Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience

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Abstract
Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral emotions which in fact exhibit significant unity.
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First archival date: 2019-08-02
Latest version: 4 (2019-12-31)
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2019-08-02

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