- Projectivism and phenomenal presence.Derek H. Brown - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 226-251.details
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Introduction to the Philosophy of Colour.Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson - 2017 - In Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge.details
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Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.details
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How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):127-142.details
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Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (1):73-89.details
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.details
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Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.details
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Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.details
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Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity.Don Dedrick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Against intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279-304.details
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Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.details
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Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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Color as a factor analytic approximation to nature.Adam Reeves - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-46.details
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Do metamers matter?Martin Hahn - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):30-31.details
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How can we discover the contents of experience?Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):127-42.details
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Qualia.Ned Block - 1987 - In Richard Langton Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Shoemaker on phenomenal content.Brad Thompson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.details
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Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.details
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An account of color without a subject?Erik Myin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):42-43.details
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Intrinsic phenomenal properties in color science: A reply to Peter Ross.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.details
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Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates.Richard M. Warren - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):51-51.details
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Beautiful red squares.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.details
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Color realism and color illusions.Dejan Todorovic - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):49-50.details
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Color: A vision scientist's perspective.Davida Y. Teller - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):48-49.details
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Knowledge of the World 1.Galen Strawson - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):146-175.details
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The Character of Color Terms : A Materialist View.Wolfgang Spohn - unknowndetails
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How to understand the foundations of empirical belief in a coherentist way.Wolfgang Spohn - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):22–40.details
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Causation, Coherence and Concepts : a Collection of Essays.Wolfgang Spohn - unknowndetails
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Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context.Michael E. Rudd - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-47.details
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The Causal Role of Consciousness in a Physical World.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):379-404.details
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Kripke, Chalmers and the Immediate Phenomenal Quality of Pain.Jessica Rae Owensby-Sandifer - unknowndetails
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Spatial position and perceived color of objects.Romi Nijhawan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):43-44.details
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A defense of the knowledge argument.John Martin DePoe - unknowndetails
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Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies.Lieven Decock & Jaap van Brakel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):27-28.details
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Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):25-26.details
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The knowledge argument, abilities, and metalinguistic beliefs.Uwe Meyer - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):325-347.details
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Clarifying the problem of color realism.Barry Maund - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):40-41.details
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Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?Rainer Mausfeld & Reinhard Niederée - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42.details
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Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science.Mohan Matthen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):39-40.details
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Surface color perception in constrained environments.Laurence T. Maloney - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):38-39.details
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La conscience, naturelle et artificielle.Bruce J. MacLennan - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):401-433.details
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Consciousness: Natural and Artificial.Bruce J. MacLennan - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):401-433.details
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Color as a material, not an optical, property.Bruce J. MacLennan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):37-38.details
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Olive green or chestnut brown?Rolf G. Kuehni - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):35-36.details
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