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  1. Moral Conflict and the Logic of Rights.Robert Mullins - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    The paper proposes a revised logic of rights in order to accommodate moral conflict. There are often said to be two rival philosophical accounts of rights with respect to moral conflict. Specificationists about rights insist that rights cannot conflict, since they reflect overall deontic conclusions. Generalists instead argue that rights reflect pro tanto constraints on behaviour. After offering an overview of the debate between generalists and specificationists with respect to rights, I outline the challenge of developing a logic of rights-reasoning (...)
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  • Which Moral Requiriments Does Constituvism Support?W. Davis Ryan - unknown
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  • From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia.Dominik Klein & Alessandra Marra - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-44.
    This paper focuses on the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for (...)
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  • Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.
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  • Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.
    One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic (...)
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  • Contrary-to-Duty Reasoning: A Categorical Approach.Clayton Peterson - 2015 - Logica Universalis 9 (1):47-92.
    This paper provides an analysis of contrary-to-duty reasoning from the proof-theoretical perspective of category theory. While Chisholm’s paradox hints at the need of dyadic deontic logic by showing that monadic deontic logics are not able to adequately model conditional obligations and contrary-to-duties, other arguments can be objected to dyadic approaches in favor of non-monotonic foundations. We show that all these objections can be answered at one fell swoop by modeling conditional obligations within a deductive system defined as an instance of (...)
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  • Requirements, Oughts, Intentions.John Horty - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):220-229.
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