Switch to: References

Citations of:

Naïve validity

Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):819-841 (2017)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Naïve Truth and the Evidential Conditional.Andrea Iacona & Lorenzo Rossi - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (2):559-584.
    This paper develops the idea that valid arguments are equivalent to true conditionals by combining Kripke’s theory of truth with the evidential account of conditionals offered by Crupi and Iacona. As will be shown, in a first-order language that contains a naïve truth predicate and a suitable conditional, one can define a validity predicate in accordance with the thesis that the inference from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion is valid when the corresponding conditional is true. The validity predicate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The logics of a universal language.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio & Edson Bezerra - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-22.
    Semantic paradoxes pose a real threat to logics that attempt to be capable of expressing their own semantic concepts. Particularly, Curry paradoxes seem to show that many solutions must change our intuitive concepts of truth or validity or impose limits on certain inferences that are intuitively valid. In this way, the logic of a universal language would have serious problems. In this paper, we explore a different solution that tries to avoid both limitations as much as possible. Thus, we argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Towards a Non-classical Meta-theory for Substructural Approaches to Paradox.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (5):1007-1055.
    In the literature on self-referential paradoxes one of the hardest and most challenging problems is that of revenge. This problem can take many shapes, but, typically, it besets non-classical accounts of some semantic notion, such as truth, that depend on a set of classically defined meta-theoretic concepts, like validity, consistency, and so on. A particularly troubling form of revenge that has received a lot of attention lately involves the concept of validity. The difficulty lies in that the non-classical logician cannot (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Non-reflexivity and Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (1):201-218.
    We present a revenge argument for non-reflexive theories of semantic notions – theories which restrict the rule of assumption, or initial sequents of the form φ ⊩ φ. Our strategy follows the general template articulated in Murzi and Rossi [21]: we proceed via the definition of a notion of paradoxicality for non-reflexive theories which in turn breeds paradoxes that standard non-reflexive theories are unable to block.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Generalized Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177.
    Since Saul Kripke’s influential work in the 1970s, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that the main revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that they are unable to block.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Expressing logical disagreement from within.Andreas Fjellstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-33.
    Against the backdrop of the frequent comparison of theories of truth in the literature on semantic paradoxes with regard to which inferences and metainferences are deemed valid, this paper develops a novel approach to defining a binary predicate for representing the valid inferences and metainferences of a theory within the theory itself under the assumption that the theory is defined with a classical meta-theory. The aim with the approach is to obtain a tool which facilitates the comparison between a theory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Logical Nihilism and the Logic of ‘prem’.Andreas Fjellstad - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    As the final component of a chain of reasoning intended to take us all the way to logical nihilism, Russell (2018) presents the atomic sentence ‘prem’ which is supposed to be true when featuring as premise in an argument and false when featuring as conclusion in an argument. Such a sentence requires a non-reflexive logic and an endnote by Russell (2018) could easily leave the reader with the impression that going non-reflexive suffices for logical nihilism. This paper shows how one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations