People can be outraged over, say, mismanagement or fraud and motivated to address such problems; they can, however, also be angry and lash out against the innocent. In addition to such unpredictability, angry people can seem literally out of their mind. My aim is to render anger intelligible and productive from a social epistemological perspective: epistemological because I assume that anger involves value recognition and arouses reflection; social because I assume that the related values and inquiries involve questions of justice (...) and/or morality. I believe that value disagreements are set up at cross purposes if we disqualify the emotional reactions of those whom we judge too unpleasant to understand. However, I also believe that we should not take anger at face value. My proposal is pragmatic for two reasons. First, and in line with classical pragmatist tenets about the role of doubt and other emotions in reasoning, it is pragmatic because I think that anger results from moral and political uncertainty and leads to a failure to understand one another and, hence, to a failure to act together. Second, my proposal is more concerned with what could be made of anger rather than focussing on what anger essentially is. In sum, I suggest that communities can regulate and use the variety of angry experiences in situations of uncertainty and conflict about moral and political values; that would be “passionate disagreement.” I explain four pragmatic considerations that go along with it and address three problems one might raise in response. (shrink)

Responding to Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage, I discuss how the book touches on the difficulties of disentangling emotions and their expressions. Then I suggest two ways in which destructive rage might be good, one on Kantian grounds and another via extension from experience. Finally, I raise the issue of whether there might be other Lordean emotions.

This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim (...) it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other. (shrink)

A microaggression is a small insulting act made disproportionately harmful by its part in an oppressive pattern of similar insults. How should you respond when made the victim of a microaggression? In this paper I survey several morally salient factors, including effects upon victims, perpetrators, and third parties. I argue, contrary to popular views, that ‘growing a thicker skin’ is not good advice nor is expressing reasonable anger always the best way to contribute to confronting oppression. Instead, appropriately responding to (...) microaggression involves difficult application of practical wisdom that does not easily fall under a simple prescription. (shrink)

Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral emotions which in fact exhibit significant unity.

While blame is not a difficult practice to defend, in part because of its ineradicability in our moral lives, angry blame has been a tougher sell. Critics of angry blame cast it as an unnecessary, punitive, or unproductive practiceâone that should be either avoided or abandoned altogether. Against these views, I argue that anger has positive moral value and should remain on the table in our blaming practices. The argument proceeds by identifying a specific mode of angry blameâwhat I call (...) âauthority-focused resentmentââwhich is both apt and uniquely valuable in cases in which agentsâ standing as equals is under threat. Insofar as anger has value in these cases it should not be dismissed wholesale in favor of other blaming alternatives, as angerâs staunchest critics would recommend. For all the virtues of anger, it is not equally accessible to all. In final chapter of the project, I identify a distinct kind of harm that happens to oppressed agents when their anger fails to receive uptake. While feminist accounts of angerâs dismissal have tended to focus on its epistemic dimensions, I shift to consider the damage to oppressed subjectsâ moral agency. I argue that what is going on in the dismissal of marginalized agentsâ anger is not merely the loss of knowledge or the dismissal of testimony. Instead, we need a different paradigm to conceptualize the dismissal and its harms. If we understand angry blame as an invocation or an assertion of authority, then its dismissal is a refusal to comply and to recognize our authority as subjectsâan altogether different problem. (shrink)