Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Our moral experience of the world comes in many flavors. Is there any phenomenal unity definitive of moral experience? Several philosophers have contested this, notably Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that paying close phenomenological attention to our moral emotions, and to what separates them from other emotions, paves the way to a promising hypothesis about the unity of moral experience.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-08-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
144 ( #22,603 of 43,981 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
144 ( #2,995 of 43,981 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.