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  1. Pyrrhonian Scepticism, the Infinite Regress of Reasons, and Ancient Infinitism.Tamer Nawar - 2023 - Rhizomata 10 (2):283-306.
    In this paper, I examine how the Mode of Infinite Regress functions in Pyrrhonian scepticism. I argue that it is used both to generate an infinite regress of reasons and to show that such infinite regresses are epistemically defective. I clarify precisely how this occurs while examining the Mode’s efficaciousness and whether ancient philosophers might have accepted infinite regresses of reasons. I ultimately argue that they would not for reasons which have hitherto not been adequately appreciated and which shed further (...)
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  • Socrates, Thrasymachus, and Competition among the Unjust: Republic 1.349b–350c.Nicholas R. Baima - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (1):1-23.
    In Republic 1, Thrasymachus makes the radical claim that being just is ‘high-minded simplicity’ and being unjust is ‘good judgment’ (348c–e). Because injustice involves benefiting oneself, while justice involves benefiting others, the unjust are wise and good and the just are foolish and bad (348d–e). The “greedy craftsperson” argument (1.349b–350c) attempts to show that the unjust person's desire to outdo or have more than ( pleon echein) everyone is a symptom of her ignorance. Many commentaries have found the argument problematic (...)
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  • Do the wise always succeed? A split-level reading of Euthydemus 278–282.Matthew Matherne - 2024 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (5):933-954.
    At Euthydemus 278–282, Socrates produces an argument that has almost universally been agreed to entail that wisdom is sufficient for happiness, necessary for happiness, or both. According to these standard readings, this is because Socrates ties wisdom to correct use of one's assets. Since wisdom is necessary or sufficient for correct use and correct use is necessary or sufficient for happiness, wisdom bears the same relation(s) to happiness, mutatis mutandis. I propose a split-level reading of this passage. On the level (...)
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  • A consistência das teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça no livro I da República de Platão.Luiz Maurício Bentim da Rocha Menezes - 2020 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 30:e03001.
    A discussão entre Trasímaco e Sócrates no Livro I da República de Platão dá vigor à questão da justiça iniciada com Céfalo. Trasímaco é um personagem importante da obra, pois vai relacionar a justiça ao governo da cidade. Isso faz com que a justiça saia da esfera individual e entre na esfera pública. Em nosso artigo, pretendemos verificar as teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça e se estas são consistentes entre si. O problema da consistência das teses é antigo entre (...)
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