzky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):142-143.details
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The devil, the details, and Dr. Dennett.Patricia Kitcher & Philip Kitcher - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):517.details
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The Epistemology of Folk Epistemology.Richard F. Kitchener - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):521-530.details
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Competence models are causal.David Kirsh - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
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Common sense and adult theory of communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.details
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Information, causality, and intentionality.David Kelley - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):147-147.details
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Reductionism and cognitive flexibility.Frank Keil - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):141-142.details
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On begging the question when naturalizing norms.Leonard D. Katz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-22.details
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The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.details
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“Good developmental sequence” and the paradoxes of children's skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.details
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Notational Variants and Invariance in Linguistics.Kent Johnson - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (2):162-186.details
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Gopnik's invention of intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.details
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Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.details
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Eliminativism, meaning, and qualitative states.Henry Jacoby - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (March):257-70.details
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Departing from consequentialism versus departing from decision theory.Frank Jackson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-21.details
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Colby's paranoia model: An old theory in a new frame?C. E. Izard & F. A. Masterson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):539-540.details
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Elicitation rules and incompatible goals.Julie R. Irwin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):20-21.details
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The borders of cognition.Earl Hunt - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):140-141.details
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The reification of the mind-body problem?Stewart H. Hulse - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):139-140.details
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Folk psychology is here to stay.Terence Horgan & James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.details
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Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'.Steven Horst - 1995 - Synthese 104 (1):123-45.details
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Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.details
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Towards a theory of cognition under a new control paradigm.C. A. Hooker, H. B. Penfold & R. J. Evans - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):71-88.details
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Restrictive Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Bennett Holman - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):61-70.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading.Mitchell Herschbach - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.details
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Computation, cognition, and representation.John Hell - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):139-139.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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Truth or consequences.John Heil - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):19-20.details
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Intentionality and the explanation of behavior.John Heil - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):146-147.details
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Psychology and computational architecture.John Haugeland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):138-139.details
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Book reviews. [REVIEW]W. F. G. Haselager, Andy Clark, Jay L. Garfield, Carol W. Slater, Louis C. Charland, Charles Siewert & Mark L. Johnson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):391-410.details
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What is the intentional stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
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Knowledge and the relativity of information.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):72-72.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Recent work on propositions.Peter Hanks - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.details
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