- Luminosity Regained.Selim Berker - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-22.details
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Foundational beliefs and the structure of justification.Kenneth Hobson - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.details
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The anti-zombie argument.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666.details
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Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.details
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Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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(2 other versions)Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.details
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That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.details
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Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(2 other versions)The components of content.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access.Jonathan Ellis - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.details
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An argument against spectrum inversion.Pär Sundström - 2002 - In Sten Lindström & Pär Sundström (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Umeå: Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå University. pp. 65--94.details
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Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):203-213.details
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(1 other version)Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Acquaintance and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 16-43.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.details
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Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies.Torin Alter - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):91-101.details
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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
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Turning Hard Problems on their Heads.Daniel D. Hutto - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88.details
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Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(6 other versions)Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Ted A. Warfield & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.details
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The Stalemate between Causal and Constitutive Accounts of Introspective Knowledge by Acquaintance.Jacopo Pallagrosi & Bruno Cortesi - forthcoming - Argumenta.details
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Phenomenal Knowledge, Imagination, and Hermeneutical Injustice.Martina Fürst - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Premium Economy: A Transparency Account of Knowledge of Perception.Shao-Pu Kang - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
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Of the perfect and the ordinary: Indistinguishability and hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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How to Know That You’re Not a Zombie.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Phänomenale Begriffe.Martina Fürst - 2019 - In Vera Hoffmann-Kolss & Nicole Rathgeb (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. J.B. Metzler. pp. 1-11..details
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What Forms Could Introspective Systems Take? A Research Programme.François Kammerer & Keith Frankish - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (9):13-48.details
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The Conscious Theory of Higher-Orderness.Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
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Implicit Bias and Qualiefs.Martina Fürst - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-34.details
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L'accointance entre omniscience et omnipotence.Matthias Michel - forthcoming - Klesis.details
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Modal Idealism.David Builes - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
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Knowing What It's Like.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):187-209.details
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(1 other version)Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness.Anna Giustina - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 4.details
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(1 other version)On group background beliefs.Nathan Lauffer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):473-485.details
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Groups that fly blind.Jared Peterson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.details
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Relational Troubles Structuralist Worries for an Epistemology of Powers-Based Modality.Giacomo Giannini & Tom Schoonen - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1162-1182.details
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On Being a Lonely Brain-in-a-Vat: Structuralism, Solipsism, and the Threat from External World Skepticism.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.details
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No Such Thing as Too Many Minds.Luke Roelofs - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):131-146.details
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On Being Internally the Same.Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. OUP.details
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Comments on Smithies.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-8.details
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Bracketing: A Phenomenological Theory Applied Through Transpersonal Reflexivity.Viktor Dörfler & Marc Stierand - 2021 - Journal of Organizational Change Management 34 (4):778-793.details
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Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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Objective Phenomenology.Andrew Y. Lee - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1197–1216.details
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Goff’s revelation thesis and the epistemology of colour discrimination.Gerrit Neels - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14371-14382.details
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Introspective knowledge by acquaintance.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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The Ethics of Attention: an argument and a framework.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Introspection and Belief: Failures of Introspective Belief Formation.Chiara Caporuscio - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):165-184.details
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