- Moralische Verantwortung für fahrlässiges Handeln.Philipp Schwind - forthcoming - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung.details
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Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
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Fit-Related Reasons to Inquire.Genae Matthews - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Partiality.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - In Mathias Steup (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging.J. Spencer Atkins - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-28.details
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Instrumentalism, Moral Encroachment, and Epistemic Injustice.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Moral Encroachment under Moral Uncertainty.Boris Babic & Zoë Johnson King - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.details
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Just Probabilities.Chad Lee-Stronach - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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The Ethics of Belief (3rd edition).Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships.Andreas Bengtson & Søren Flinch Midtgaard - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-32.details
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Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging.Z. Quanbeck - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):2955-2975.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence.Caroline von Klemperer - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (7).details
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Imagining in Oppressive Contexts, or What’s Wrong with Blackface?Robin Zheng & Nils-Hennes Stear - 2023 - Ethics 133 (3):381-414.details
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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Gender and first-person authority.Gus Turyn - 2023 - Synthese 201 (122):1-19.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.details
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Defining Wokeness.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (3):321-338.details
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Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment.Julius Schönherr - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26:53-71.details
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Doxastic Harm.Anne Baril - 2022 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46:281-306.details
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When to Psychologize.A. K. Flowerree - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):968-982.details
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Rumination and Wronging: The Role of Attention in Epistemic Morality.Catharine Saint-Croix - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):491-514.details
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Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling.Lisa Cassell - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1759-1779.details
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The Importance of Forgetting.Rima Basu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):471-490.details
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The logic of challenging research into bias and social disparity.Regina Rini - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45.details
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Obligations of feeling.Mario Attie-Picker - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1282-1297.details
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Prejudiced beliefs based on the evidence: responding to a challenge for evidentialism.Anna Brinkerhoff - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14317-14331.details
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Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2475-2505.details
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Accuracy, probabilism, and the insufficiency of the alethic.Corey Dethier - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2285-2301.details
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The Ethics of Expectations.Rima Basu - 2023 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol 13. Oxford University Press. pp. 149-169.details
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Epistemic Norms, the False Belief Requirement, and Love.J. Spencer Atkins - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (3):289-309.details
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Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law.Renée Jorgensen - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):1-17.details
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Time discounting, consistency, and special obligations: a defence of Robust Temporalism.Harry R. Lloyd - 2021 - Global Priorities Institute, Working Papers 2021 (11):1-38.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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Against normativism about mental attitudes.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):295-311.details
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Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.details
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Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory.Erin Beeghly - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):547-563.details
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On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View.Catherine Rioux - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):247-264.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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Moral Encroachment, Wokeness, and the Epistemology of Holding.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):86-100.details
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Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties are not Epistemic Duties.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact.Paul Silva Jr & Eyal Tal - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Are Algorithms Value-Free?Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2023 - Journal Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):1-35.details
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A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.details
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Algorithmic bias: on the implicit biases of social technology.Gabbrielle Johnson - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9941-9961.details
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What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism?Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 132–150.details
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